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Abstract: 
 
The increasing frequency and economic losses from natural disasters within the 
framework of decreasing agricultural prices and trade liberalization is becoming crucial 
in increasing poverty in the Mexican rural economy. During the past two decades, the 
governmental withdrawal from supporting the agricultural sector with investments in 
physical, financial and logistic instruments continues to stress agricultural livelihoods, as 
current private mechanisms have not replaced them effectively. It has contributed to 
making the agricultural sector particularly vulnerable to a number of hazards as it has 
weakened economic agents’ response and impeded assets accumulation. This dissertation 
identifies economic vulnerability to natural and economic hazards in order to assess 
public and private coping capacity, and provides a conceptual framework and economic 
theory that supports the overall approach and employed methodologies. It is based on 
quantitative and qualitative research methods, and makes use of econometric analysis and 
stakeholders’ views aimed at finding feasible solutions. Further, this dissertation offers a 
spatial model that can support policy-decision-making for the creation of differential 
investments in productive infrastructure, as well as financial instruments to reduce 
current vulnerability and poverty throughout the national territory. 
 
During the past two decades, over 80% of total economic losses from weather-related 
disasters occurred in the agricultural sector. In the same period, mean weighted 
agricultural prices have decreased over 50% in real terms, and since 1996 a trade deficit 
has persisted in this sector. Currently, the insufficient credit access, low coverage of crop 
insurance, as well as the near lack of investments to expand irrigation and further 
productive infrastructure is sharpening the vulnerability of rural livelihoods. These facts 
explain why this sector produces only 4% of the GDP despite employing over 20% of the 
national workforce. These facts undermine farmers’ expectations of future incomes 
within the community, stimulating rural-urban out migration, which usually cannot be 
absorbed by the urban economy in sight of the modest industrial dynamism of the recent 
years.  This leads to the enlargement of the informal sector in large cities and migratory 
flows to abroad, among others. 
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Abstrakt: 
 
Die Zunahme der Häufigkeiten von Naturkatastrophen und die daraus resultierende 
wirtschaftlichen Verluste, betrachtet im Rahmen von fallenden Landwirtschaftspreisen 
und der Liberalisierung des Handels, sind von Kernbedeutung für die Zunahme der 
Armut in der ländlichen Wirtschaft Mexikos. Während der letzten zwei Dekaden steuerte 
die Wegnahme der staatlichen Unterstützungen in den Landwirtschaftsektor (in den 
Bereichen physischen, finanziellen und logistischen Mitteln) weiterhin dazu bei, den 
Druck auf die landwirtschaftlichen Lebensunterhalte zu verstärken, da 
Privatmechanismen diese bis heute nicht durchgreifend ersetzen konnten. Diese Faktoren 
trugen bei, dass speziell der Landwirtschaftssektor für eine Anzahl von Katastrophen 
verwundbar wurde, da diese die Wirkung auf ökonomische Akteure abgeschwächt und 
eine Akkumulierung von Gütern verhindert hat. Die Dissertation identifiziert 
ökonomische Anfälligkeiten von Natur- und Wirtschatkatastrophen, um die 
Bewältigungskapazitäten der privaten und öffentlichen Hand zu prüfen. Weiters dienen 
diese dazu das Rahmenprogramm und die ökonomische Theorie abzugrenzen, die das 
Rahmenkonzept und die angewandte Theorien unterstützen. Die Arbeit basiert auf 
quantitativen und qualitativen Methoden und bedient sich ökonometrischer 
Untersuchungen. Weiters unterstützt die Einbeziehung von Betroffenermeinungen die 
Analyse zur Findung von Lösungsansätzen. Weiters wird in dieser Arbeit ein räumliches 
Model herangezogen, das den politischen Entscheidungsprozess unterstützen kann, um 
alternative Investitionsmodelle in die Infrastruktur als auch Finanzierungsinstrumente zu 
kreieren, um die derzeitige wirtschaftliche Anfälligkeit  und Armut im gesamten 
Staatsgebiet zu reduzieren.  
 
Während der letzten zwei Dekaden sind über 80% der Gesamtwirtschaftsverluste von 
wetterbezogenen Desastern dem ladwirtschaftlichen Sektor zuzuordnen. In derselben 
Periode reduzierten sich die gewichteten durchschnittlichen Landwirtschaftspreise über 
50% und seit 1996 hält das Handelsdefizit an. Gegenwärtig verschärft der unzureichende 
Zugang zu Krediten, die geringe Abdeckung von Ernteversicherungen, als auch das fast 
nicht Vorhandensein von Investitionen von Bewässerungsanlagen und weiterer 
produktiven Infrastruktur die Verwundbarkeit der ländlichen Wirtschaft. Diese Tatsachen 
erklären weshalb dieser Sektor nur zu 4% am Bruttosozialprodukt beiträgt, obwohl mehr 
als 20% der gesamten wirtschaftlichen tätigen Bevölkerung in diesem Sektor beschäftigt 
ist. Diese Fakten unterlaufen die Erwartungen der Landwirte für zukünftige 
Einkommensentwicklung in Gemeinden und heizen die Landflucht an. Die städtische 
Wirtschaft kann jedoch die zugewanderte Bevölkerung aus den ländlichen Räumen nicht 
absorbieren, vor allem wenn wir die bescheidenen industriellen Dynamiken der letzten 
Jahre berücksichtigen. Dies führt zu einem Wachstum des informellen Sektors in den 
Ballungsräumen, und unter anderem zu einer verstärkten Abwanderung ins Ausland. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
 
Along with economic and institutional stressors, the occurrence of natural 
disasters is increasingly determining income and asset accumulation of vulnerable 
population in Mexico. This dissertation identifies and estimates the effect of natural 
hazards and some economic variables on poverty, as well as assesses the impact of 
current public and private strategies aimed at reducing economic vulnerability. Most of 
the workforce living in poverty in rural areas relies on agricultural livelihoods and they 
are increasingly affected by weather-related disasters. The insufficient physical and 
financial instruments to hedge the agricultural sector both from weather- and market-
related risks contributes to the weakening response of farmers, the negative consequences 
of which expand to other regions. 
 
During the period 1980-2005, over 80% of total damages from weather-related 
events affected the agricultural sector in Mexico. Though the contribution of the 
agricultural sector is only around 4% of GDP, it is the livelihood of over 20% of the 
national population. Trade liberalization, in Mexico since the mid of the 1980s, has not 
only resulted in a negligible increase in production, but also contributed to an increase of 
uncertainty with regards to small farm incomes, with the rise in imports and depressed 
prices of agricultural products. 
 
This dissertation recognizes that natural disasters and trade liberalization are not 
the only factors contributing to poverty in this country, however it aims to prove that they 
are becoming economically crucial in maintaining and increasing structural poverty with 
their disruptive effect on the asset accumulation process. As confirmed in this 
dissertation’s analysis, it drives small-scale farmers out of business, and increases out 
migration from rural areas. The purpose of this analysis is to examine how natural 
disasters and adverse economic conditions affect agricultural livelihoods and the 
implications of these stressors upon the poor in the agricultural sector, in order to come 
up with suggestions to reduce their vulnerability. Special emphasis is given to the effects 
of these hazards on migration patterns.  In addition, this project analyzes selected policy 
options (e.g. government-supported insurance schemes) to reduce the vulnerability of 
farmers. To further this aim, this work makes use of descriptive and econometric 
analyses, as well as stakeholders’ interviews. 
 
1.1 Methodology 
During the past two decades, the rising number of research work particularly in 
the natural sciences has been warning about the increasing pressure of natural hazards on 
human societies. So far, the economic sciences have given little attention to these studies. 
This dissertation presents an integral analysis of both natural and economic hazards as 
determinants of poverty and labor mobility, embracing social and policy aspects. The 
methodology includes both quantitative and qualitative methods. The review of existing 
economic and policy literature is mainly presented in chapter 2 to 4, which discuss 
evidence supporting this dissertation’s hypothesis and describe the process behind 
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economic vulnerability in Mexico. In chapters 5 and 6 a statistical analysis is introduced. 
The analysis was based on a survey of farmers and further stakeholders, as well as a 
spatial econometrics analysis of data from the 2,443 municipalities of Mexico. Data was 
gathered by the author from a number of sources, including national and international 
organizations, as well as those collected directly from the households and policymakers 
during the survey and country consultations carried out in 2003, 2004 and 2005.  This 
analysis quantitatively validates the hypotheses presented in this text.  
 
1.2. Outline 
The conceptual framework of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 2, is based 
on the vast existing literature from both the natural and social sciences. It describes the 
basic mechanisms by which vulnerable societies tend to amplify the negative 
consequences from natural disasters given their usual weak coping and adaptive capacity. 
Coping capacity, as discussed, is in turn conditioned not only by natural hazards and 
market imperfections, but also a result of the original endowment modified by the historic 
process of wealth distribution, giving shape to the current entitlement system. In addition, 
the inherent capacity of the economic agents to adapt their structure and functioning in 
response to harmful events is closely conditioned by the institutional organization. Given 
the prevailing levels of poverty and vulnerability in Mexico, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the current public intervention to strengthen coping and adaptive capacity of the exposed 
population is being exceeded 
 
Considering the increasing tendency of frequent and severe natural disasters and 
the economic losses associated with them, together with the dropping agricultural prices 
presented in Chapter 3, this research warns of the most likely forthcoming increase in 
poverty if no implemented an effective strategy to reduce vulnerability. As the urban 
economy has experienced a very modest growth during the last two decades, it is unable 
to absorb the additional workforce released from rural areas. It has led to the proliferation 
of slums and to the currently fast growing informal urban economy. As both the uncertain 
agricultural incomes and the precarious urban jobs do not fulfill the expectation of the 
vulnerable population, increasing emigration to the USA is the usual response, 
particularly in the case of farmers living in remote regions. This trend is further verified 
both by the stakeholders’ survey and the spatial model. 
 
Chapter 4 assesses current policy instruments for reducing agricultural 
vulnerability, identifying areas where public investments in productive infrastructure can 
greatly achieve progress in poverty reduction if combined with disasters mitigation works 
and expanding public-private insurance schemes. In addition, it analyzes possible 
improvements to policies and instruments for reducing economic losses, e.g., subsidized 
micro-insurance, and for reducing poverty and vulnerability in the agricultural sector. In 
light of the current comparatively low implementation of ex-ante instruments, this 
chapter underlines the need for a more active promotion of existing disaster mitigation 
instruments (e.g. funds for mitigation works) from the federal authority along with more 
participative action from the community and municipal authorities to propose projects. 
This chapter’s research is based to a large extent on a project the author carried out in 
2003 for the World Bank and the Provention Consortium, which was complemented with 
a consultation with policymakers in Mexico. (Saldaña 2004a). 
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The current role of the government, the private market (e.g., insurers), the farmers 
and other stakeholders in dealing with the adverse outcomes from natural disasters and 
income uncertainty of small-scale farmers are still insufficiently interconnected, as 
verified by the views of the stakeholders presented in Chapter 5. This chapter identifies 
the problem of farmer vulnerability to natural disasters and trade liberalization, and 
examines the preferred policy responses from the point of view of stakeholders, including 
the farmers, the farmer cooperatives, the crop insurers, and the ministries and 
departments of the local and national governments. The dramatic governmental 
withdrawal of the previous two decades from supporting the agricultural sector with 
facilities for production and commercialization continues putting stress on rural 
livelihoods as no effective compensatory mechanisms have been successfully 
implemented. This fieldwork identified a clear need for a more profit-oriented production 
and expansion of coverage of individual and collective financing instruments to face 
extern shocks. The chapter is derived from research the author conducted between 2004 
and 2005 as part of a project for the START-IIASA Advanced Institute of Vulnerability to 
Global Environmental Change (Saldana 2006). 
The great human and geophysical diversity of Mexico is reflected in its existing 
plurality of economic practices and natural hazards exposure. Chapter 6 applies spatial 
econometric analyses to assess the importance of natural disasters and depressed prices 
due to imports (or to simple low international prices), and analyzes their differential 
interaction with the diminishing income of vulnerable regions to stimulate out migration 
from municipalities highly exposed to natural hazards. During the past two decades, 
failing in implementing effective mechanisms for reducing risk to climatic and market 
variability is impeding accumulating enough physical and human assets in particularly in 
the agricultural sector. The negative effects of hazards in vulnerable regions have a 
spillover effect on neighboring regions. For that reason, direct public intervention is 
needed to allow asset accumulation. Derived from the migration model, one can observe 
that the segment more prone to emigrate is that with greater reductions in real incomes 
and more frequently affected from disasters. It reveals the role of expectations of future 
incomes in the configuration of migratory flows. Chapter 7 integrates the results of all 
chapters to provide conclusions of this work and presents a final discussion for future 
directions. 
 
This dissertation’s analyses contribute to the current conceptual and empirical 
debate in economic and social sciences, as well as offer an integral methodology 
combining natural and social sciences for further studies of economic vulnerability in 
developing countries. The lessons derived from this analysis provide useful elements for 
the design and improvement of governmental policies concerning social and economic 
development. In addition, the desegregation of this analysis has the advantage of 
facilitating the design and evaluation of governmental projects at municipal, state, sub-
national and national level. 
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CHAPTER 2: A conceptual framework of economic 
vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This introductory chapter is devoted to presenting the conceptual framework and 
background of this dissertation required to understand the dynamic of economic 
vulnerability first in general and further concretely in Mexico. This chapter quotes a 
number of research works relevant to provide elements for a solid discussion, an 
objective judgment of the problematic, and a grounded argumentation of this work’s 
hypothesis.  
 
The chapter starts providing a review about different concepts and approaches of 
vulnerability (section 2.1) and economic vulnerability (section 2.2) towards defining this 
work’s concept of economic vulnerability. Further, we approach at briefly illustrate the 
structure of economic vulnerability and its functioning as dynamic and cyclic process. 
One interpretation of the complex process of multiple interacting stressors to economic 
vulnerability is expounded in section 2.3, emphasizing the role of assets, especially those 
of the poor in rural areas. This section also discusses poverty definitions, asses briefly 
poverty in Mexico, and provides some elements towards explaining historic facts 
defining entitlements and some issues of economic policy behind poverty in Mexico and 
concretely in the countryside. The need for taking into account concepts and patterns of 
agricultural growth and rural-urban migration in a strategy to deal with economic 
vulnerability is presented in section 2.4. Extern shocks tend to amplify due to structural 
weakness and interacting stressors, and are explicitly described along this chapter –
summed up in section 2.5-, allowing us to leave the mere conceptual discussion to come 
out into assessing vulnerability and public-private response in Mexico, along with its 
tentative solution paths, in the forthcoming chapters of this research work. 
 
2.1 Vulnerability 
 
Vulnerability is the key concept to our approach, and we proceed now to expound 
definitions of vulnerability from different disciplines and perspectives relevant to the 
present work, their linkages to related concepts and, based on them, to propose a 
definition of economic vulnerability. 
 
In a broad sense, vulnerability is incumbent upon two sides: unit of exposure and extern 
force(s). So, vulnerability can be initially defined as the susceptibility of a certain unit to 
a specific force, and risk can be expressed as the probability of an undesired derived 
outcome, based on the potential occurrence of harmful events and on the susceptibility to 
them among those likely to be exposed (Dielley and Boudreau 2001). 
…Una historia que toma sentido a partir 
de la conciencia de marginalidad 
LEOPOLDO ZEA, Filosofía de la 
historia americana 
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The way the sustainability science analyzes both elements included in these sides, as well 
as the complexity of their interrelations, provides excellent basis towards defining, 
further, economic vulnerability. So, for some scholars of the sustainability science, 
vulnerability is conceived, above all, as a coupled human-environment systems’ 
interaction, which posses a likelihood to experience harm due to exposure to a hazard 
(Turner et al 2003). In this concept, hazards are understood as threats to the system, 
which act by means of perturbations and stressors. Perturbation is a major alteration in 
the system -of extern origin- generating exceeding effects to those the system can cope 
with, and stress is a continuous increasing pressure upon the system. The novel of this 
concept is that expands the analysis spectrum to embrace multiple stressors and the 
structure of hazard’s causal sequence as a complex of socioeconomic conditions and 
biophysical subsystems lying behind.  
 
So, vulnerability does not involve merely active and passive factors, but rather dynamic 
objects and subjects in continuous motion. As pointed out in Turner et al (2003), systems 
have different sensitivities to perturbations and stressors strongly linked to entitlements in 
the case of social units. Entitlements are essentially the system of legal and customary 
rights defining the access to the society’s resources.  
 
Along with entitlements, other elements defining susceptibility of social units are coping 
and adaptive capacity. Coping capacity can be defined as the ability of a unit to respond 
to a harm occurrence as well as to avoid its potential affectation. Adaptive capacity is the 
ability of a unit to gradually transform its structure, functioning or organization to survive 
under hazards threatening its existence (Kelly and Adger 2000).  Another concept 
contributing to vulnerability comprehension is resilience, which, borrowed from the 
ecology science, defines a system’s ability to return to a reference state after a 
disturbance and to maintain basic structures and functions despite disturbance (Turner 
2003). However, as this concept has elements from both coping and adaptive capacity, 
this work maintains it out of the analysis in order to avoid conceptual overlapping. 
 
Thus, the expound linked concepts –entitlements, coping and adapting capacity, and 
resilience- obligate us to incorporate social, economic, institutional, and cultural 
structures into the set of forces shaping units’ susceptibility in the vulnerability analysis, 
overcoming so the eventual limitations other frameworks do, i.e. risk-hazard and 
pressure-and-release models1. Moreover, these concepts will be useful to the present 
work, since their implementation into our analysis may allow us to maneuver with 
existing structures in the country our case of study deals with, especially in the part 
concerning decision making. 
 
                                                 
1 Risk-hazard models tend to consider impacts of hazards as a function of exposure to the hazard event and 
the sensitivity of the unit without clarifying how the units amplify or attenuate the impacts, as well as the 
role of multiple stressors in defining susceptibility. In the case of pressure-and-release models (PAR), they 
emphasize the conditionings of unit’s unsafe, including even ethnicity, class, etc. However, the PAR model 
does not incorporate biophysical subsystems interacting with the society. 
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Vulnerability analysis is increasingly being applied to different concrete matters using 
implicitly most of the above listed elements of vulnerability, but emphasizing the 
concrete area they deal with. For instance, some works on vulnerability to climate change 
underline the contribution of natural disasters mismanagement to increase vulnerability of 
human systems to natural hazards (Abramowitz et al 2002); Works focused on concrete 
biophysical dimensions of vulnerability, i.e. water, emphasize, for instance, inadequate 
supplies of potable water and sanitation, and exposure to waterborne diseases of a given 
human settlement (Cocklin 2002). Other works on food security emphasize shortages in 
food supply due to extreme events (Liverman 1990). Approaches about dynamic 
vulnerability focus on, i.e., the extent to which environmental and economic changes 
modify the capacity of regions, sectors, ecosystems and social groups to respond to 
shocks (Leichenko and O’Brien 2001). 
 
2.2 Economic Vulnerability 
 
The rise of literature on vulnerability issues over the last two decades has demanded for 
an each time more specialized definition of vulnerability. For instance, social 
vulnerability conceives social entities as its units of analysis, aiming concretely at 
identifying the way human societies and individuals are prone to suffer from disturbances 
and stresses (Adger 1999). So, social vulnerability, as expound above, relies at a large 
extent on concepts like endowments and entitlements.  
 
From its part, economic vulnerability is still sparsely defined, and one can find concepts 
which, though useful and valid, fail in describing vulnerability in its wide spectrum. 
There exists interesting views about economic vulnerability highly biased to the side of 
drivers, like those provided by some scholars of political economics in the context of 
international development. The germinal works on this matters of Todaro (1982) consider 
vulnerability as a situation in which least developed countries (LDC) find themselves in a 
dominance and dependence relationship vis-à-vis the developed countries. In this view 
concretely, LDC are said to be economically vulnerable to the decisions of rich nations in 
areas such as trade, private foreign investments, foreign aid, technological research and 
development, etc. This is a useful concept whose asymmetry component is closely 
interconnected with other concepts from the economics of development, like the center-
periphery relations and terms of trade in the works of Raúl Prebisch (i.e. 1950 and 1973, 
respectively).  
 
In-line-with the Todaro’s definition, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) defines economic vulnerability as the structurally more 
exposed position of LDCs than most other developing countries to external economic 
shocks. Also, UNCTAD points out that economic vulnerability implies consequences of 
major global and regional economic and financial disturbances and increases in the prices 
of critical imports such as energy products; The typical export dominance of a single 
commodity or service sector makes their economies particularly vulnerable to adverse 
physical or economic shocks (UNCTAD 2001).  
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So, in the early 1990s, UNCTAD developed a first attempt to construct an index of 
economic vulnerability2, and in 1994 the Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) adopted an index of economic 
vulnerability, expected to demonstrate that SIDS were generally more vulnerable than 
other developing countries. So, the UNCTAD Economic Vulnerability Index was 
constructed as a composite indicator based on three fundamental dimensions: (1) the 
magnitude of external shocks beyond domestic control (measured through indicators of 
the instability of agricultural production and exports); (2) the exposure of the economy to 
these shocks (estimated through the share of manufacturing and modern services in the 
gross domestic product, and an indicator of merchandise export concentration), and; (3) 
the structural handicaps explaining the high exposure of the economy (taking into 
account economy’s smallness, measured by a proxy demographic variable) -UNCTAD 
2003.   
 
In the view of Briguglio (2002), a country can be economically vulnerable and yet 
register a relatively high GDP per capita. So, countries like the SIDS are particularly 
economically vulnerable due to their limited ability to exploit economies of scale, lack of 
natural resources, low diversified economy, dependence on narrow range of exports, and 
high dependence on imports of strategic goods, i.e. fuel and food. Notwithstanding, what 
essentially makes a country economically vulnerable in the definition of Briguglio, is its 
exposure to economic forces outside its control. Thus, the peripherality condition of an 
economy goes beyond geographic insularity and remoteness (leading to high costs and 
marginalization from world trade), but also includes inability to influence international 
prices (price-taker economies). 
 
However, being vulnerable is not only a question of poverty and smallness of a country, 
as this work approaches. Vulnerability accrues to also countries of big population and 
large economies, whose vulnerabilities are less visible at a glance, and only through more 
detailed analysis exhibit differential vulnerabilities due to dualistic characteristics 
(Rodriguez 1980). So, above all, Latin American countries like Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina should not be considered as entirely vulnerable, but unequally vulnerable, 
whose rich and poor societies, high productive and left-behind economic sectors, etc. 
coexist at differential degrees of vulnerability (Rodriguez 1980, Colosio 1979). 
 
More recently, economic vulnerability is being used to refer the extent to which 
macroeconomic policies can exhibit performance inconsistencies, sudden loss of net 
national product, and hence lead to economic crises, as result of underscored 
development of warning systems and economy’s inability to work with multiple 
equilibria (Yap 2002). The response to these types of vulnerabilities can consist on 
financial monitoring and modeling of early warning systems, as Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996) propose to concretely avoid economic crises originated in financial factors like the 
Asian one of 1997. However, these approaches do not address structural factors of the 
economy, and tend to reflect rather what this work calls risk and preparedness, instead of 
vulnerability and vulnerability reduction, respectively.  
                                                 
2 Cfr. Briguglio, L. (1992). Preliminary study on the construction of an Index for ranking countries 
according to their economic vulnerability. Report to UNCTAD, 1992. 
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2.2.1 Coping and adaptive capacity 
In defining economic vulnerability is crucial thus to consider approaches with imbedded 
structural factors. So, the implications of vulnerability to economic analysis are explicitly 
expound by Amartya Sen (1981) by relating entitlements and initial endowment in a 
coherent process where individual levels of vulnerability are conditioned by broader 
institutional structures, which sometimes reproduce or even amplify vulnerability given 
society’s capacity to provide opportunities. These views and concepts are inserted below 
both in our immediate concept of economic vulnerability as well as in further details in 
section three. Now, let us explain the concrete elements constituting coping and adaptive 
capacity in economic vulnerability. 
 
I. Coping Capacity 
The capacity to respond to a harmful event as well as to avoid its potential affectation of 
an economic agent is not only determined by its productive level, but also by its relative 
position within its society. Factors like entitlements, information availability and assets 
distribution in a society gives shape to this coping capacity.  
 
i) Entitlements. Connected with this way of seeing vulnerability from the perspective of 
economic agents, Amartya Sen (1981) addresses vulnerability using entitlements. 
Entitlements are the package of goods and services, which an economic agent can obtain 
by means of trading their stakes under current regulatory conditions. In other words, there 
exists an intrinsic susceptibility in the way economic agents profits their assets. With a 
very similar meaning, Cannon (1994: 19) calls this vulnerability of livelihood resilience. 
In addition, entitlements also influence information availability, which plays a key role 
concerning economic vulnerability, since the common assumption of homogeneity of 
information among economic agents (as in the neoclassic approach of economics) does 
not usually apply in practice. Heterogeneity with respect to information possession makes 
considerable differences when taking decisions and in turn when obtaining incomes. 
Better informed economic agents are normally more able to identify the risk their asset 
implies and hence to take better decisions. 
 
ii) Assets. Assets are a key variable to understand impoverishment in poor rural families 
(or households), which can be defined as the stock of wealth used to generate well being 
(Vatsa & Krimgold 2000). This concept is important when considering the effects of 
natural disasters, which can decrease the capital assets of households and businesses. 
Families have an initial asset, which generates an output. This output varies widely, 
depending on market price of the produced factor, and on the productivity of its use 
(profitability). As families pursue strategies to maximize their assets, they are in better 
position to enlarge their risk pool and reduce vulnerability.  
 
II. Adaptive Capacity 
The ability of a unit to gradually transform its structure and/or functioning to survive 
hazards affectation is interconnected with assets and entitlements as well in that of it 
influences economic agents’ ability to hedge from adverse events. Explicitly, adaptive 
capacity concerning economic vulnerability includes risk management and protection 
actions. 
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i) Risk management. Derived from options to deal with negative shocks, prevailing risk 
management capacity in a country is crucial in reducing vulnerability. Risk management 
is the set of pre- and post-disasters actions towards facing negative consequences of 
hazards (Freeman et al 2001). Pre-disaster actions include risk transfer (i.e. insurance), 
risk assessment (monitoring, mapping, etc.), mitigation works (i.e. infrastructure 
strengthening, etc.), and preparedness. Post-disaster actions include emergency response 
(aid, clean-up, etc), rehabilitation, rebuilding, and loss sharing (i.e. private-public, 
national-local).  
 
ii) Protection. From its part, protection is a concept situated at the both sides of risk 
management phases (pre- and post-disaster). Protection is the network of awareness and 
emergency response for disaster and crisis state avoidance, initially based on various 
technical interventions usually known as preparedness. Preparedness is the management 
capability before a disaster occurs to provide an effective and efficient (prompt and due) 
reaction to face a disaster (Freeman et al 2001). Protection granted by governmental 
planning plus those from other social institutions are termed social protection, which acts 
complementary to self-protection (Cannon 1994).  
 
In concordance with the conceptual discussion above expound and attempting to 
overcome dispersion and partiality of available definitions of economic vulnerability, this 
work defines economic vulnerability as the susceptibility of an economic agent to absorb 
extern shocks (hazards) negatively, given its assets possession and entitlements system 
(coping capacity), as well as its implemented risk management and protection measures 
(adaptive capacity). 
 
Finally, reducing economic vulnerability consists basically on implementing the due 
changes in time to minimize negative effects from exogenous shocks upon economic 
agents’ assets by strengthening contractual elements in the society (entitlements and 
assets) and/or improving the risk management and protection strategies. 
 
2.2.2 The cycle of economic vulnerability 
Figure 1 below provides a very simple illustration of, first, the structure of economic 
vulnerability according to this work’s approach, as well as of some elemental cause-
effect relations derived from hazard occurrence. Individual unit of analysis’ vulnerability 
is depicted in the diagram by three fundamental elements: Unit adaptability, public 
response, and probability of economic losses. Unit adaptability embraces coping and 
adapting capacity within the framework of society’s prevailing entitlements and assets 
distribution.3 The second pillar of economic vulnerability is public protection, understood 
as the set of social programs, antipoverty strategy, etc., constituting the social and 
redistributive policy, as well as the public mechanism of disasters avoidance, whose 
                                                 
3 In fact, adaptability is the preferred term for this work though that word itself could seem to misrepresent 
its components, and perhaps better represented by terms like resistance, strength, etc. However, most 
literature of vulnerability uses it conventionally to represent system’s ability, competency or capacity of a 
system to adapt and respond to climatic stimuli. Also, see Schjolden, A. (2003), Kelly and Adger (2000), 
and Chambers (1989). 
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strength or weakness degree contributes to define economic vulnerability of both our unit 
of analysis as well as to the entire society –elements of risk management are marked with 
an asterisk in the diagram. 
 
The share of assets at risk –out of units’ assets total value- defines the probability of 
economic losses. Assets at risk are the monetary valuable elements, i.e. capital stock, 
production of goods and services, and in general any form of assessable wealth, exposed 
to hazards at a given extent. Economic Vulnerability is the outcome of these factors 
together. To this extent of the diagram, all said elements are potential facts, which 
materialize until a hazard hit the system.  
 
The hazard causes damages translatable into economic monetary losses, whose 
implications can be direct damages, like loss of public and private productive 
infrastructure, housing, etc. Also, such a loss of assets leads to indirect losses4, to 
productive disruption and, therefore, to decreasing incomes of private economic agents. 
The government, from its part, may decrease revenue from state-owned companies as 
well as because of decreased taxing basis (concerning basically income and consumption 
taxes) as a consequence of a potential reduction in economic activity. This process draws 
a vicious cycle as less income lead to less financial ability to invest in reducing 
vulnerability both at unit level, i.e. household, as well as at global level, i.e. economy, in 
reducing vulnerability. Unlike perturbations, stresses are linked to the unit’s resistance 
(discontinuous line) because, as above expound, they are understood as threats to the 
system, which act by means of continuous increasing pressure upon the system, and are 
associated at a large extent to structural conditions. Appendix 1 provides further elements 
to analyze the dynamic of economic vulnerability, suggesting a mechanism to maneuver 
with coping and adaptive strategies in order to reduce economic vulnerability under this 
work’s framework. 
 
2.3. Drivers of economic vulnerability 
 
So far, the basic elements shaping economic vulnerability have been here presented, and 
we turn now to explain the relevance of the hazards analyzed in the following chapters of 
this dissertation (natural disasters and trade liberalization). Considering that hazards are 
threats to the system, which act by means of perturbations and stressors, analyzing assets 
structure and their functioning along with the historic impact of the entitlements in this 
country is crucial to clarify why natural hazards and economic policy have been drivers 
of increasing vulnerability in Mexico. 
 
                                                 
4 Indirect losses are actually the share of unrealized production, which act by reducing GDP growth at the 
current year, whereas direct losses are not accounted into GDP growth reductions, since they are added 
value belonging to GDP accounting of past years (cfr. ECLAC 2002).  
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Figure 1: The structure of economic vulnerability and its cycle 
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2.3.1 Assets accumulation 
Increasingly, scholars argue that poverty is not only a lack of income or consumption, but 
also a lack of assets (Haveman and Wolff 2000, Oliver and Shapiro 1990, Sherraden 
1991). So, asset poor involve those households with insufficient resources to invest in 
their future or to sustain household members at a basic level during an economic 
disruption (Fisher and Weber 2004). There exists empirical evidence showing that wealth 
is more unequally distributed than income. For instance, Wolff (2001) points out that the 
top 20 percent of households in the USA earn 56 per cent of nation’s income and own 83 
percent of national wealth. For that reason is crucial to identify households’ assets poor in 
order to, further, encourage assets accumulation.  
 
Among other authors, Chambers (1989) cautions about the relevance of increasing assets 
in low-income families, since this improves human conditions beyond poverty just in 
terms of flows, but also structural vulnerability. He affirms that vulnerability is even 
more interlinked with net assets than poverty. For authors like Vatsa & Krimgold (2000), 
vulnerability is a broader and more dynamic concept, which involves the poor, but also 
households living above poverty line at risk of falling below in case of an income shock 
(new poor). Given that linkage, factors that obstruct an accumulation of assets are, in 
turn, impeding poverty reduction and putting additional population into poverty. For 
instance, losses from natural disasters or income reductions due to depressed agricultural 
prices impede rural households in accumulating assets, creating a vicious cycle of 
inefficient risk management strategy, low return, low consumption and low savings and 
investment (Vatsa & Krimgold 2000). 
 
The role of assets protection in reducing poverty 
A poverty reduction strategy possesses two sides. One consisting of irreducible actions 
aimed at providing short-term relief to families living in poverty (i.e. health facilities) and 
making affordable some long-term intangible assets (i.e. education). The other side is 
related rather to directly strengthen income generation, i.e. agricultural 
commercialization, reducing information asymmetries, productivity enforcement, etc. 
However, the latter side of the anti-poverty strategy in Mexico –as in most of the 
countries- is less actively promoted (Fisher and Weber 2004, ECLAC 2001, Attanasio 
and Szekely 1999). It is so partly because it implies actions falling outside the jurisdiction 
of mere poverty-related governmental agencies. It is so also because strengthening 
income generation is more complex and usually requires changes to the national 
socioeconomic structure and lot of political lobbying and willingness. 
 
Programs aimed at reducing poverty tend to increase transfers, but they do not affect the 
long-term lack of assets in the current case of Mexico (Attanasio & Szekely 1999). Anti-
poverty programs help to raise income or consumption but only in terms of flows. In 
addition, ECLAC (2001, p. 32) points out that social programs of poverty reduction in 
Mexico are merely of aid character, though if these programs were more substantial and 
long-term sustained, these additional resources could increase assets, as well as for 
instance improve ability to invest on education and other long term variables, which 
directly modify assets and in last instance income. For that reason, 
prevention/compensation mechanisms are required. In Mexico, such mechanisms have 
 24
been actively promoted by the State along the past 90 years, as part of the resulting social 
State implemented by post-revolutionary governments. That is the reason which 
motivated the present work to assess in chapter 4 the current network of social security in 
Mexico as well as the system of social programs in general5. 
 
2.3.2 Poverty and entitlements 
Stressors, understood as continuous increasing pressure upon a unit, are analyzed in this 
section when approaching entitlements determinants in prevailing poverty in Mexico, i.e. 
the colonial legacy and industrialization patterns along the XX century. The following 
subsections are an attempt to define poverty for this work’s sake based on the vast 
conceptions and measurements of poverty in order to further present the most likely 
causes of structural poverty in this country. 
 
Poverty 
Defining poverty implies dealing with a very controversial paradigm. There exists no 
consensus about what issues are embraced by poverty. However, a point of agreement 
among the vast existing literature on poverty seems to be that poverty is a lack of 
opportunities to reach a basic minimum level of well being. In turn, well-being can also 
include several determinants, i.e., assets, infrastructure, social networks, institutions, 
human development, etc. This leads us to another point of agreement about it: poverty is 
a relative concept that deals with “minimums of well being” (as in SEDESOL 2002), 
“society’s hopes and aspirations to be fulfilled” (World Bank 2001), or “basic needs” 
(Todaro 2000), all they varying widely among and within societies.6  
 
Other concepts of poverty go beyond tangible factors and include rights issues, 
relationships, powerlessness, socioeconomic exclusion, and even loss of dignity (i.e. 
Elankumaran et al 2000). Nevertheless, this work will only focus on those more 
quantitatively measurable economic dimensions of poverty. 
 
2.3.2.1 Income and Consumption measurements 
Among measurements of poverty, there are two basic criteria: income and consumption. 
Income-based measurements of poverty embrace the total current monetary and non-
monetary inflow a household obtains from different functional sources, including wages, 
salaries, dividends, rents, etc. The use of income-based measurements is advantageous in 
that of allowing identifying those economic activities to be strengthened to reduce 
vulnerability, -tough more subject to errors due to difficulties in incorporating non-
                                                 
5 A key argument in the current debate about development in developing countries is that income alone is 
an insufficient indicator of economic well-being. In response, various alternative supplementary measures 
have been proposed, including consumption-, income- and wealth-based indicators (SEDESOL 2002, 
Haveman and Wolff 2000, Slesnick 1993). The present work considers assets the ideal welfare measure. 
Despite recognizing that fact, this work approaches assets by household incomes in measuring economic 
vulnerability in chapter five. We did so because available statistics and data sources do not allow us to 
make assets’ quantitative analysis. Hence, quantitative analysis of economic vulnerability until assets level 
will be possible for only the individual municipalities that our case of study inquires through field work in 
chapter four. 
6 For instance, infrastructure necessities in least developed countries consist conventionally on tap water 
and sanitation services, but in middle income countries like Mexico electricity is included as well.  
 25
monetary income, self-consumption and transfers. Consumption-based measurements 
consist of the total amount of monetary and non-monetary expenditure a household 
makes in all possible items. The advantage of using consumption-based measurements of 
poverty relies on the fact that it reflects smoothing strategies a household implement in 
response to sudden income fluctuations, i.e. family solidarity, aid, remittances (WB 
2004). 
 
2.3.2.2 Rural Poverty 
The World Bank 2004 Report on Poverty in Mexico estimated income poverty in Mexico 
at 51.7%, and consumption poverty at 51.3% of the population in year 2002 (WB 2004). 
In addition, the country has clear gaps in terms of purchasing power. According to the 
Poverty and Social Development Indicators of the Mexico’s Country Assistance Strategy 
(WB 2002), inequity in power of consumption is dramatic: Consumer price index shows 
219, compared to food price index 227 (1995=100). Consumption in terms of income 
distribution reveals also high inequity in Mexico: the lowest (poorest) deciles consume 
only 4% of income, whereas the highest one consumes 56.7% (INEGI 2000, WDI 2001). 
 
However, both moderate and extreme poverty in Mexico is dramatic in rural areas. 74% 
of rural population lives in poverty -in urban areas it represents 36% (WB 2002). From its 
part, 20% of the Mexican population is reckoned to live in extreme poverty7, from which 
65% in rural areas (WB 2004: 54). Also, the livelihood of 72% of the extreme poor in 
Mexico is agriculture (WB 2004: 54). Section 4 below presents a more detailed 
description about rural livelihoods and their links to vulnerability.  
 
Education and jobs quality 
Low education is, in turn, much more concentrated in rural areas: 73% of rural extreme 
poverty has no education or incomplete primary –compared to 51.3% in urban extreme 
poverty. Nevertheless, it is still risky trying to explain income differences by merely 
education asymmetries. For instance, based on a regression analysis, the WB staff in 
Mexico estimated the contribution of household characteristics to rural-urban income 
differences, and reckons that 35% of that difference is due to disparities in educational 
levels, but employment characteristics explains ca. 50% of that difference (WB 2004: 
57). That analysis compared employment characteristics between remunerations from 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities, attempting to reflect differences in 
household’s living standard of being employed in industrial sectors relative to the 
agricultural ones.  
 
Inequity and access to social healthcare 
Inequity in rural areas has increased along the last decade. Based on the Gini coefficient8, 
rural expenditure coefficient increased from 0.41 to 0.48 between 1992 and 2002, 
reaching top bottom in year 2000 with a 0.56 coefficient (WB 2004). Also, despite the 
                                                 
7 Extreme poor is those population living below the food-based poverty line. 
8 The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini.  
The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 means perfect equality (everyone has the same 
income) and 1 means perfect inequality (one person has all the income, everyone else has nothing). 
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fact that over 25% of Mexican labor force works in agriculture, only 2.5% of total 
insured people by the Mexican Social Healthcare Institute (IMSS) work in this economic 
sector (INEGI 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Entitlements behind rural poverty 
As in other Latin American countries, poverty in Mexico is a complex issue with ancient 
causes (e.g. land tenure) but also explained by dynamic factors and processes (e.g. 
economic policy and extern shocks). The former corresponds to the so-called original 
endowment9 in the form of initial allocation of wealth -after the Spanish conquest in our 
case of study. Factors like the industrialization model undertaken during the 50´s and 
60´s provides some elements to understand poverty increase in the countryside. 
 
2.3.3.1 Historic land tenure: from colonial times to the post-revolution 
On the one side, initial endowment during the colonial establishment margined 
indigenous population of wealth property, making them serve as slaves (Encomienda 
System) –even though some indigenous communities could work its arable land under 
permission and contributing to the colonial authority’s revenue. It worked in that way 
until the independence war (year 1810), when slavery was abolished, but even in spite of 
that fact, the most productive land were already appropriated and concentrated in very 
few hands. So, at this first stage of independent life, dispossessed but now free farmers 
had to continue being still highly exploited by semi-feudal productive systems. It was so 
basically because the resulting government of the independence war did not change the 
status quo of former wealth allocation derived from a sort of amnesty pact between 
insurgency, Catholic Church and colonial officials as pacification and independence 
condition (Alamán 1968). Mexican Revolution forced towards land redistribution 
(Aguilar & Meyer 1989), and a successful and gradual process was undertaken by the 
early post-revolutionary governments10 to improve conditions in the rural poor (Cosio 
1991) and to eliminate Hacienda system. But from the end of the 1940’s, industrial 
policy in Mexico seems to have been reoriented in favor of the industrial sector (Tejo 
2000: 10). 
 
2.3.3.2 The rural-urban disjunctive in economic policy after the 1950s 
The school of structural economics supported the reorientation from agricultural to 
industrial driven economy in Latin-America. Raúl Prebisch (1951), one of the initiators 
of economic structuralism points out that if one considers the high share of working 
population employed in agriculture in Latin America, one can understand that land tenure 
is only part of the big issue about economic development. For him, any solution about it 
must first take into account that there will not be any improvement in people standard of 
life, as long as exceeding workforce in agriculture is not eliminated and redirected it to 
higher productivity sectors. According to that efficiency approach, the sector expected to 
                                                 
9 For further details about Endowment, and Endowment Effect, see John List (University of Maryland), and 
Daniel Kahneman (Homo sapiens vs. Homo economicus).  
10 Post-revolution is conventionally considered the period between the end of the government of Alvaro 
Obregon –the last Caudillo-, in 1928, and the end of the Second World War in 1945, characterized land 
redistribution, expropriation of the oil industry and the begin of a model of economic growth based on 
imports substitution. 
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absorb such a displaced labor force was to be the Industry11. So, the economic pivot 
would be the industry, which would become the most dynamic sector, able even to 
encourage agriculture by demanding increasingly row materials (Figueroa 1991). Under 
these assumptions, agriculture would turn into an input provider for the Industry. Proof of 
that are policies to drag agricultural prices –especially those of primary goods- in order to 
encourage industry by means of making affordable industrial inputs. In practice, inability 
in sustaining such an industrial policy in the long-term in Mexico led to failing in turning 
theory into reality (Montserrat and Chavez 2003).  
 
During the 1950s, the first scholars of modern economic development identified 
industrialization and urbanization as the main structural change a country should undergo 
in order to improve welfare and for economic growth (Lewis 1954, Fei and Ranis 1961). 
The core of that argument is that, historically, economic systems are composed of sectors 
characterized by a clear difference in factor endowments. In such case, it is possible 
shifting factors from less to more productive sectors. Historically, this shift has taken 
place from agricultural to non-agricultural activities, and labor is the most frequent factor 
in motion.12 This reallocation of factors leads also to a rise in efficiency of food 
production, creating thus an agricultural surplus, which in turn provides the basis for fast 
industrialization and, further, for growth and poverty reduction. In addition, the tendency 
of higher relative value of manufactured to agricultural goods, known as the Prebisch-
Singer Theory of Terms of Trade (Prebisch 1950 and 1951, Singer 1950), is another 
crucial reasoning to base economic growth on Industry. 
 
2.3.3.3 Urban capacity to absorb additional workforce 
Contrary to theoretical expectations, labor transfers from rural to urban areas in Mexico 
have exceeded economic systems capacity of employment. The cost of urbanization is 
high when urban conditions are not appropriated to absorb additional workforce. 
Population in Mexico became prematurely urbanized in the sense that the share of urban 
population was greater than the current stage of development could support (Colosio 
1979). Global crisis during the 70´s, oil crisis, high cost of public debt (due to the rise in 
international interest rates), along with wrong estimations on future country’s incomes, 
slow downed industrial production along the 1980´s, accompanied with an increasing 
carelessness about agriculture. As a result, the industry did not develop as expected and 
therefore was unable to absorb exceeding labor force, which in fact had been released 
from agricultural activities. Below in chapter 3, it is expound the state of the art of 
agriculture in Mexico, the process of trade liberalization gradually implemented from, 
roughly, 1986 and abruptly accelerated in 1994 when NAFTA started, as well as 
discusses the impact of trade liberalization on incomes and poverty in the countryside. 
 
                                                 
11 Industry understood as the group of activities related to primary resources processing and manufactures. 
12 For instance, the historic process of recognizing property titles to landlords in Britain embracing 
communal lands during the XVII and XVIII centuries forced to displace enormous masses of rural workers 
to urban centers to meet the increasing workforce demand from the increasing industrialization process. 
Marx, K. (1848), David Ricardo (1817). 
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2.3.4 Emigration as response to rural poverty 
Lack of support for the countryside and agriculture, as well as inappropriate urban 
projecting in large cities in Mexico has contributed to increasing urban vulnerability after 
the 50´s. There are theories of rural-urban migration helpful to understand better the 
phenomenon of slums concentrations in urban areas (Lewis 1954, Fei and Ranis 1964, 
Todaro 2000), most of which find the labor market failure in the (1) incapacity of 
agriculture to reabsorb rural workers together with its respective low-income 
(productivity), and (2) insufficient industrial development in the cities. For Todaro (2000: 
305), migration is primarily an economic phenomenon, which for the individual migrant 
can be a quite rational decision despite the existence of urban unemployment.  
 
The Todaro model postulates that migration proceeds in response to urban-rural 
differences in expected incomes rather than actual earnings. That decision is taken in 
order to maximize their expected gains in life and, for a given time horizon the urban 
sector results more convenient. In that sense, as natural disasters reduces future incomes 
expectations from agricultural activities, it stimulates in turn slums growing as well. 
Empirical evidence in that way was found by this research work, and is presented in 
chapter 3 when discussing vulnerability in Mexico City, in chapter 6 when making spatial 
econometric analysis at municipality level, as well as verified in the stakeholders’ 
consultation in three communities in rural Mexico, presented in chapter 5 of this work. 
 
In last instance, such failures in rural-urban incomes forecast have drawn a vicious circle 
of public inefficiency. As migrants from rural areas do not get employed in urban 
industrial activities, they are forced to engage in low-productivity tertiary activities. Also, 
large portion of this underemployed population becomes an obstacle to an efficient 
allocation of public resources, since the society is forced to provide large amounts of 
urban social infrastructure at the expense of directly public investments. For that reason, 
investments in agricultural productivity as well as in improving rural income can provide 
valuable solutions both in fighting poverty and in allocating efficiently society’s 
resources. 
 
2.4 Agriculture as livelihood 
Despite producing about 4% of GDP in 2002, the agricultural sector employs over 20% 
of the national population and its relative economic weight has declined permanently 
along the last five decades –in 1950 it provided about 18% of GDP. Agriculture is still 
the main livelihood of the poor in rural areas in Mexico (ECLAC 2001). However, 
agricultural income is increasingly complemented by income from low-salary activities. 
In general terms, poor rural population work in small-size rained agriculture, producing 
basic grains of fluctuating low prices, with inability –rather than aversion- to contract 
crop insurance.  
 
The typical landholding in the Mexican agrarian system is the Minifundio, which is too 
small to provide the workers with levels of living much above the bare survival 
minimum. For that reason, holders of minifundios are forced to provide seasonal labor to 
latifundios, or even to other labor markets, working either as wage laborers in other 
agriculture activities in the nearby, or taking a job in non-agricultural activities in semi-
rural areas. It happens regularly because agricultural incomes are so low, that it is not 
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enough even to subsistence. That fact was empirically verified by this dissertation’s field 
work, and is presented when analyzing subsistence farmers’ coping strategies in Southern 
Mexico. In sum, only 45% of total income of rural workers in Mexico is provided by 
agriculture, with a decreasing trend along the past 30 years (ECLAC 2001).  
 
2.4.1 Off-farm activities as response to economic vulnerability 
As land-tenure is smaller, a higher share of personal income must be obtained from 
alternative sources, as shown in an empirical study on the Mexican case carried out by De 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2000). Owners of two hectares or smaller properties earn only 23% 
from agriculture in year 1997, whereas holders owning more than 18 hectares earn at 
least 62% from this activity. Also the dependence from remittances and self-employment 
decreases as the size of land increases. 
 
However, shifting economic activity (or migrating) may fall outside the coping capacity 
of a rural household, given that it use to lead to destruction of its livelihood, in many 
cases forcing to change unit’s livelihood permanently. The latter is relevant to the present 
work given that it makes visible that as agricultural income decreases, the coping 
capacity of the worst-off farmers comes to the end, and they have then either to share 
income source or even to shift activity.  So, protection to rural households must not be 
thought as facilitating the transition from rural to urban economy, but rather 
strengthening rural incomes. For that reason, the present work includes work field with 
Mexicans farmers living in extreme poverty, and attempts at getting a realistic picture of 
their circumstances as possible, as well as to inquire into their coping strategies, in order 
to incorporate that learning to come up with stakeholders-based solutions.  
 
Increasingly, rural incomes rely at a larger extent on transfers (from social programs, 
remittances, etc.) as part of income. At national level, remittances from nationals working 
abroad represented 1.2% of households’ total income in year 2002. However, remarkable 
differences arise when comparing among urban and rural, where it reaches 0.5% and 
3.5%, respectively. Particularly relevant are remittances to the first rural quintile (poorest 
20%), where remittances represents 20% of the income. That quintile is reckoned to 
obtain 53% of total income from remittances, social programs, and other transfers (WB 
2004:75).  
 
2.4.2 Agricultural growth and poverty reduction 
Given current inequity conditions in Mexico, agricultural growth itself is not enough to 
reduce poverty in Mexico. In projecting towards reducing both economic vulnerability 
and poverty in the countryside is crucial to account for some structural patterns of 
agricultural growth, whose characteristic may help to maximize benefits from public 
intervention. Agricultural growth does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction in all the 
countries. Empirical studies shows remarkable progress in poverty reduction after 
agricultural growth under certain particular conditions: It depends on income structure 
and other distributional variables in a given country. The Ravillion and Datt (1996) 
results about India show that 85% of poverty reduction in the country for the analyzed 
period is explained by agricultural growth. Also, rural absolute poverty is negatively 
related to rural real incomes and the average crop yield, what is also an increasing 
function of food prices.  
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For Timmer (1997), agricultural growth and poverty reduction depend on equity state. If 
national growth were uniform (elasticity of connection = 1) in all income-ranges, then 
simple growth would generate poverty reduction at the national growth rate. But in 
practice, countries’ structure is no uniform. On the one hand, some countries have an 
elasticity-growth greater than 1 in high-income population, whereas less then 1 in the 
poverty, like agriculture in Pakistan (Adams and He 1995). On the other hand, countries 
with the inverse behavior would benefit even from neutral support policies to agriculture. 
In this sense, agricultural growth contributes to both growth and poverty reduction if (as 
discussed in Sarris 2001) the achievements of the initial productivity stimulus is allocated 
on economic agents who, in turn, make circulate this flow by investing/spending 
domestically on labor intensive domestic products. Timmer’s analysis (1997), based on 
rural and urban income by productive sector, shows that for countries with large income 
gaps, growth in agricultural activities is no more successful in poverty alleviation than 
growth in the non-agricultural economy. Mexico is situated in this case. Under that 
analysis, one must not be expected to achieve large progress in poverty reduction in 
Mexico by means of only improving average productivity in the countryside, but 
exclusively by aimed strategies. In that sense, one must admit that even when the current 
strategy to reduce natural disasters risk in the countryside and to support agricultural 
production provide valuable support, but it is not optimally contributing to reduce 
poverty given the current structure of the income in the Mexican countryside. To meet 
with that, support to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters in the countryside in Mexico 
must act discriminatory upon different economic agents. Public support (and subsidy) to 
increase productivity in the countryside must keep proportion with necessity degree. For 
instance, Chile has achieved a more equitant system to provide subsidy for crop insurance 
premiums, by supporting up to 80% of premium to those poorest farmers, whereas the 
support reaches at maximum 50% to farmers with more financial ability and better 
market information. By contrast, subsidy to crop insurance in Mexico has benefited 
relatively more to non-poor farmers, as criticized in chapter 4 when this work turns to 
assess the current disaster management strategy and concretely of AGROASEMEX, 
Fondos and FOPREDEN. 
 
2.5 Final comments 
 
The analysis of economic vulnerability implies dealing with a complexity of elements 
interacting on a given unit to deal with hazards, demanding a careful identification of 
what makes it vulnerable. A hazard, generally expressed as threats to a given system, 
affects depending on strengths and weaknesses of the unit, defining its coping and 
adaptive capacity. In the economic ambit, hazards can embrace abrupt perturbations 
derived from economic crisis, economic policy reorientation, among others, or can arise 
from relatively subtle stressors, like unequal entitlements and assets distribution, which 
makes continuous pressure upon the unit. In the natural ambit, hazards can also be subtle 
as well, as the case of continuous reduction in rainfalls, recurrent heavy winds and rains, 
etc., or more abrupt like their corresponding superlatives, i.e., droughts, hurricanes, etc. 
 
Coping capacity in Mexico, understood as unit’s ability to respond to a given hazard to 
reduce its affectation, is being highly undermined by unequal access to society’s 
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resources and prevailing poverty conditions, more remarkably in rural areas. The 
impossibility of rural masses to accumulate assets seems to be contributing to reduce 
their capacity to cope with negative outcomes from natural disasters and current 
economic challenges. In addition, social programs in Mexico, though valuable, do not 
show clear signs of being contributing substantially to reduce economic vulnerability. In 
fact, even if the social policy works correctly in this country –tested further in chapter 4-, 
prevailing entitlements and assets distribution systems seem to reduce their efficacy. 
Historic unattended social and economic demands continue threatening incomes, 
especially those in rural areas, whose negative effects can be observed in the increasing 
emigration tendency of the last years. 
 
As outlined in the discussion on economic policy along this chapter, one has to admit that 
a country with real development aspirations cannot rely on agriculture to take off its 
economy. However, if the urban economy fails in providing enough employment to 
additional workforce arriving from the impoverished countryside, given low dynamism 
of the national industry –as over the past 20 years in Mexico-, an emerging policy to 
strength rural assets and manage disasters has to be more actively implemented. A 
country like Mexico, where a quarter of the national population relies on agricultural 
activities producing less than 4% of the national product, has to not only upgrade 
productive infrastructure to increase rural incomes, but also has to manage its disasters 
and market risk in a more efficient way. Even if hazards threats especially the poorest 
population, one has to also not misunderstand and label the poor as vulnerable, since 
population above the poverty line is as vulnerable as the poor: its main risk consists of 
falling below the poverty line after an extreme hazard. 
 
So far this work has justified the need for investigating natural and economic hazards, 
and the next chapter attempts at presenting more substantially natural disasters and trade 
liberalization affectation over the past two decades in this country in order to identify the 
stakeholders and involved institutions. This chapter’s arguments concerning entitlements 
and assets and its relevance in shaping coping capacity will be complemented in chapter 
three, where adaptive capacity is more detailed addressed, assessing the scope of public 
intervention in social programs and risk management strategy. In general, chapters 2-4 
are thought to gradually expand the spectrum of this vulnerability analysis to embrace 
multiple stressors and hazards’ sequence with a complexity of socioeconomic conditions 
and biophysical subsystems behind. 
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Appendix 2.I: The dynamic of economic vulnerability 
 
 
Is high vulnerability responsible for low adaptability, or low adaptability the reason for 
high vulnerability? That question is the core of the discussion about how to asses the 
negative impacts of climatic events. It can be summed up in the following two positions: 
(1) the vulnerability-adaptability: identifying vulnerability in order to maneuver with 
adaptability measures; and (2) the adaptability-vulnerability, that is, studying adaptability 
to understand and further influence vulnerability. In this regard, supporters of the 
vulnerability-adaptability position (Kelly and Adger 2000, Chambers 1989) emphasize 
social vulnerability, and consider vulnerability to be causal variable in this relation, 
where being vulnerable influences the ability of the systems units to cope with external 
stresses. In this perspective people is considered as risk manager subject to a relative 
context and restrictions. The adaptability-vulnerability position considers adaptability to 
be an independent variable explaining vulnerability, where vulnerability is a residual of 
adaptive capacity after a given climatic event. As in the first position, interdependence 
between adaptability and vulnerability is present here as well, but the causal force in this 
case is adaptability. However, which position is right depends rather on at what side of 
the dichotomy one locates assets and entitlements. As pointed out by Schjolden (2003) 
when comparing adaptability in Norway and Mozambique, vulnerability and poverty are 
not equal, and calls for an analysis of adaptability indicators to make them relative to 
economic and social stressors. She includes assets and entitlements in Vulnerability, 
falling into Position 1. However, given that adaptive capacity is rather result of coping 
capacity, as seen in section 2, we have more reasons to associate entitlements and assets 
with adaptability than with vulnerability itself in this paradigmatic cause-effect relation. 
if one considers entitlements and assets to be part of adaptability, expanding this concept 
to embrace coping capacity, one can asses vulnerability in the form expound in this 
Appendix, making easier to quantify vulnerability. 
 
In this approach, as observed, the level of economic vulnerability to shocks is 
permanently interacting, and therefore can be modified by means of strengthening or 
weakening one or more of its constituting elements. Figure 2 is a theoretical illustration 
of the dynamic of economic vulnerability. As one move from the origin (intersect 0) 
values on the axis increase, that is, all values on the axis are positive. 
 
The right x-axis of the graphic represents extern shocks, which can be a perturbation or a 
stress in the form of a natural hazard, a sudden export restriction, etc. The upper y-axis 
represents the vulnerability level of a given unit of analysis. Extern shocks are 
independent of the vulnerability level of our unit of analysis, and so, a given extern shock 
can be corresponded by different levels of vulnerability; Hence, this relation is 
represented by a vertical line; we term quadrant I the area depicted by these two axes.  
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Figure 2: The dynamic of economic vulnerability 
 
 
Lower y-axis represents the variable Coping and adaptive capacity is a function 
of adaptive (risk management plus protection levels) and coping capacity (entitlements 
and assets). Coping and adaptive capacity–hence CA-, related with the variable hazards 
on the right horizontal axis shapes quadrant II. The slope of the respective curve, R, is 
determined by entitlements and assets system; the higher the slope, the less favorable 
entitlements and assets system to our unit of analysis. Curve R in quadrant II is the 
relation between unit’s coping and adaptive capacity and hazards, which is a negative 
function: As hazards increases either severity or frequency, a lower CA level is related 
with them. 
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Figure 3: The dynamic of economic vulnerability after reducing coping and adaptive capacity 
 
 
Left x-axis is the economic losses probability inherent to our unit of analysis, and 
is a variable representing the likelihood of having certain amount of economic losses as a 
consequence of a given shock affecting our unit given prevailing coping and adaptive 
capacity. Both CA and the economic losses probability axes shape quadrant III. The 
relation between CA and probability of economic losses is negative, since as unit’s CA 
decrease, the presence of economic damages is more likely to occur, represented by curve 
L. 
Quadrant IV is depicted by the economic losses probability and axes. In the same 
way, economic losses probability contributes to increasing vulnerability, thus, the relation 
vulnerability-economic losses probability is positive13.  
 
The graph above illustrates vulnerability relations with an initial equilibrium, where none 
of the components of vulnerability reduce or increase vulnerability level. So, V0 
represents initial level of vulnerability, S0 is the shock occurrence at a given magnitude, 
whose repercussions upon the unit is absorbed until the level R0, the level the unit is able 
                                                 
13 In last instance, the nature of vulnerability as potential event force our analysis to deal with, above all,  
probability terms. 
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respond to such a shock magnitude. To this extent, the effects of the shock have explored 
only unit’s non-monetary elements. Now, the resistance-protection level combined with 
the probability of economic losses is set at the level L0. Now, curve V reflects finally the 
combined consequences of the shock upon the system depicting unit’s vulnerability after 
passing by all its determinants. In this initial example, vulnerability level remains 
unchanged.  
 
This vulnerability assessment is in line with position 2 described in section 3 above, 
given that vulnerability is result of a given level of coping and adaptive capacity, and its 
level can be estimated only derived from a concrete shock –where most vulnerability 
indexes use to fail. That is also the reason of the present work to prefer holistic to 
deterministic disasters models, as observed in chapter 6 of this work. 
 
Now, figure 4 below shows the effects of the same shock but in this case the curve R, 
resistance, was displaced downwards (relative to the origin, 014). That displacement can 
be result failures in risk management in a given community, less access to credit for 
reconstruction, etc. The curve R’ posses lower CA values for all shocks compared to R. 
The same shock implies thus a lower resistance-protection level, moving from R0 to R1, 
corresponding to lower CA levels for all kinds of hazards. Given the relation where 
reductions in unit’s CA increase the probability of economic losses (from L0 to L1, in this 
case), the resulting level of vulnerability increases from V0 to V1. The increase in 
vulnerability is thus the difference V1 – V0.  
 
The same mechanism applies conversely for a displacement in the opposite direction of 
R. For instance, strengthening an element of the curve R leads to reducing vulnerability 
levels, other things equal. The aim of the present work consists in identifying strategies 
that displace out the curve R, to thus reduce the probability of economic losses to, in last 
instance, reduce economic vulnerability. This dynamic will be explored in more detail 
and quantitatively developed in chapter 6, when modeling the effects of trade 
liberalization and natural disasters on rural economic vulnerability. If curve R displaces 
from R to R’’, the extern shock of figure 4 produces less economic losses than those 
derived from R and R’, given that L2 < L0, L1. It leads to reduction in vulnerability 
relative to that derived from the same shock with lesser coping and adaptive capacity, as 
the case of R and R’, moving down economic vulnerability to V2. In this perspective, 
vulnerability is determined by CA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 When we say downwards concerning curves displacement, we are keeping the reasoning of a typical x-y 
graph. Hence, saying downwards means only a move (displace) of the curve approaching zero, the origin. 
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Figure 4: The dynamic of economic vulnerability after strengthening coping and adaptive capacity 
 
 
Something similar can be done if one makes improvements to the entitlements and assets 
system, like for instance increasing units income, access to better infrastructure, less 
information asymmetry, etc. It would imply changing the slope of R from R to R’, as 
seen in the graphic below. It reflects the fact that after improving assets and entitlements, 
the economic agent is better off to face a given hazard15. As observed, with the curve 
reducing its slope, the same hazard S0 from figure 2, is smoothed by a higher coping and 
adaptive capacity level, which compared to the previous state increased from R0 to R1. 
For the given curve of economic losses distribution, it produces a reduction in economic 
losses, depicted by the reduction of probability of economic losses from L0 to L1. Now, 
this effect reflected on the vulnerability curve represents a reduction in vulnerability level 
equal to the difference V0 – V1. In that way, improving assets and entitlements to our unit 
of analysis implies strengthening its economic vulnerability for a given hazard. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 However, as the hazard increases, this capacity reduces approaching the previous levels, R. 
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Figure 5: The dynamic of economic vulnerability after strengthening entitlements and assets system 
 
As analyzed in this appendix, improving risk management contributes to reducing the 
probability of economic losses for a given hazard. However, risk management and 
protection systems have a limit, where additional progress cannot be reached despite 
increasing investments at a constant rate. For that reason, there is a need to combine 
adaptability with actions to improve assets and entitlements, that is, with coping capacity. 
In that sense, reducing vulnerability is not a mere result of adaptability measures to face 
hazard impact, but implies a more robust strategy dealing with that hazard in a more 
complex context. 
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CHAPTER 3: Natural hazards and economic stressors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter explains the mechanism by means of which natural disasters and some past 
economic policy decisions have turned into hazards in Mexico. Natural disasters 
occurrence is increasingly producing severe damages to the so-called traditional 
agriculture, highly exposed to climatic events due to its predominating rainfed cropping 
practices as well as its high marginalization conditions, which together tend to amplify 
the negative effects from hazards. In the frame of the economic reforms implemented 
from the middle of the eighties, trade liberalization has led some economic sectors to 
increase more remarkably their exposure to international markets. It has been evidenced 
over the past two decades through prices drop of agricultural grains, the main crop of 
subsistence farmers. It has undermined their incomes given their limitations to increase 
neither productivity nor cropping land, as well as their inability to re-orientate 
production. 
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Data source: La Red (2003), SEGOB (2003) and CENAPRED (2001) 
 
Figure 6: Frequency and economic losses from natural disasters in Mexico (1970-2000) 
 
Section 1 describes the historical and spatial distribution of economic losses from natural 
hazards in Mexico.16 Section 2 analyzes the specific weight of natural disasters in the 
                                                 
16 It is more detailed analyzed in chapter four, which model it with coping- and adaptability-related 
variables. 
No cabe duda que es preciso superar el 
liberalismo del siglo XIX. 
ORTEGA Y GASSET, La rebelión de las masas 
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agricultural sector, further discussed in Section 3, which assesses its influence on the 
poor and on rural-urban emigration in the country.17 Section 4 discusses the contribution 
of trade liberalization to increasing economic vulnerability in Mexico, and section five 
concludes presenting a balance of these hazards in shaping economic vulnerability. 
 
3.1 Historical losses from natural hazards 
 
Like Japan and Central America, the Pacific Cost of Mexico is located at the so-called 
Circum-Pacific-ring of fire of tectonic activity. Hurricanes are a regular hazard on both 
the Atlantic and Pacific Costs. Roughly speaking, the South of the country suffers of high 
floods frequency, whereas the North of droughts and of an ongoing desertification 
process. Over the past three decades, natural disasters in Mexico have increased both 
frequency and economic cost (see chart above). However, most that affectation has been 
due to weather-related disasters, responsible for ca. 80% of economic losses over the 
period 1980-2005 (see Table 1). As observed in the next section, the weight of hurricanes 
in total disasters losses is particularly remarkable as it has implied 68% of total losses 
over the same period.  
 
Table 1: Losses from disasters in Mexico 1980-2005 (Losses in current USD mill)  
 
Disaster type Direct losses Indirect 
losses 
Total 
losses 
As % of 
total 
Weather 21,887 145 22,032 79
Geologic 4,044 517 4,561 16
Human 1,150 134 1,284 5
Total 27,081 796 27,877 100
With data from Guy Carpenter (2006), SEGOB (2003) and CENAPRED 
(2001) 
 
 
3.1.1 Hurricane 
For its geographic location, Mexico can be hit at the same time by two independent 
cyclones, namely from the North Atlantic and the North Pacific. Alone between the 
period 1967-1977 Mexico suffered 57 hurricanes, which caused severe damages in 
particularly six states in the South of the country (CENAPRED 2001). 
 
These hurricanes have mostly originated in the Caribbean Sea and the Central American 
Pacific Cost, moving into Mexican territory. Hurricane Paul in 1982 moved over the 
Pacific from El Salvador and Guatemala, upgraded from tropical storm in these 
countries18 to a 100 mph hurricane once in Mexican territory.19 Hurricane Pauline in 1997 
                                                 
17 More deeply analyzed in chapter five 
18 Over 1,000 fatal victims in Central America. 
19 The Southeast of Mexico shares with Central America and Caribbean countries not only the above 
presented high hurricanes and earthquakes affectation, but also the fact that disaster-vulnerable population 
is highly poor. Affected population in Mexico are usually located in southeast states, which, like in Central 
American and Caribbean countries, are subsistence farmers without access to credit, low crop insurance 
coverage, and work small farms. However, most the times these countries are hit by the same hurricane, 
relative higher economic losses and calamities occur in Central America and the Caribbean compared to 
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caused floods and mudslides, whipping up strong waves and currents with devastating 
effects across the coastline of Oaxaca and Guerrero. Alone in Acapulco it killed over 200 
people and caused over US$400 mill to public assets (see Table 2). This region’s uneven 
topography contributed to flooding and landslides following the hurricane. This calamity 
evidenced the rapid and wrong projected urbanization process in large costal cities of the 
recent years, which has led to increase potential economic and human losses from 
extreme climatic events. 
 
Table 2: Major hurricanes in Mexico, 1980-2005 (losses in current USD mill) 
 
 Hurricane Economic losses* 
1982 Paul 82 
1988 Gilbert 597 
1990 Diana 91 
1993 Gert 114 
1995 Opal 151 
1997 Paulina 448 
2002 Isidore** 235 
2005 Emily 250 
2005 Wilma 15,000 
2005 Stan 1,500 
Losses 1980-2000 18,968 
Period 2002-2005: data from Guy Carpenter (2003, 
2006); 1980-2001 SEGOB (2002) 
* Period 1980-2000 are estimates of losses to exclusively 
public assets. 
**Losses estimated at 50% total economic losses 
reported from Guy Carpenter in Mexico and the USA 
from Isidore, and in Central America and Mexico from 
Stan. 
 
 
The 2005 hurricane season 
Munich Re said the 2005 hurricane season to be the most costly of all time 
(MunichRe 2005). In turn, Mexico got severely damaged by hurricanes in that season, 
particularly on the Peninsula of Yucatan, where hurricanes Emily, Wilma and Stan hit 
within 3 months. Damages from Emily and Wilma accrued to mainly the tourist sector, 
whereas Stan hit mainly the poor in both urban and rural areas. 
Emily made landfall on the Yucatan Peninsula on 18 July, provoking the 
evacuation of around 130,000 tourists from luxury beachfront hotels in the resort city of 
Cancun. The storm produced heavy rains and winds, demolishing buildings, triggering 
floods and affecting especially the tourism. Almost 3 months after, hurricane Wilma 
destroyed thousands of homes and hotels and flooded luxury hotels and resorts (Guy 
Carpenter 2006), whose economic losses were five fold higher than those from Emily, 
becoming Mexico’s ever most costly hurricane (see table above). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mexico. It is so particularly due to differences in coping and adaptive capacity among them. It suggests the 
potential applicability of this thesis approach of vulnerability reduction to these other countries. 
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In October 2005, hurricane Stan passed over the Peninsula of Yucatan, but 
derived climatic events caused dramatic human and economic losses rather hundreds of 
kilometers to the South in especially marginalized areas. Hurricane Stan itself was not as 
damaging as its derived strong winds, floodings and mudslides on Chiapas, Oaxaca and 
Veracruz, killing 42 people and destroying assets of over one million of people, 
exceeding USD 1.5 billion in direct losses. In Guatemala the magnitude of Stan was 
higher in terms of human fatalities (1,400 dead), but lesser in economic losses, ca. USD 1 
billion20. 
 
3.1.2 Floods 
Whereas flooding caused by rivers overflowing their banks occurs almost every year in 
Mexico (especially in summer time), flooding from heavy rainfall occur permanently, 
causing erosion, landslides, and severe damage to housing, agriculture, livestock and 
public infrastructure. This section comprises river overflowing and heavy rainfalls only 
as they are cause of flooding. Flooding is naturally less frequent in semi-arid regions, but 
however it can be particularly devastating when it does occur there21. 
 
Heavy rains alone rarely cause floods. Soil erosion caused by deforestation, inadequate 
agricultural practices, and increasing urbanization contribute to increasing the floods risk. 
Despite considerable invest in drainage infrastructure, Mexico City experience losses 
every year from flash flooding. 
 
The occurrence of flooding is increasing in recently urbanized plain areas as change in 
land use broaden the capture of rainfall, producing flows that the natural basin cannot 
cope with. The loss from flooding in Mexico has been high. Alone between 1970 and 
1990 more than 1,800 people died and about USD $7.7 billion in economic losses are 
estimated to be incurred (Gutierrez 1998) from over 1,000 floods events in Mexico22. 
In September 1998, floods and landslides strike Chiapas, turning into the worst disaster in 
Mexico after the 1985 earthquake. It devastated huge extensions in costal areas, and left 
some 800,000 people homeless (25% of Chiapas population), and caused more than 200 
deaths. The most immediate problem was to reach the (isolated) areas affected for the 
flooding to provide aid relief and reconstruction to rehabilitate destroyed transport and 
telecommunication infrastructure. Other Mexican states affected by the torrential rain 
were Guerrero, Morelos, Oaxaca, Guanajuato and Nayarit, and they are also considered 
highly prone zones to landslides.  
3.1.3 Earthquake 
Historically, a number of large earthquakes have occurred within the Trans-Mexico 
Volcanic Belt, located approximately at 20˚ N latitude. This area runs from west to east, 
and its high tectonic activity is accompanied of active volcanic and faulting. Some of the 
largest earthquakes in recent history –like the 8.1 and 8.0 Richter degrees Michoacan and 
                                                 
20 However, losses in Mexico compared to national GDP are equivalent to 0.002%, while in Guatemala it 
reached 3.5% of GDP. 
21 As in the arid region of Monterrey in 1998 (CENAPRED 2001). 
22 With data from La Red. 
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Colima earthquakes in 1985 and 1995, respectively- originated in this region and spread 
across the pacific cost (Currie et al 2001). 
 
Most seismic activity in Mexico is related to the active tectonic boundaries between the 
North America and the Pacific and Cocos plates (Currie et al 2001, Bitrán 2001). A 
northern boundary that accommodates friction between the North America and Pacific 
plates runs beneath the Gulf of California and runs southward parallel to the Pacific cost 
of Mexico (WB-Guy Carpenter 2000). This area is part of the called circum-Pacific Ring 
of Fire, which draws a circle along Eastern Oceania’s Islands, Asian Pacific, and North 
and Central American Pacific costs. 
 
Other significant earthquakes in the recent times have been originated in this area as well, 
like in January 30, 1973 (magnitude 7.5), November 29, 1978 (magnitude 7.8), March 14, 
1979 (magnitude 7.6) and September 19, 1985 (magnitude 8.1) (CENAPRED 2000). In 
general, these earthquakes’ epicenters are located on seismic gaps, that is, on places 
where at least one strong earthquake has stunned in the past, but where no earthquake has 
taken place for a long time (John A. Martin 1988, WB-Guy Carpenter-IIASA 2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Seismic map of Mexico. Primary source: CENAPRED, Ministry of the Interior of Mexico 
 
 
Michoacan (or Mexico City) Earthquake 
As observed in Figure 7, CENAPRED has elaborated a Seismic Map of Mexico based on 
historic registers of major earthquakes in Mexico and on data of terrain acceleration from 
major earthquakes. The map shows four zones: Zone A represents areas without seismic 
activity over the last 80 years, which terrain acceleration is expected to keep fewer than 
10%. Zone D is the area with high earthquake frequency, and its acceleration exceeds 
70%. Zones B and C are mid-intensity regions. 
 
Trans-Mexico 
Volcanic Belt 
ChiapasOaxacaGuerrero
Epicenter 
Earthquake 
1985 
Mexico City
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Table 3: Earthquakes in Mexico 1980-2001 (losses in current USD mill) 
 
Earthquake Dead Direct 
losses 
Indirect 
losses 
Total 
losses 
Mexico City 1985 6,000 3,589 515 4,104 
Colima 1995 0 21.1 - 21 
Oaxaca, Puebla and Morelos, 
June 1999 
15 151 0 151 
Oaxaca, September 1999 35 153.6 1.4 155 
Guerrero 2001 0 2.9 - 3 
Data from CENAPRED (2001), Ministry of the Interior, Mexico. 
 
 
In 1985, the Michoacan Earthquake caused severe damage and collapse of high-rise 
construction in Mexico City (located on Zone B) even despite its long distance from the 
epicenter. It is said to be so due to the fact that the period of vibration of deep lacustrine 
soils beneath Mexico City coincided with the fundamental period of many high-rise 
buildings (Singh and Suárez, 1987). This earthquake produced US$ 4, 104 in economic 
losses, the most costly earthquake during the analyzed period (see Table 3). This event 
generated relevant social and politic changes in some cases, and accelerated other 
existing ones (see box 1). Derived from a natural hazards survey from the World Bank, 
IIASA and Guy Carpenter of 2000, Mexico can expect a 6.5 Richter degree or greater 
earthquakes every two years, a magnitude 7.0 or greater about every two years, and a 
magnitude 8.0 or grater about every 33 years (WB-Guy Carpenter 2000).  
 
 
Box 3.I: Political changes after 1985: triggered or catalyzed by the Michoacan 
Earthquake? 
 
The 1985 Michoacan earthquake in Mexico City caused 89% of total geologic losses over 
the period 1980-1999 (over 4 US billion, ECLAC, CENAPRED 2001), and is considered 
point of break in Mexico’s recent history. Some authors affirms this amount could be 
imprecise, since original estimations of the Mexican government overinflated damage 
figures up to $US6bn as a lever to relax IMF conditions for reconstruction loans (Albala-
Bertrand 1993:140, Proceso 1985). ECLAC estimates were more conservative (US$ 
4.1bn.), but it was estimated based on officials losses assessments. By contrary, these 
authors presume the number of deaths to have been underestimated in order to avoid the 
army of undertaking the emergency control, as stated in Mexican law* (Castillo 1985). 
After the students’ genocide in 1968 in the Three Cultures Square in Mexico City, 
military intervention is believed to irritate civil society in Mexico, which had put 
additional tension to the disaster. 
 
This earthquake undermined the image of the Federal government as warrant of national 
security in the country due to the delay and badly coordinated response (Monsivais 
1987), as well as due to the governmental corruption evidenced through constructions 
approved by the authority despite not fulfilling buildings codes requirements (Castillo 
1985, Ramírez 2005). Since this disaster, corruption started to be perceived in this 
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country beyond the economic burden and the public moral issue it is, but also as factor of 
risk to citizens’ life. The insufficient governmental preparedness and response to this 
disaster led the civil society to undertake rescue, cleaning up, and relief operations 
(Ramírez 2005, Monsivais 1987). It generated a collective feeling of absent state and led 
to crucial political transformations. 
 
 The political cost of such insufficient response was paid in the upcoming national 
elections in 1988. Most likely influenced by these events, the hegemonic PRI - the ruling 
party since 1929-, split. Corriente Democratica, an intern organization of PRI, joint the 
leftist PSUM party, which obtained a gigantic electoral triumph in 1988, which included 
dozens of seats in the federal congress and municipal governments (Rosenblueth 1991), 
and perhaps the presidency of the republic as well. PRI is widespread suspected of 
committed electoral fraud through the electronic votes counting system (Proceso 2003). 
In any case, that political change proved having contributed to the fast electoral growth of 
the opposition in the oncoming years as the congress reached a real multiparty 
representation six year later, leaving behind the one-party political system of the previous 
six decades. 
 
 
Natural-social stunning events 
Over 50% of Zone A (most prone to earthquakes) is located along Mexico’s poorest 
states: Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero (see Figure 7), recurrently hit by hurricanes and 
floods as well. These states are historically characterized by having Mexico’s lowest per 
capita income, highest illiteracy rates, and worst health facilities in Mexico. 
Coincidently, all Guerrilla movements after the Mexican Revolution of 1910 have 
popped up on precisely these three states, i.e. Lucio Cabañas Guerrilla in Guerrero during 
the 1970s, EZLN Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional in Chiapas since 1994, and 
EPR Ejercito Popular Revolucionario and ERPI Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo 
Insurgente in Guerrero and Oaxaca from 1995. 
 
3.1.4 Volcanoes 
As a result of the collision between the North America and the Pacific and Cocos plates, 
dozens of volcanoes are distributed along Mexican territory, but especially on the Trans-
Mexico Volcanic Belt (Cordillera Neovolcánica, see 7), which defines the 
geomorphologic boundary between North and Central America.23 In fact, 14 of these 
volcanoes have erupted in recent history. 
 
Chichonal 
The most recent volcano eruption that resulted in catastrophic losses in Mexico was El 
Chichonal (State of Chiapas) in 1982, which completely destroyed eight communities 
and claimed 2,000 lives. The eruption lasted nearly six hours and caused severe damages 
to crops, cattle, and cultivable land within a 50-kilometer radius (Gutierrez 1998). 
                                                 
* Plan DN-III-E, Art. 42, Ley Orgánica del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos. 
23 In geomorphologic terms, the Trans-Mexico Volcanic Belt defines the boundary between the North 
American Rocky Mountains-Sierra Madre Occidental system, and the Mesoamerican Sierra Madre del 
Sur- Sierra Madre de Chiapas. 
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Popocatepetl 
Between 1993 and 1998, volcanoes Popocatepetl, Colima, Tacaná, and Everman heve 
registered activity. According to seismographers from the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM), a major eruption of Popocatepetl would affect thousands 
of people in settlements within a 20-30 kilometer radius (CENAPRED 2002). This 
volcano is being carefully monitored for preparedness sake, including evacuation 
measures for communities in the vulnerable area.24  
 
3.1.5 Droughts 
In Mexico only around 20% of harvested hectares is irrigated (ECLAC 2006, INEGI 
2004). This fact reveals a high dependence of agricultural production from 
meteorological phenomena. Lack of water in form of droughts, forest fires, and high 
temperatures damaged over 36 million of crops hectares over the period 1970-2002 
(Garcia and De la Parra 2002), which means 18 times total cultivated surface in Mexico 
in 2002. Alone in the 1980s, economic losses from droughts reached US$1.2 billion 
(CENAPRED 2001). 
 
Weather dependence of agriculture  
The graphic below shows the distribution of 6, 296 disasters (natural and anthropogenic) 
in Mexico occurred over the period 1970-2001. Over one third of them are events caused 
by excess of water (floods, heavy rains, storms, hurricane, etc., 2,208 reports), whereas 
lack of water represented 18% of total events. Floods are the most frequently reported 
event (blue bar, over 1,112 reports), followed by fires (828 reports) and frosts (407)25.  
 
Although other natural disasters have damaged less spectacularly, they have been more 
frequent.26 Frost is the kind of phenomena which have damaged agriculture more 
permanently, accumulating MX$95, 910 mill over the period 1979-1988, followed by 
hailstorms (MX$30,153 mill) (CENAPRED 2001).   
 
3.2 Hazard exposure of agriculture 
 
Macroeconomic analyses tend to ignore crucial impacts of natural disasters on the 
economy. Though the agricultural sector in Mexico is small sector in GDP terms (4%, 
compared to 68% from services, 28% from industry27), this sector employs 68% of the 
population in extreme and moderate poverty in rural areas.28 Moreover, the Mexican 
                                                 
24 In large cities –such as Puebla, Cuernavaca, and Mexico City, over 40 kilometers away from 
Popocatepetl-, the effects of an eruption are likely to be limited to falling volcanic ash. 
25 This data basis has been created by Desinventar (DesenRedando, La Red, Mexico, 2003) by collecting reports from 
media, especially from three Newspapers for the Mexican case: El Universal, La Jornada, and Excelsior. Given that 
fact, data arising from Desinventar must to be carefully employed, since in detailed analysis some data may be 
incomplete, leading to either over- or underestimate losses due to its journalist nature. However, it is helpful to get 
general pictures of disasters. It also provides good approaches on magnitudes and disaster frequency. Amount of losses 
are still controversial, since they vary widely from observation to observation, and rarely coincide with other sources. 
26 In fact, most the increase in weather-related disasters may be linked to El Niño phenomena (Vatsa & 
Krimgold 2000: 131, CENAPRED 2001: 145) 
27 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Aguascalientes, Mexico. 
28 Country assistance strategy of the World Bank Group for the Mexican United States, 2002 
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agriculture is highly vulnerable to weather-related disasters given current levels of 
rainfed agriculture. The 82 major weather-related events that have struck between 1980 
and 2002 have damaged mostly agriculture disrupting rural incomes, as discussed across 
this section. 
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Figure 8: Disasters in Mexico 1970-2000 by kind of event 
Data source: DesInventar, DesenREDando 2003. 
 
Every time a hurricane strikes, over 70% of total damages are located in agriculture. 
Thanks to reports from La Red (2003), we know that natural disasters affectation in 
agriculture over the past 35 years has affected mostly assets of poor and extreme poor 
farmers.  
 
• In 1982, Hurricane Paul and floods caused MX$7.4 millions in direct losses to the 
agriculture, equal to 70% of total losses from this event. 
• Floods in 1985 hit Mexico, and 85% of total losses were located in agriculture, 
damaging especially crops. In the same year, heavy rains caused losses at 
MX$4,177 mill, 97% in agriculture (infrastructure and crops).  
• In 1988, Hurricane Gilbert hit severely Peninsula of Yucatan and North-eastern 
Mexico, damaging the whole local economy. Losses in agriculture sector were 
especially acute, since it meant 86% of total losses (US $ 65 mill.). Along the 
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same year, three more hurricanes hit Mexico causing economic losses to crops 
three fold Gilbert’s losses (CNA 1998, CENAPRED 2001). 
• Hurricane Paulina hit Oaxaca and Chiapas (the poorest Mexican states) in 1997, 
sparking off severe damages on the whole economic activity and housing, but 
88% of total losses are in agriculture and livestock.  
• Agricultural losses from climatic events repeated in 1998 in these two states 
again, though more dramatically in Chiapas. Heavy rains caused landslides and 
avalanches from the southern mountains of Chiapas to the cost. This disaster 
buried dozens of communities, destroyed 712 Km of asphalted roads and over 
50% of rural roads of the state (3, 600 Km.), 22 bridges, etc. Over 25% of total 
infrastructure of Chiapas was totally destroyed. Losses reached US $ 603 mill, too 
high for a poor state.29 
• By 1999, heavy rains continued damaging agriculture in Southern Mexico. 
Several poor communities in the states of Puebla, Veracruz and Tabasco were 
severely affected by heavy rains. Inhabitants of these communities survive 
historically of agricultural activities, and 66% of total losses from these heavy 
rains accrued to rural infrastructure and crops of small-scale producers 
(MX$1,767 mill.). 
 
3.3 Relative vulnerability of the poor 
Though being poor doe not necessarily imply being vulnerable, but poverty makes 
individuals relatively more vulnerable to a given hazard. People worldwide living in 
adverse economic conditions is less able to invest in all items, including those to manage 
risk and increase disasters protection. Developing countries have historically been more 
severely damaged compared to developed countries (Benson & Clay 2002: 11). On the 
one hand, total economic losses tend to be higher in rich countries in absolute terms, but 
compared to economy value, losses are much higher in developing countries (i.e. 
Freeman and Mechler 2001). A given natural hazard with identical intensity can hit in 
different degree two distinct countries. Differences in civil protection system, health 
facilities and public financial ability (i.e. for reconstruction) make countries to absorb 
hazards differently. For instance, the same hurricane hit the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti in 2004, but it caused economic losses five fold higher in Haiti. Though both are 
developing countries, but at different development stages. As Cannon (1994: 24-26) 
points out, what turns a natural hazard into a disaster is not simply a question of money, 
but also of economic and political system. The way countries structure societies 
determines that similar hazard lead to very different impacts among societies.  
 
3.3.1 Coping capacity of the poor 
Given current entitlements, the poor is the most prone stratum to suffer of natural 
disasters, especially in developing countries. The distribution of human assets in many 
developing countries reveals high inequity. The most productive and safe terrains belong 
to middle- and upper classes, whereas less productive and/or unsafe areas were left to the 
poor. Most of the victims of Guatemala’s Earthquake in 1976 were poor (23,000 deaths), 
                                                 
29 Losses reached 9.3% of Chiapas GDP in 1998. 
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who lived in ravines and gorges, areas very prone to disaster in case of earthquake or 
landslides. The river Oder, which divides Germany from Poland, overflowed in 1997 
producing severe floods. Lack of maintenance of dykes and flood defenses, together with 
poor people living along the river in the polish side, produced disgracefully notoriously 
higher damages there than at the German side (Vatsa & Krimgold 2000). That reveals, on 
the one hand, budgetary differences to mitigate disasters between these countries. On the 
other hand, it reflects differences in living conditions within population in these countries 
as in both countries assets of lower incomes people got more affected. Additional 
evidence in the same way is found in Honduras with hurricane Mitch (Vatsa & Krimgold 
2000), El Salvador Earthquake in 1986 (ECLAC 1986), Dominican Republic with 
hurricane Georges (Butterfield 1998), the United States of America when hurricane 
Kathrina hit in 2005 (O’Brien 2005), among others. 
 
3.3.2 High losses-high adaptability regions versus high losses-low adaptability 
As discussed in section 1.1, hurricanes Wilma and Stan affected the Yucatan 
Peninsula and Chiapas in 2005, with relatively higher damage to assets of the poor. 
Economic losses from Wilma exceeded USD 15,000 mill, while those from Stan in 
Chiapas were at USD 3 mill. However, the adaptive capacity of affected population from 
Wilma in Yucatan proved to be much higher, where over 50% were insured losses (Guy 
Carpenter 2006). It was so especially due to the fact that most losses from Wilma took 
place in Cancun, damaging luxury hotels and resorts. By contrast, losses derived from 
Stan were totally uninsured, affecting basically assets of the poor both in marginalized 
slums in urban areas (i.e. Las Americas in Tapachula) and in subsistence farmers regions 
(i.e. Escuintla, Mapastepec, Cacahoatan). Facts like that is the motivation to assess 
coping and adaptive capacity in that region, presented in Chapter 5 derived from a 
fieldwork of the author to these municipalities in 2005. 
 
3.3.3 Spatial distribution of agricultural losses  
The map below plots 1,372 reported events on agriculture affectation in Mexico over the 
period 1970-2001. The map is divided in states, and colors represent ranges of damages. 
As observed, the most damaged state is Chiapas, followed by Oaxaca and Yucatan (in the 
South), Mexico and Guanajuato (Center), and Jalisco, Tamaulipas, Sonora and Sinaloa 
(North). Chapter 6 overlaps disaster affectation maps with distribution maps of income, 
marginalization and access to risk management instruments, showing that the South is 
relatively the most vulnerable region in the country.  
 
At a first sight, economic losses from natural disasters seem to be similar across the 
national territory, but it produced dramatic effects on marginalized regions without access 
to risk management instruments in mostly rural areas. Though the 1985 Michoacan 
earthquake is considered Mexico’s all time most dramatic earthquake -losses reached 
2.17% of GDP in year 1985-, but the huge differences in coping and adaptive capacity 
between Mexico City and Chiapas has made the latter to absorb much more negatively 
past hazards. The 2003 poverty report issued by the Mexican government points out that 
Chiapas is now the poorest state of Mexico, both in terms of GDP per capita as well as in 
social indicators. In addition, the development gap between Chiapas and the other states 
of Mexico is continuously enlarging. Thus, the relevance of natural disasters lies on the 
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fact that they do not hit significantly upon the whole economy, but to the agricultural 
sector in highly marginalized regions with low coping and adaptive capacity. These 
hypotheses are quantitatively tested through the spatial econometric model presented in 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Damaged hectares due to natural disasters in Mexico by state (1970-2000) 
Data source: DesInventar, DesenREDando 2003. 
 
 
3.3.4 Emigration as response to disasters vulnerability in rural areas 
Given adverse entitlements system and assets distribution, natural disasters affectation in 
the Mexican countryside tends to exceed rural coping and adaptive capacity and so to 
terminate rural livelihoods, triggering domestic rural-urban and abroad emigration. As an 
efficient strategy for agriculture and rural areas was not successfully undertaken during 
the 80´s –discussed in chapter 2 and further in 4 and 5-, these rural workers have been 
migrating massively to especially large domestic cities, i.e. Mexico City, Monterrey, 
Guadalajara, and Tijuana, building irregular settlements (mostly slums) on areas very 
prone to natural disasters as well. Out migration from Mexico to other countries has 
increased over the past two decades. The Population Census of 1990 reports that 0.24% 
of Mexican population was residing abroad, whereas in the 2000 Census this figure rose 
to 0.41% (INEGI 2005). 
 
 50
3.3.4.1 Domestic migratory flows 
In Mexico City, the most disaster-prone areas are populated by the poor. Socio-economic 
maps of Mexico City show the poor located along an area going from Southeast to 
Northwest, wide in the South and narrower as moving northwards (INEGI 2006), exactly 
on very prone areas to natural disasters, whereas richest areas run from Southeast to 
Northeast, that is, on the less prone areas to disasters.30 Figure 10 below relates zones at 
high risk to earthquake in Mexico City and slums location. Violet color represents areas 
whose underneath is the lake Tenochtitlán.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Earthquake risk in Mexico City and slums distribution 
With data from CENAPRED and INEGI 
 
 
The severe damage and collapse historically experimented on this area has occurred due 
to the accelerating vibration of deep soils beneath (resonance effect), as in 1985 when the 
Michoacan earthquake hit Mexico City. In red circles are represented slums and very 
poor areas, which are mostly located upon this high-risk area. 
 
                                                 
30 Experts on demography use to name this socio-economic distribution as The Bell of Income, due to its 
geographic shape: poor  from south-west to the north, each time narrower; rich from north to south-east, 
each time wider; and a mixture of middle, high and low income in the middle.  
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The nature of the Mexican economy is dualistic, since in general terms exists a modern 
urban capitalist sector geared toward capital-intensive of large-scale production, 
coexisting with a traditional rural subsistence sector geared toward labor-intensive of 
small-scale production. In the same way, this dualism is observed in the urban economy, 
which is divided into formal and informal sector. In Mexico, estimated share of urban 
labor force in the informal sector is 57%, and slums as percentage of population in 
Mexico City is reckoned to be 46 (ECLAC 2003a). This city concentrates over 20 
millions people,31 the world second largest city in terms of population (after Tokyo, 26 
mill.), and the world largest in terms of surface (4,986 km2) –INEGI 2005. 
 
3.3.4.2 International migratory flows 
About one-quarter of Mexico’s labor force is still employed in agriculture, and as 
conditions in the countryside continue to worse, rural workers do not have incentives to 
stop out migration not only to urban Mexico, but also to urban and rural USA (Robinson 
et al 1995). Mexico is the first country of origin of migrants to the USA, where nowadays 
1 out of 3 migrants was born in Mexico, integrating the first majority migrating 
community in the USA as well as in 31 of the 50 states of the American Union (Center of 
Migration Studies of Washington 2003, US Census Bureau 2002).  
 
3.4 Trade liberalization 
 
In the previous sections was discussed the relevance of natural hazards to the agricultural 
sector and in turn to the rural poor in Mexico. This section discusses basic concepts 
leading to understand why trade liberalization turns into a hazard despite its high 
expectations of becoming source of benefits for even subsistence farmers. It presents, as 
well, empirical evidence of the increasing imports trend and decreasing agricultural 
prices undermining rural incomes. 
 
3.4.1 Globalization and regionalization 
Before starting explaining trade liberalization, let us clarify some key concepts lying 
behind, like globalization and regional markets. The idea of globalization can be first 
understood by simply language interpretation. Global is an adjective implying the earth 
globe. The dimensions of globalization are still polemic. Some authors opt to include 
only visible measurable aspects into the globalization concept, like flows of trade, capital 
and people across the globe.32 Others denote in addition a stretching of social relations 
and activities across regions and frontiers, implying cultural and symbolic dimensions 
(Held and McGrew 2000). In turn, these broader concepts use to include achievements of 
institutions and organizations of the international community dealing with global shared 
                                                 
31 15.6 millions People live alone in Distrito Federal, plus 5.1 in neighbour municipalities, which have been 
integrated to the metropolis. Sources: World Resources Institute 1996-1997: The urban environmental 
(New York: Oxford University Press) tab. 1.1; United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. See 
Appendix B for income distribution. 
32 A frequent questioning to globalization is about its innovation. Hellainer (1997) considers globalization 
to be not only a phenomenon of the modern age, but placed in the context of secular trend of world 
historical development. So, one can find similar globalization patterns connecting the second half of the 
19th century (Victorian era of the English empire, la belle epoche in France), with the Spanish colonialism 
in the centuries 17th and 18th (i.e. Galeon Manila-Acapulco-Cadiz) and even with the ancient Silk Route. 
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knowledge (i.e. UNESCO), international aid (i.e. Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontiers, 
etc.), and even going beyond by including scopes from rather modern multilateralism (i.e. 
UNO, NATO, APEC, etc.). However, we prefer to limit this concept to just include trade, 
capital and people for this work’s sake.33 Some arguments criticize the spatial validity of 
denominating globalization the current stage of world economic integration, opting 
instead to call it regionalization. Castells (1996) points out that the world is rather 
passing by an increase in interregional relations. In terms of merely trade, the case of 
Mexico is more in line with that view.  
 
Despite the current trade agreements between Mexico and over 40 countries, Mexican 
foreign trade continues very concentrated with USA. These trade agreements include the 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mexico-European Union Free 
Trade Agreement (MEUFTA), and the Mexico-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(MCAFTA), among others. In addition, Mexico is member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) since 1986 (GATT that time) and is preparing negotiations for 
expanding trade agreements to the rest of the American continent by means of the FTAA 
(Free Trade Agreement of the Americas). For that reason, Mexico is usually considered 
one of the most opened world economies. However, ca. 90% of Mexican foreign trade 
value is concentrated with exclusively the USA (Saldana 2002). Beyond trade, other 
productive factors are highly concentrated with the USA as well, i.e. labor move34 and 
foreign direct investment.35 That fact is understandable if one looks at the relevance 
geographic aspects posses in factors mobility, what in turn seems to be the main limit of 
Mexico for going global. 
 
3.4.2 Growing share of foreign trade in the economy 
As the share value of the foreign trade compared to the whole value of the economy 
(GDP) increases, economies like the Mexican become more exposed to extern factors. 
Foreign trade expansion is conventionally said to have a positive effect on the economy 
as a whole (Franker and Romer 1999), especially when boosting exports (Micco and 
Perez 2001). Also, when foreign trade growths faster than the sum of the other 
components of the economy (consumption, investment and public sector expenditure), 
foreign trade becomes relatively more important in a weighted appreciation of the 
economy. Given that foreign trade is subject to international market fluctuations, which at 
a large extent volatize out of the scope of domestic measures, the country's exposure 
increases (Briguglio 2002), and small-scale economic agents turn into mere price takers 
                                                 
33 A conventionally admitted aspect of globalization is its growing magnitude or intensity of global flows 
such that states and societies become increasingly inserted in world systems and in networks of interaction 
based on continuously improving communications facilities. 
34 In terms of flows of people (legal and illegal), the trend is very similar too. Unlike some negligible 
programs on temporary work, Mexico has not signed trans-boundary labor agreements with the USA, and 
despite that fact, over 90% of international emigration goes to that country. 
35 Quiroz (2002) reckons that 60% of foreign direct investment in Mexico arose from the USA in 1995 –the 
rest from Germany (5%), Japan (4.5%), etc. There is a widespread critic on the fact that most FDI in 
Mexico is comprised of investments of multinational companies in their existing branches in Mexico, rather 
than of new business implementation and incorporating new economic agents to the benefits of foreign 
trade (Dussel 2000). In addition, capital and exports concentration in very few hands is taking place after 
started trade liberalization in this country (Saldana 2002). 
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without much ability to influence on international prices. In this regard, the size of 
foreign trade of Mexico (exports plus imports) compared to GDP shifted from 43% 
before NAFTA implementation (1993) to 98% six years later (using data from INEGI 
2000). It has stressed the Mexican agriculture as the rise of grains imports from the USA 
has led to lower prices. 
 
3.4.3 Negative terms of trade 
Another stressor to the countryside is the negative Terms of Trade both of the whole 
agricultural sector as well as of most crops within that sector. Incomes from exports 
depends both on the volume of these exports sold abroad and also on the price paid for 
them. The ratio between the price of a typical unit of exports and the price of a typical 
unit of imports is called commodity Terms of Trade. If the price of the country’s exports 
are falling relatively to the price of the products it imports, it should either to sell that 
much more of its export product (enlisting more of its scarce productive resources) or to 
contract debt at the amount of the net loss, merely to keep constant imported goods 
purchased in the past. When it succeeds, commodity terms of trade are said to deteriorate 
for a country. Todaro (2000: 466) conducted empirical studies about it, which suggest 
that relative primary-products prices have declined to manufacture goods at world level 
during the XX century. Between 1977 and 1994 the prices of non-oil primary products 
relative to those of exported manufactured declined by almost 60%. For reasons like that, 
countries depending on primary commodities to exports must sell greater quantities in 
order to purchase a given quantity of imports (generally manufactures). Given that in the 
short-run a quick expand of exports is usually not possible due to existing duties and 
other barriers to penetrate foreign markets, export amounts change only moderately, and 
in consequence a net loss from foreign trade appears necessarily in this kind of countries. 
Especially high is this risk for mono-crop countries. As Benson and Clay (2002: 23) point 
out, mono-crop regions must face vulnerability from not only natural disasters, but also 
those associated to world trade uncertainty due to non-diversified export products of 
primary commodities. In addition, the Prebisch-Singer thesis (Prebish 1950, Singer 1950) 
argues that there was and would continue to be a secular decline in the terms of trade of 
primary-commodity exporters due to a combination of low income and price-elasticity of 
demand. This decline resulted in a long-term transfer of income from poor to rich 
countries, says Prebisch, which could only be combated by protecting domestic 
manufactures industries through the so-called process of import substitution.  
 
In order to reduce the vulnerability associated to negative terms of trade, the Mexican 
economy opted for reducing the ratio agricultural/industrial products. Roughly speaking, 
between 1945 and 1975 the Mexican economy applied a model of import substitution, but 
it was no longer sustainable due to self limits of the model as well as to world context. 
However, the Mexican economy has been conducting efforts towards vulnerability 
reduction by improving terms of trade. By 1974, Mexico has joined the ranks of the new 
industrialized countries (NIC´s), with manufactured goods representing over 50% of total 
exports and agricultural goods falling back to 39% -and to 4% in 2002. In addition, 
whereas oil exports represented 75% of Mexico’s foreign exchange earnings in 1980, by 
2000 this percentage was reduced to only 18%, decreasing thus vulnerability to sudden 
oil prices reductions. It is true that vulnerability to negative terms of trade was reduced, 
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but the traditional rural economy increased later its vulnerability to imports due to trade 
liberalization, increasing natural hazards affectation, and the dismantling of public 
companies aimed at supporting adaptive capacity in the agricultural sector. 
 
3.4.4 NAFTA and agriculture 
Despite surprisingly significant increases in exports due to signed trade agreements, its 
gains have been unequally distributed in Mexico, whereas agricultural imports (mostly 
grains) have contributed to drive farmers out of business. It is so partly because of per se 
asymmetries in the country, and partly because of a public planning that has ignored (or 
underestimated) some crucial elements of the country’s vulnerability.  
 
It might be risky to provide a judgment on the gains and losses of trade liberalization as a 
whole to the Mexican economy. Just 11 months after initiated NAFTA, a dramatic 
economic crisis hit the Mexican economy, making it hard to disentangle the effects of the 
trade agreement on the economy from other factors. 
 
The impact of trade liberalization on the Mexican agriculture has received a lot of 
criticism even prior to the NAFTA implementation in 1994 (i.e. Calva 2004, Baffes 1998, 
Levy and Van Wijnbergen 1994, Burshifer et al 1992), as well as more positive 
judgments from others (see Serra 1993, Lederman et al 2003, Yunez-Naude and 
Barceinas 2003). It has also become a very controversial point in the Mexican political 
arena, especially regarding the liberalization of certain sensitive products for Mexico 
implemented from last January 2003 on due to its associated effects on small-scale 
farmers.  
 
3.4.5 Unfair trade 
The exposure to foreign markets volatility discussed in the previous section seems to be 
not as damaging as trade unfairness. Trade unfairness is driven mainly by trade partner 
countries, but it is influenced by domestic factors as well. 
 
3.4.5.1 High subsidies in trade partner countries 
There is an increasing pressure from the Mexican poorest farmers to force developed 
countries to make fair trade. Fare trade is focused on cutting back on subsidies in order to 
reduce damage they inflict on depressing prices and, in turn, on the income of poor 
Mexican farmers. By 2002, over 90% of total foreign trade of Mexico was held with the 
United States and the European Union. Farmers from these countries have gotten more 
than US$ 300 billion in subsidies every year, which allows industrial-size farms to 
produce more hectares of crops than needed for domestic consumption, and exceeding 
production is sold overseas at prices far below the international benchmark price (Saldana 
2003). Usually, that exceeding production from rich and developed countries is big 
enough to drag down the world price of the commodity. On the one hand, farmers in 
developing countries like Mexico cannot compete with cheap imports, and in the other 
hand they cannot compete in foreign markets given depressed world price of the 
commodity. So, they loose both in domestic markets and have little chance of exporting. 
If one adds this problematic to the negative terms of trade of primary goods, one can 
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realize the adverse trade conditions farmers should cope with –not only from Mexico, but 
also from most developing countries. 
 
High subsidies for agricultural producers from Mexico’s main trade partners make 
Mexican small farmers more vulnerable to imports rise. Small-farmers' discontent is 
growing in all developing countries. Not only Mexican farmers participated actively in 
the demonstrations against unfair trade at the Ministers Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization on September 2003 in Cancun, but also farmers from over 30 developing 
countries. More important, ministers of trade from most of these developing countries at 
the WTO have started supporting that discontent, and disagreed with moving towards a 
global liberalized trade in other industries (Round of Doha) as long as developed 
countries (centered in basically the USA, Canada, EU, and Japan) do not lift high 
agricultural subsidies. After the experience in Cancun, that discontent has become so 
generalized that forced the EU Commission, with its conditions, to negotiate with other 
blocks of industrialized countries an eventual subsidies reduction. 
 
3.4.5.2 Domestic unfairness 
Though the external framework and international trade legislation are crucial to define 
foreign agricultural trade, domestic factors might also become decisive. Macroeconomic 
stability plays a key role in agricultural vulnerability as well. For instance, Yuñez-Naude 
(2002) shows that a substantial share of the variations of domestic agricultural prices 
during 1980-1999 in Mexico were due to rather sudden exchange-rate fluctuations.  
 
In addition to high subsidies, there is also an increasing discontent in Mexican 
agricultural producers because of dumping practices, smuggling, and trade 
triangulation.36 It contributes to increase imports, to depress prices, and, in last instance, 
to drive Mexican agricultural producers out of business, contributing to poverty and 
inequity in the countryside.  
 
3.4.6 Increasing imports, decreasing prices in the agricultural sector 
Overall, Mexican agricultural trade of balance has a deficit (see chart below), which may 
be greater if one could integrate smuggling into. After 1995, both agricultural imports 
and exports increased, but a slight deficit has been permanent. Most the increase in 
agricultural imports is due to grains, historically produced by subsistence farmers with 
low yields, and much more efficiently produced in the USA at lower cost. It has led to 
increase imports biased to grains, with a consequent impact in reducing mean crops 
prices. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Trade triangulation is considered a kind of documented smuggling, since it consists of importing 
merchandise from a non-NAFTA country, but presenting false purchase bills from a NAFTA area country 
in order to get the tariff exemption agreed in NAFTA.   
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Agricultural Balance of Trade, Mexico 1980-2000
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Figure 11: Agricultural trade of balance, Mexico 1980-2000 
Data source: Mexican Central Bank (Banco de Mexico, 2005) 
 
 
Prices drop of agricultural grains explains over 60% of the tendency observed in Figure 
12 below. It is crucial given that grains like maize, beans and rice are the main crops of 
most subsistence farmers in this country (ECLAC 2003a, 2001a, WB 1994), undermining 
rural incomes of most farmers given their impossibility to increase neither their 
productivity nor cropping land.37 Graph 10.a plots mean weighted agricultural prices, 
which are estimations of the author based on registers of mean rural prices and 
production with data from SIACON (2005).38 It is made of the mean prices of crops 
weighted by their share production in the corresponding year at 2002 constant prices. 
Graph 10.b attempts at showing the net prices evolution after incorporating changes in 
mean yield –tons/hectare- over the same period. This graph thus plots weighted prices of 
a crop hectare in the country.39 As observed by the slope difference of trend lines 
between these graphics, the price decrease in terms of production volume ($/ton) is 
higher than those of cropping hectares ($/ha), given the incorporation of the yield 
increase over this period. It means that even if one includes the yield increase, prices 
trend has still decreased remarkably over this period, decreasing incomes of farmers 
unable to crop more intensively and/or extensively, sharpening poverty conditions, and 
stressing particularly those farmers more frequently affected by disasters. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 More detailed expound in chapter 4 of this work 
38 Subsistema de Informacion Agricola, Ministry of Agriculture. 
39 Obtained by multiplying weighted production prices ($/ton) by weighted agricultural yield (ton/ha). 
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Agricultural volume prices, weighted mean ($/ton)
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Figure 12: Decreasing agricultural prices (1980-2002)  
Data source: Subsistema de Informacion Agricola, SIACON (Ministry of Agriculture) 
 
 
Finally, the economic policy reorientation implemented since the end of the 1980s has 
contributed to reduce farmers’ adaptive capacity as it has dismantled some crucial 
instruments aimed at supporting agricultural productivity. One has to admit that it has 
helped to reducing excessive paternalism and fiscal burden, but it has contributed to 
reduce the adaptive capacity of farmers to reorganize in light of current competition in 
the said context of globalization. This discussion has been left to the next chapter, which 
assesses public intervention in building adaptive capacity in this country. 
 
3.5 Conclusions  
 
The increasing frequency of natural hazards over the past 35 years in Mexico has implied 
increasing economic losses as well. Hurricanes and floods have been the most damaging 
disaster type, mostly affecting subsistence farmers, whereas earthquakes have mainly hit 
the urban poor. Most natural disasters in Mexico have caused destruction of rural assets 
at large extent in mainly marginalized regions. Though economic losses from extreme 
events have been higher in urban assets, the relative impact of disasters in marginalized 
rural areas is higher, contributing to increase rural-urban migration. Along with the 
higher exposure of agriculture to droughts, as the case that ca. 80% of agricultural surface 
in Mexico is rainfed, prevailing asymmetries in coping capacity and access to adaptive 
instruments in that regions is often observed, as for instance when comparing effects 
from hurricane Wilma and Stan in 2005 in Cancun and Chiapas, respectively, as well as 
among rich and poor countries sharing a same natural extreme event. 
 
There exists per se a trend of the poor to settle on disaster-prone areas in urban Mexico, 
which more recently newcomers from the countryside have aggravated. Ironically, most 
these immigrants decided leaving their rural livelihoods as consequence of unfavorable 
conditions to improve agriculture-derived incomes due to a number of hazards, disaster 
occurrence among them. 
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Along with recurrent natural hazards in this country, current economic policy has 
contributed to stress agricultural livelihoods. The overall vulnerability of the Mexican 
economy has increased as the weight of foreign trade to GDP has increased as well. It has 
led to increasingly expose the economy to extern forces. Low prices of agricultural goods 
in Mexico’s main trade partners –most likely due to high subsidies-, has resulted in 
higher agricultural imports, pressing downwards agricultural domestic prices in the 
country. Rural incomes tend thus to decrease to those farmers without possibilities to 
either increase productive yield or to enlarge cropping area, like subsistence farmers. It is 
leading to reduce subsistence farmers’ ability to create a financial pool to face hazards 
their activities imply, drawing a vicious circle of low income, low coping capacity, lack 
of climate adaptive instruments (i.e. crop insurance, reserve fund), and higher disasters 
vulnerability. In virtue of these facts, an assessment of the public policy and its derived 
intervention seem to be the next step toward reducing economic vulnerability to these 
hazards, presented in the following Chapter 4. It analyzes the evolution of public 
intervention in improving coping and adaptive capacity through social programs and 
disaster management instruments, emphasizing the scope of loss sharing and risk transfer 
instruments. 
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CHAPTER 4: Assessment of vulnerability-related programs 
 
 
Wenn wir in der Lage kommen, unsere Grundrechte 
verteidigen zu müssen, so ’dürfen’ wir weder 
Feindseligkeit noch Gleichgültigkeit vom Staat 
erfahren, sondern Wohlwollen! 
KARL POPPER, Ministaat oder paternalistischer Staat? 
 
 
This chapter explores current actions the government implements to reduce 
vulnerability to natural and economic hazards in Mexico. It begins presenting, in section 
1, an overview of social programs implementation to strengthen access to opportunities 
of the poor. Along with that, section 2 analyzes the responsibility taken on by the 
government to absorb many of the losses from natural disasters (loss-sharing). The 
government rebuilds not only public infrastructure, but also housing and provides some 
relief to the poor after disasters. Loss-sharing has been based on a combination of ex-post 
instruments, like budget diversion, foreign credit, etc. From its part, risk-transfer has been 
based on mainly ex-ante instruments like insurance, mitigation, and more recently, 
contingent fund. Concerning agricultural and livestock activities, ex-post instruments are 
the most used, whereas disaster prevention measures keep relatively low, and consists of 
mostly insurance. The allocation of subsidies for agricultural insurance in Mexico after 
1990 has led to less coverage compared to the 80s in terms of both area and producers. 
Mitigation works implementation is minor, whose trade-offs are also discussed in section 
3. This chapter concludes in section 4 with a discussion on integrating risk-financing 
instruments to avoid them to render as mere transitory instruments to deal with poverty 
and inequity in the countryside, suggesting areas where public investments may produce 
greater effects in strengthening coping and adaptive capacity. 
 
4.1 Social Programs assessment 
 
In light of the high natural and economic hazards discussed in the previous 
chapters, the key issue is where exactly to allocate scarce public resources. This section 
proceeds to briefly assess the most relevant social programs related with economic 
vulnerability. Given the vast literature on social programs in Mexico (WB 2004, ECLAC 
2003, Wodon and Velez 2000, among others), this section just summarizes their main 
results. 
 
Governmental intervention to alleviate poverty 
In sight of the current restrictions to redistribute wealth directly, the governmental 
intervention to reduce poverty and inequity limits mainly to social programs. Social 
programs are usually divided into broad and targeted policies. The former category is 
comprised of those programs for the general population devoted to social security, 
healthcare, education, housing, etc. Targeted policies consider exclusively a determined 
group. For our analysis’ sake, only policies targeted to the poor are addressed in this 
social programs overview. Roughly, around 13% of social spending (1% of GDP) is 
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being aimed at targeted programs to reduce poverty (WB 2004, Wodon and Velez 2000). 
Social programs to improve welfare include investments in human and physical capital as 
well as those aimed at increasing opportunities for the poor. 
 
4.1.1 investment in human capital of the poor 
To this category belong programs to support education, health, and food access. 
PROGRESA is a set of projects to support education, health, and nutrition to poor 
households living in poor rural areas. LICONSA and TORTIBONO are food programs. 
They provide subsidized milk and tortilla (the base of Mexican nutrition), complemented 
with subsidized stores in poor rural areas through the program DICONSA. CONAFE is 
an educational program mainly oriented to the rural poor. IMSS-Solidaridad provides 
health services, designed to assist medical care in mainly remote communities. DIF is a 
program for family development, which includes support to poor families with small 
children through school breakfasts, food, communal centers for maternal care, and 
workshops, among others. 
 
4.1.2 Investment in physical capital of poor areas 
Programs to improve physical capital, i.e. housing, roads, schools, hospitals, etc., 
are being increasingly delegated to local governments. Currently, there have been 
governmental actions towards decentralization, like observed in federal budget 
distribution, which each time has increased budgetary shares to state governments. On 
that base, the building of physical social infrastructure has been transferred to local 
governments. Nowadays, it relies mostly on state and municipal governments. Though it 
has implied lesser clarity to asses the way local governments allocate their share, but this 
decentralization provides the poorest states the opportunity to increase their available 
resources to build a needs-based educational and health infrastructure, given the fact that 
they are supposed to have a better comprehension about local concerns. However, as 
criticized in Wodon and Velez (2000: 93), these allocations are in practice not based on 
need, but on past expenditures and existing costs. They add that Mexico’s 
decentralization process has taken place so rapidly, that local governments have not had 
time to fully adapt. In turn, physical infrastructure to mitigate natural disaster risk in poor 
areas reproduces these limitations as well, as further discussed in section 2. In turn, the 
hydro-agricultural project within this program has not fully clear achievements as water 
supply is administrated at municipal level as well. Municipalities are getting the 
resources with wide autonomy in its employment. For instance, impact on rural poverty 
reduction from irrigation works in agriculture seems to continue inestimable due to that 
fact. 
 
4.1.3 Investment to increase income opportunities for the poor 
Onerous investments in strengthening income of the poor are included in this category. 
Roughly, half of its fund is spent in the temporary employment program (PET), 
accounting for 7.44% of total expenditure on poverty in Mexico alone in 2002. This 
program is comprised of off-season temporary employment in poor rural areas. It is self-
targeted through below-minimum-wage pay. According to some appraisals, the cost of 
increasing income one peso in the margin is 3.5 pesos by means of this program (i.e. 
Wodon and Velez 2000: 92). 
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In addition to its observation on education, Mexican government provides training 
and income support to the urban unemployed (PROBECAT). It is conventionally 
accepted that as one spends more on education, expected national future incomes tends to 
increase, but it is also accepted that funds allocation should be appropriately done 
(Rizzuto and Wachtel 1980, Card and Krueger1996). Most appraisals on PROBECAT 
evidence this program to neither have achieved wages increments nor increased the 
probability of employment. Moreover, only less than 2 per cent of those in the poorest 
decile are reckoned to have access to this training program. Over half the budget to 
increase opportunities of the poor is devoted to this kind of programs, whose 
effectiveness has, so far, not proved to achieve substantial progress to poverty reduction 
(Rizzuto and Wachtel 1980). 
 
4.1.4 Programs aimed at agriculture and rural development 
In addition to targeted programs to exclusively the poverty in Mexico, there are 
some public programs to upgrade agricultural productivity and conditions in rural areas, 
what although obliquely, in last instance contributes to reduce poverty. 
  
Economic liberalization: public intervention and trade 
As part of the large reforms implemented over the last 15 years, agricultural 
policy has shifted towards less support and subsidies, aiming at the emergence of a 
private-sector-driven rural economy and largely liberalized markets. It has implied lesser 
public intervention in agricultural markets through dismantling state-owned companies 
for agricultural production and commercialization support. Over the 1990s, that economic 
reform included the dissolution of CONASUPO, BORUCONSA and LICONSA, the state 
owned companies responsible of providing grain storage, warranty prices and securities, 
freight, and commercialization services to the agricultural sector in general40 –whose 
negative impacts on farmers’ adaptive capacity to natural and economic hazards are 
further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The increasing trade liberalization through implemented trade agreements, i.e. 
NAFTA in 1994, Mexico-European Union Trade Agreement in 2002, among others, has 
generated on the one hand, benefits for large-scale producers, mainly thanks to greater 
access to large markets (especially in the USA) and to a relative fast absorption of new 
technologies to increase efficiency. On the other hand, those producers less able to 
compete under such conditions have been stagnated, especially small-scale producers of 
domestically consumed and subsistence commodities, as described along the previous 
chapters.  
 
Given the increasing social pressure to counteract that governmental withdraw, 
Mexican representatives from the opposition have been promoting a legal reform (Salinas 
2004). After a heat debate within the federal congress and negotiations with the 
                                                 
40 CONASUPO (Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares), spanish acronym of nacional Company 
for Popular Subsistence, was created in 1965 to support the countryside. In 1989, this company reduced 
intervention as withdrawn warranty prices for most agricultural prices. By 1993, remaining warranty prices 
were removed. Particularly remarkable is the case of basic grains as they are base of most rural economy. 
For further details, consult Perez-Haro (1990). 
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executive, on December 2001 was approved the Law for Sustainable Rural Development, 
which is an attempt to improve welfare in the countryside to reduce regional disparities 
(North-South) and foster agricultural production (DOF 2001, Art. 5). It brought the 
reorganization in most ministries and public agencies to give the Ministry of Agriculture 
a central role in coordinating measures to promote rural development. 
 
Table 4: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock: budget distribution (constant prices 2003, mill. of 
pesos) 
 
PROGRAM 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Alianza para 
el Campo 
0 2,542 2,738 2,870 3,213 3,121 4,470 6,893 6,250 
PROCAMPO 16,527 14,261 13,133 12,736 12,057 12,194 12,155 12,979 14,191 
Marketing 
support 
2,082 1,096 3,564 2,895 2,024 3,583 5,920 5,867 6,406 
Temporary 
employment 
0 0 522 604 834 1,037 1,116 1,154 1,800 
Sanitary 
programs 
1,389 229 288 287 300 285 392 361 871 
Others 16,483 15,998 13,696 12,666 8,667 8,817 11,740 9,928 11,591 
TOTAL 36,480 34,108 33,941 32,058 27,095 29,036 35,794 37,181 41,109 
Source: Rosenzweig 2003, Cuenta de la Hacienda Publica Federal and Presupuesto de Egresos de la 
Federación. Deflated with the national consumer prices index, Banco de Mexico 2003. 
 
As a result, budget allocation for the Ministry of Agriculture recovered 
substantially. By 1994, it accounted at 49,848 million (constant pesos of 2003), in 1999 
dropped to 27,049 million, and in 2003 recovered to 41,109 million of pesos mainly 
derived from the reform. Set-aside for low-income producers of basic crops, 
PROCAMPO and Alianza para el Campo (AC) are also the main agricultural programs41 
in terms of funds consuming (see Table above). 
 
PROCAMPO support is provided on a per-hectare basis, which will be phased out 
in 2008. PROCAMPO is officially said to benefit currently 3 million producers, covering 
90 percent of Mexico’s cultivated land. From its part, AC was introduced in 1996 to 
foster agricultural productivity through subprograms. Farmers must apply for a grant to 
get into one of these subprograms. Subprograms include: rural equipment, fertilization, 
irrigation, among others. Although this program is usually classified as poverty reduction 
program, there are some reasons to reclassify it as merely productivity encourager, since 
there is no evidence that AC contributes significantly to improve conditions of the poor 
(Rosenzweig 2003). However, the main limit of this program is that most farmers lack of 
enough resources to provide the guaranty financial solvency to get into. In a similar way, 
this eligibility limitation is present in Fondos as well, the crop insurance schema, 
described in the next section. After this overview to social programs, we turn now to 
describe the current natural disaster strategy in Mexico, analyzing the nature of its design 
                                                 
41 Implemented since 1993 and 1996, respectively, by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
(SAGARPA) 
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and reforms in the past three decades. Despite its relevance, there is to date no available 
integral assessment on instruments for natural disasters management in Mexico.42 
 
4.2 Governmental actions to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters in Mexico 
 
Given the prevailing levels of poverty, inequity, hazard exposure, and, in general, 
economic vulnerability in Mexico discussed along the previous chapters, the Mexican 
government is committed to assume risk from its population besides its own risk on 
public assets. There are three basic sources of risk if natural disasters occur: public 
infrastructure, insurance markets (as insurer of last resort), and aid to the poor (Mechler 
2003).  In the first category is the risk of loss to government buildings, including schools 
and hospitals, and infrastructure like roads, bridges, airports, etc., let us term it public 
assets risk. The second category focuses its attention not only on the poor, but also on the 
risk to agriculture, strategic industries, and to local governments: private assets risk. The 
third category consists of emergency response and providing elemental health and 
housing facilities after disaster to the poor: disaster relief. The Mexican government has a 
good financing capacity and response to cover losses from both public assets risk and 
disaster relief. However, private assets risk is still an insufficiently managed source of 
risk and, as above discussed, crucial in social terms. 
 
 
Table 5: Public instruments for risk management financing to natural disasters in Mexico (2003, by 
type of asset at risk) 
Ex-ante Ex-post RISK Mitigation Insurance Reinsurance Reconstruction 
Private 
assets 
FOPREDEN AGROASEMEX 
a) Subsidy to crop 
premiums 
contracting 
b) Advises Fondos 
 
FAPRACC 
a) Only for small-
scale farmers 
b) Administrated by 
Ministry of 
Agric.  
AGROASEMEX 
a. For Fondos,  
b. For Private 
companies 
 
FAPRACC 
) (only for small-scale 
farmers) 
  
Public 
assets 
FOPREDEN Hidalgo Insurance Large Reinsurance 
Companies 
FONDEN 
Disaster 
Relief 
   - State governments 
- FONDEN 
- FAPRACC (wage 
compensation payments) 
 
                                                 
42 Bitran (2001) documents direct economic losses from natural disasters between 1980 and 1999, but 
without presenting the disaster management strategy. Kreimer et al (1999) assesses and projects exclusively 
the insurance markets, though crucial reforms to the insurance system have been left out with the course of 
the time. Guy Carpenter (2000) makes a hazards’ assessment and explains FONDEN, but in a limited 
fashion as it does not embrace neither agricultural insurance markets nor a number of instruments 
implemented after 1999 in the country. 
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The federal government has very developed and varied public instruments to 
reduce disaster risk in Mexico. For instance, subsidy to crop insurance premia is available 
by means of AGROASEMEX, the public crop insurance company; rebuilding of public 
assets is possible by the federal fund FONDEN; mitigation works can be undertaken by 
the federal-state shared fund FOPREDEN; and FAPRACC is a fund designed for 
rebuilding, mitigation and insurance to the poorest farmers. Table 5 summarizes the 
current public instruments responsible for risk management financing in Mexico, as well 
as its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, where are failing these instruments? To answer this 
question, let us briefly analyze their working mechanisms. 
 
4.2.1 FONDEN 
FONDEN (Fondo de Desastres Naturales) is a fund to permit access to 
governmental agencies to financial resources after a natural disaster occurs, both at 
municipal, regional (state) and federal level. The fund is an attempt to give priority to 
rebuild public assets involving poor families and is operated by the Ministry of the 
Interior (SEGOB) in close coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 
(SHCP). 
 
4.2.1.1 FONDEN budget 
Since its establishment in 1996, FONDEN’s budget has varied widely because its 
payments have exceeded budget in most years, achieving to finance most economic 
losses of public assets (see Table 6 below). Given the brevity of FONDEN’s existence, it 
is still difficult to define with accuracy how much to set available for FONDEN from the 
federal budget, since public resources are scarce and all federal agencies struggle for 
more, relying still on lobby capacity at a large extent. Resources allocation is usually 
based on the criterion of employed amount over the previous fiscal year (SHCP 2002). 
Some years, budget is under the level of final requirement due to high loss from natural 
disasters, and vice versa for years when expenditures are considerably below budget 
targets. For that reason, resources redirection from other programs and also from other 
ministries have been diverted from other public sources (SHCP 2000) to observe the 
commitment, as seen in Table 6. FONDEN annual budget averages ca. US$ 350 
million43, whereas economic losses of public assets averages US$ 486 in the same period, 
that is, 70% of losses to public assets were covered through this instrument. 
 
Table 6: Indicators on Natural Catastrophes Financing in Mexico, selected years (mill. US$) 
With data from Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Interior (CENAPRED and FONDEN), INEGI and WB 
 
                                                 
43 For further details, see Reglas de Operación del FONDEN 2002 (DOF 2002). 
 1982 1985 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Losses 314 4,160 5 448 670 1,221 304 271 
Losses/GDP 0.14% 2.25% 0.00% 0.10 0.14% 0.22% 0.05% 0.04% 
FONDEN 
disbursements -- -- 195 431 463 427 531 73 
FONDEN / 
Losses  -- -- 3900% 96% 69% 35% 175% 27% 
Loss/Pub. Exp. 1.16% 15.4% 0.00% 0.09% 0.12% 0.19% 0.04% 0.03% 
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In terms of economic losses, 1985 was particularly damaging due to the 
Earthquake, whose losses reached current US$4,160 millions, which means 2.25% of 
GDP, also equal to 15% of Mexican public expenditure in 1985, as observed above in 
Table 6. Except for this disaster, historical losses have not exceeded 0.25% of GDP, even 
on 1999, when heavy rains hit state of Chiapas producing flooding and landslides, whose 
reconstruction implied resources allocation both on 1999 and 2000.44 It is remarkable that 
when the Michoacan Earthquake hit Mexico City in 1985, there was no financial 
instrument from the government to undertake reconstruction, which derived in the 
billionaire credit from multilateral financial institutions. If a natural disaster reaches the 
same level of economic losses today, FONDEN resources would be insufficient to 
finance rebuilding (max. historic budget US$ 531 mill.). In this scenario, average 
FONDEN resources would represent scarcely 10% of losses. 
 
The kind of natural disasters paid for by FONDEN has varied over its existence. 
Drought was dominant in 1996, hurricanes in 1997, floods in 1998, and earthquakes and 
floods in 1999. FONDEN has been highly useful, and although its effectiveness does not 
attack causes of poverty, there is no doubt about its usefulness for immediate relief. 
FONDEN fashion is unique among risk management, since it eliminates on the one hand 
a number of formalities and financial transfers inside the public administration. On the 
other hand, it has led to a fast mechanism for public works coordination. This instrument 
also contributes to avoid automatically contracting extern debt and resources diversion 
from the social budget, bringing more stability to the public financing in this country. 
 
4.2.1.2 Responsible for only public assets since 2003 
However, given FONDEN insufficiency to deal with both public and private assets over 
its first 6 years of existence the Mexican government is decentralizing its resources to 
other public entities. From May 2003, FONDEN is responsible for financing exclusively 
public assets, whereas for private assets the involved ministry or public responsible 
agency. In turn, insurance contracting for their own assets is responsibility of each public 
entity45 (Ministry, organism, state and municipal governments, public enterprises, etc.).  
 
4.2.1.3 Loss sharing 
Currently, FONDEN operates on a decentralized manner in order to shift 
responsibility on natural disasters from the federation to state and municipal 
governments, aimed at encouraging local governments to identify and further undertake 
risk reduction measures. FONDEN provides matching funds through state trust funds 
(Fideicomisos Mixtos Estatales). The federal government continues assuming partial 
responsibility for local repairs and reconstruction. According to the FONDEN 2002 Rules 
for Working (Reglas de Operacion del FONDEN 2002), federal, state and municipal 
governments share the responsibility depending on the case. For instance, for roads and 
transport owned by state governments, the federal government is responsible for 50% of 
the losses, while, for municipal roads and transport, the federal government is responsible 
to cover only 30%. Nevertheless, due to high indebted outstand of most state 
                                                 
44 More detailed discussed in chapter 2. 
45 Insurance options include the state owned insurance company Aseguradora Hidalgo, as well as a number 
of private insurance companies. 
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governments, reconstruction from natural disasters in Mexico is many times undertaken 
by using only federal resources. 
 
4.2.2 AGROASEMEX 
AGROASEMEX is the state-owned crop insurance company, which currently 
manages and grants subsidy for crop insurance premiums to farmers` mutual 
arrangements of insurance (Fondos) and is also responsible for advising FAPRACC. 
Both individual farmers and Fondos get AGROASEMEX subsidy on contracted 
premiums with private insurance companies. AGROASEMEX acts also as re-insurer for 
private companies and for Fondos. Fondos are mutual funds arranged by farmers, which 
work mainly along low- and medium income regions of the country. Covered risks 
include drought, excess moisture (due to floods, heavy rains, etc.), frost, hail, fire, wind, 
and also plant infestations, impossibility to cultivate, non-germination, and livestock 
diseases, accidents, incapacity, and forced sacrifices. The products offered by Fondos are 
described in Table 7. These products have multi-peril coverage, aimed to hedge both 
yield and revenue-related risks. The advantage of Fondos is that cover not only natural 
and biologic disasters, but also those derived from yield variations due to changes in 
inputs costs, approaching thus to hedge from some economic hazards. 
 
 
Table 7: Types of insurances operated by Fondos 
 
Type Coverage Remarks 
Insurance to investments Amounts of investments on 
the crop 
Technological equipment and 
infrastructure improvements. 
Insurance to investments 
adjustable to living stock 
Payable at the moment of the 
disaster certification 
 
Insurance by plant Hedges plant value to climate 
risks  
An agreed price is stipulated  
Insurance to expected harvest 
at agreed price 
Pays indemnity for yield loss, 
adjusted to commercial price  
i.e. per kilo 
Insurance yield Pays indemnity when realized 
yield is under trigger yield due 
to cost increment.  
Insurance yield is an estimate 
of the long-run average yield 
based upon the actual 
production history for the 
insurance unit.46 
Source: AGROASEMEX 2002 
 
 
Along the past 20 years, subsidies to agriculture in Mexico have been granted 
both directly (monetary payments per crop), and indirectly (price protection, preferential 
credit, insurance coverage). After started markets liberation in Mexico (GATT adherence 
on 1986), public policies have been leaving direct subsides to agriculture, and indirect 
instruments of subside have been progressively implemented. As that have been 
occurring in general terms, the subsidies system for insurance contracting in agriculture 
                                                 
46 In the USA, for instance, the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 authorized the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC) to enlarge coverage up to 85 percent in certain circumstance, but its coverage typically 
ranges from 50 to 75 percent of the expected yield in 5 percent increments (Skees 2000). 
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have changed analogically. After two decades experimenting with insurance subsidies to 
agriculture, Mexican authorities realized that the former system was not longer 
sustainable, especially due to experimented corrupt practices (Hernández Trujillo 1997: 
5, Wenner and Arias: 8) and inequities among insured producers when paying premiums. 
In its place, Mexican public crop insurance company (AGROASEMEX) have been 
withdrawing from directly insuring crops. It has transferred responsibility to Fondos, in 
order to make the government to work as exclusively technical advisor and liable of last 
resort (reinsurance). In general, although less governmental intervention in agricultural 
insurance has led to healthier public finances to the company, but it has implied less 
coverage of farmers and cropland over the past twelve years. This sub-section proceeds 
now to analyze the reasons for implementing these reforms to the crop insurance subsidy, 
to further compare its performance with the current system, emphasizing its implications 
in farmers’ adaptability to climatic hazards. 
 
4.2.2.1 The crop insurance system 1961-1991 
Although first agricultural insurance program in Mexico dates back from 1942, it 
was rather arrangements between mutual unions and private insurance companies. Until 
1961 was formally created the first specialized public company for insurance crop, the 
National Crop and Livestock Insurance Company (ANAGASA). In practice, ANAGASA 
started operations until 1963, working with clients of state development banks, like 
Banco Ejidal and Banco Agrícola (later combined to form Banco Nacional de Crédito 
Agrícola - BANRURAL). Credit granting was conditioned to crop insurance contracting 
through ANAGSA. Policies covered multiple-peril, premiums were subsidized and 
cultivated area insured was large. Unfortunately, due to lax monitoring, actuarially 
unsound pricing, and fraud (filing of false claims), losses for ANAGASA were 
staggeringly high. Sometimes, indemnity payments represented up to 70% of the loan 
recoveries by BANURAL, the state-owned credit-conceding bank (Hernandez 1997: 2).  
 
High indemnities 
Hazell (1992) compares the experience of ANAGSA with its counterparts in 
selected countries, evidencing its relative negative financial results, presented in Table 8. 
Average payouts (indemnities plus administration costs) greater than average paid 
premiums mean net loss for the scheme. On one extreme, Brazil has high ratio costs to 
premiums (4.57), where indemnities payments explain most the deficit (4.29). On the 
other extreme, Japan 85-89 has very high administrative costs as component of its ratio 
costs to premiums (3.57 of 4.56). Mexico’s performance looks more similar to the Brazil 
tendency, since the ratio indemnities/premiums are extremely high (3.18) within the total 
cost (3.65). To achieve a ratio below 1 (as Canada, Japan 85-89, USA 99), some authors 
affirm it requires high investments in obtaining the right information for surveillance 
(Skees 2000, OECD 2000). 
 
Financial deficit 
Lack of surveillance led to misestimating risk, and therefore made distortions in premia 
pricing during the 80s (Wenner and Arias 2000). The allocation of subsidies for 
agricultural insurance in Mexico over that decade showed signs of bad management, 
which turned AGROASAMEX into a loss-making entity (Hazell 1992). ANAGSA had to 
face an extremely high number of claims for indemnification. The situation turned so 
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financially unsustainable, that ANAGASA was closed in 1988. Under such 
circumstances, a reform to the Mexican system was implemented. The reform 
incorporated some farmers’ self-initiative into the system to reduce public burden, which 
derived into mutual funds to hedge crops. 
 
 
Table 8: Financial performance of Crop Insurance Schemes in selected countries 
 
Country Period Indemnities/
Premiums 
Administration 
costs/Premium 
Total Costs (Indemnities + 
Administration costs) / 
Premiums 
Brazil 75-81 4.29 0.28 4.57 
Costa Rica 70-89 2.26 0.54 2.80 
Japan 47-77 1.48 1.17 2.60 
Japan 85-89 0.99 3.57 4.56 
Mexico 80-89 3.18 0.47 3.65 
USA 80-89 1.87 0.55 2.42 
USA* 1999 0.96 0.96 3.68 
Canada** 98-99 0.48 0.07 0.56 
Sources: Hazell 1992, (*) Skees 2000, (**) Saldana-Zorrilla 2003 
 
 
4.2.2.2 The 1991 reform to crop insurance system 
In 1991 was formed AGROASEMEX in order to replace and overcome 
ANAGSA problematic. Even prior to ANAGSA closure, some well-organized farmers 
realized disadvantages of ANAGSA from the 70´s when comparing premiums to real 
needs, and in 1978 was founded the first mutual insurance fund (Fondo Común de la 
Coalición de los Valles del Yaqui y Mayo, CECVYM). Real disaster level of these 
farmers was very low compared to average in the zone (Hernández 1997), and therefore 
insurance contracts with ANAGSA meant net financial transfer for them. This fund was 
created to reduce insurance costs, to offer technique support for members, to develop 
financial options (Gordillo 1988), as well as to reinvest remaining (residual of premiums 
minus indemnity payments after administration costs). These funds became the current 
Fondos, which have been supported since 1991 by the reformed crop insurance system. 
Hence, insurance funds Fondos are understood as the civil associations conformed by 
producers, who are self-assuming responsibility of insurance for their agricultural 
activities47.  
 
Fondos budget 
Financial resources of Fondos consist of premiums funds (paid by farmers) plus 
governmental subsidy minus operation costs (reinsurance plus administration). Residual 
amounts after operation costs and indemnity payments are earmarked to either a 
contingent fund (to cover disasters exceeding contractual coverage) or to a social fund i.e. 
to purchase technological improvements for members. The main requirement to farmers 
to get into a Fondo is holding a profitable crop from a technical and financial perspective. 
                                                 
47 Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades mutualistas, Art. 13; Ley sobre el Contrato del Seguro, Art. 
40; Reglas Generales para la Constitucion, Operacion y Funcionamiento del los Fondos de Aseguramiento, 
de vida campesino, y conexos a la actividad agropecuaria (SHCP). 
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Premium subsidy does not have to exceed MXP 2,000 per hectare (ca. US$ 182), 
subsidizing between 25% and 45% of the premium 48 (ROSPSA 2002: Art. 6). 
 
In 1995 AGROASEMEX was re-designed to withdraw progressively from the 
sector as direct insurer. Between 1995 and 2001 AGROASEMEX insured both directly to 
individual farmers and indirectly by means of paying Fondos reinsurance, as well as 
acting as insurer of last resort for private companies. Given that natural disasters damage 
a large number of farmers in unison, private companies require re-insurance services. As 
the government is liable of last resort by acting as re-insurer, private companies can be 
covered when the ratio of indemnities over premiums exceed certain range. 
AGROASEMEX provides non-proportional re-insurance, which covers catastrophic 
events to private insurance companies at 50% when exceeding 120% of premiums fund. 
 
During this public-private transition period, the surface coverage has decreased 
despite being a disasters period. By 1999, 37% of insured subsidized surface contracted 
premiums directly with AGROASEMEX, 34% via FONDOS, and the remaining 20% by 
private insurance companies. However, 14% of the national cultivated area49 (3 mill ha) 
was lost to disasters in 1999. Over 90% of these losses were uninsured, since the subsidy 
reached to less than ten percent of national cultivated area. From its part, both disasters 
frequency and economic losses increased dramatically during that period, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
4.2.2.3 The 2002 reform to the crop insurance system 
In 2002 the system was reformed again, which consisted of migrating 
AGROASEMEX to the second floor, that is, to operate as exclusively agricultural re-
insurer, allowing the expansion of private insurance in the country.50 In this new scheme, 
AGROASEMEX does not operate directly as insurance company anymore. While 
AGROASEMEX supported directly 56% of insured crops in 2000, in 2001 it represented 
7%, whereas private companies moved from 34% to 77%, respectively. The subsidy51 per 
hectare increased from 330 to 401 pesos, and average insured amount rose from 3,435 to 
4,032 hectares (AGROASEMX 2002).52  
 
                                                 
48 Determined through a ranges classification of socioeconomic regions and type of crop –it includes 83 
different crops. 
49 The national territory has an extension of 197 million hectares, 11% of which (ca. 3mill ha) was 
cultivated in 1999. 
50 Since 1995, Mexican government started a program to reform subsidies for crop insurance premiums by 
reducing costs of contracting insurance and, at the same time, encourage participation of social and private 
agents, which allowed to establish the National System of Rural Insurance (Sistema Nacional de 
Aseguramiento del Medio Rural), which involved AGROASEMEX, as well as social and private agents 
related to crop insurance (ROSPSA 2002). It led to latest reform of 2002 Further details: Reglas de 
Operación del Subsidio a la Prima del Seguro Agropecuario (2002). Diario Oficial de la Federación del 15 
de marzo de 2002.  
51 The subsidy is paid once the producer contracted either private insurance or hedge the crop through a 
established Fondo. 
52 According to estimations from Hernandez (1997:8), average ratio of indemnity to reinsurance via Fondos 
accounts 13.06% for the period 1991-96. 
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By 2002, AGROASEMEX did not issued insurance contracts anymore, allocating 
95% in subsidies to premiums which farmers contracted with private companies53, and 
the remaining 5% was spent in subsidies to Fondos54 (see table below). 68% of the 
subsidy value granted crops and the rest livestock55. On average, the subsidy accounts at 
32.5% of the premium, and the average premium at MXP 468 for that year 
(AGROASEMEX 2003). The trend of average premiums indicates that while price of 
Fondos premiums decrease, the price of private companies’ premiums increases, 
stimulating farmers to better join Fondos system.  
 
On average, Fondos are expanding especially due to its participation in basic 
(extensive) crops (i.e. maize, bean, wheat, potato, etc), whose insured amounts and 
premiums are lower. From its part, private insurance companies are being reducing 
participation in the basic crops segment, but expanding in livestock and intensive crops 
(fruits and vegetables). In 2002, 44.7% more livestock were insured compared to the 
previous year. That increment is explained by the expansion of private insurance 
companies, which tripled insured units and caught up most of the clients left by 
AGROASEMEX56.  
 
4.2.2.4 Critics to the reforms 
a) Paternalism. The discussed reforms to the agricultural insurance system in Mexico 
have been an attempt to overcome some of the deficiencies in private-sector response to 
farmers’ risk management needs. The 1991 reform achieved to leave behind insufficient 
design and projecting, since public sector subsidized insurance schemes had generally 
had little effect to encourage productive efficiency. In fact, in many cases they had made 
farmers less productive and gave rise to moral hazard. That design has been many times 
criticized because offering all-risk coverage, providing extremely subsidized premiums to 
non-poor farmers, and little willingness to crop variation in per se geographical areas at 
risk, seemed to contradict market efficiency. 
b) Financial health and coverage. Under purely efficiency criteria, allocation of society’s 
resources into agricultural insurance in Mexico over the 80’s shows clear signs of 
inefficiency, as seen along this section. However, under a social perspective, it has meant 
less coverage (in both terms of area and producers). In the decades previous to the 90s, 
agricultural insurance was inefficient due to the above commented lack of surveillance, 
high moral hazard, and rent-seeking from some economic agents. After the reforms, the 
Mexican crop insurance system works with a financial surplus. However, in terms of 
covered area and insured farmers, the impact has been negative compared to that period. 
In the 80s, ca. 7 million crop hectares were covered by the insurance subsidy, whereas in 
the first three years of the present decade it accounts for less than a half of that (see 
Figure 13). In other terms, government subsidies to crop insurance premia have only been 
relevant to farmers in 10% of Mexico’s cultivated area during the 1990’s, whereas during 
the 1980’s the subsidy reached 40% of that area. In a broader perspective, by 2002 only 
                                                 
53 7 private insurance companies participate in this system (AGROASEMEX 2002). 
54 In 2003, the Fondos system consisted of 224 Fondos. 
55 Livestock insurance available via Fondos offer coverage related to risks of sickness, accident, physic 
inability, whose coverage includes from transportation, establishment, and adaptation to new habitats.  
56 Also, livestock coverage rose from 576 thousand heads in 1991 to 9.7 million in 2000. 
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25% of cultivated area got access to some financing (credit, loans and/or insurance). In 
sum, three-fourths of cropland in Mexico was out of institutional financial support and 
90% uninsured. 
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Figure 13: Agricultural coverage of the subsidy along decades  
Source: AGROASEMEX 2003  
00´s are estimations corresponding period 2000-2003 
 
c) Exclusion. Compared to the crop insurance system of the past, Fondos work in a very 
decentralized frame, what also implies atomization and exclusion. One of the main 
negative characteristic of that is the high figure of farmers that cannot get into a Fondo. 
Due to their lack of solvency, they are usually rejected by existing Fondos, and can just 
expect some indemnity payments from the government only if their municipal authorities 
promoted FAPRACC, still exceptional in practice, as further discussed in the next 
section. 
d) Inequity. Support for agricultural insurance premia is unequally earmarked, since there 
are relatively more resources spent on medium and large-scale farmers than on small 
farmers, evidenced in the distribution of insurance subsidy. In 2002, 95% of the subsidy 
went to premia contracted through private companies, conceding more weight to private 
sector in the insurance market on the one hand, but benefiting mostly to the less poor 
farmers on the other hand. The rest went to Fondos, made of farmers with a minimum of 
financial capacity. It might be justified if these beneficiaries were large-scale export-
oriented producers, since, after all, it may act as counterweight to high subsidies to 
farmers in Mexico’s main trade partner, the USA –for a crop insurance comparison 
between Mexico and the USA, as well as with other trade partners of Mexico, see 
Appendix 1. Though it may contribute to enhancing coping capacity of the overall 
agriculture to the economic hazard dumping practices imply, but may be not a viable 
solution given its contribution to continue enlarging the gap between rich and poor 
farmers in the country. 
 
In this context, the best option would be expand the crop insurance subsidy more 
actively and selectively based on a coordinated analysis, as well as to increasing 
investments in mitigation. Most important, before investing in mitigation works, a 
productive reorientation, i.e. crop diversification, crops change, etc., can exploit better 
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these risk-transfer instruments. For its design, FAPRACC has the virtue to pursue such a 
strategy; we turn now to analyze this instrument. 
 
4.2.3 FAPRACC, crop insurance for subsistence farmers 
Farmers without ability to contract insurance and without solvency to be members 
of a Fondo remain exposed to disasters. If they had access to credit they could probably 
manage agricultural risk better, but 85% of them have not access (INEGI 2003c). So, that 
risk has to necessarily be internalized. The Ministry of Agriculture implemented in 2003 
a program to hedge these farmers indirectly in two ways: ex-post, paying indemnities 
after disaster, and ex-ante, subsiding crop insurance premiums. FAPRACC57, Spanish 
acronym of Fund to Attend Damaged Population due to Climatic Contingencies, aims at 
covering these farmers. 
 
4.2.3.1 Ex-post measures 
Indemnities payment is done on the basis of disaster declaratory, which is made 
through meteorological measurements. Once exceeded certain climatic threshold, e.g. 
mm of rain, temperature ranges, etc. a disaster state can be declared. Afterwards, all 
damaged agricultural producers listed as low-income population are eligible to get the 
support (upon request). The authorities responsible for that initial selection are the state 
governments, which in turn request the resources to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture. 
This post-disaster support is temporal, since only corresponds to one event. Also, 
resources disbursement is shared by the federal and state governments at 70-30%, 
respectively (DOF 2003: Art. 7). The program includes direct support to agriculture, 
livestock, and fisheries, granting (1) per crop hectare, livestock unit, or damaged boat, 
depending activity; (2) by wage in case of mitigation works; and (3) for catastrophic 
insurance contracting, summarized in the figure below.  
 
Table 9: The FAPRACC subsidy 
 
Support Unit Maximum support Unitary amount (MXP) 
A. Agricultural activity    
I. Annual crops $/Ha 5 ha/producer 800 
II. Perennial crops $/Ha 5 ha/producer 800 
III. Fruit plantations 
(including coffee, 
avocado and nopal)  
$/Ha 5 ha/producer Up to 5000 
B. Livestock Animal unit (depending 
on specie) 
25 animal units  380 per animal unit for 
droughts, 850 otherwise 
C. Fisheries $/boat 1/producer 2230/boat 
D. Aquaculture  $/Ha 2 ha/producer 1,110/ha 
E. Others Day-wage/producer 40 day-wages/producer According to labor 
legislation 
F. Catastrophic 
insurance contracting 
$/ha or animal unit  100% premium price 
Source: Diario Oficial de la Federacion (27 de mayo de 2003), complemented with DOF (2005)58 
                                                 
57 Fondo para Atender a la Población Afectada por Contingencias Climatológicas 
58 DOF (2005). Modificaciones y Adiciones a las Reglas de Operación del Programa del FAPRACC 
publicadas el 27 de mayo de 2005. SAGARPA. Miércoles 30 de marzo de 2005. Mexico City. 
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4.2.3.2 Ex-ante measures 
Conditions for insurance contracting are responsibility of state governments, who 
in turn can request support for catastrophic crop insurance to the federal government, 
based on research conducted together with AGROASEMEX, as well as complemented 
with information from the Water National Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua), as 
well as by interested producers. Beneficiaries must accomplish all requirements stated in 
Operation Rules of FAPRACC (DOF 2003: Art. 4), which in general demand being 
small-scale producer (in accordance to defined ranges). Agreed parameters of climate 
risks rule the insurance contract, and the eventual beneficiary of catastrophic crop 
insurance (Seguro Agricola Catastrofico) should renounce to additional benefits of 
FAPRACC in case a covered disaster occurs.  
 
4.2.3.3 First FAPRACC experiences 
Despite its novel design, FAPRACC less than 1% in insurance in 2003 (last 
available registers), whereas 99% on indemnities for reconstruction59. Though these 
indemnities were needed, but the penetration of insurance seems to still be low 
considering existing hazard exposure and individual economic vulnerability. That subsidy 
for catastrophic insurance contracting went to the State of Guanajuato, supporting 95,415 
hectares, too low if one considers that it means 0.005% of uninsured crop area in Mexico. 
 
Delay in indemnities payment 
Given its very recent implementation, probably is too early to attempt to evaluate 
achievements, but however we could have an overview to some experiences. Zacatecas, a 
Center-North state of Mexico, has been suffering of extreme weather for the past 20 
years, what varies from frosts to warm wave (range: +50 to -10 Celsius degrees), as well 
as from floods to droughts. For the last four years, the state has been declared in state of 
emergency at least once a year. In 1999, FONDEN provided MXP 27.2 million, from 
which 16.2 to wages and 11 for seeds distribution, but the resources were distributed with 
a one-year delay. In 2000 and 2001 succeeded the same delay: resources providing one 
year after emergency declaration 60. However, FAPRACC proved to do it not much better 
in 2003. In a recent assessment to FAPRACC elaborated by UNAM upon request from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Gay and Conde, et al (2004: 5-6) criticize delays in 
indemnities payments to act negatively on reincorporating farmers to their agricultural 
activities.  
 
4.2.4 Comparing FAPRACC and AGROASEMEX scopes 
AGROASEMEX subsidy went to premium financing of mainly low and medium 
income farmers through Fondos. The main merit of AGROASEMEX consists then in 
hedging assets of non-extremely poor farmers at risk of falling below the poverty line in 
case of natural disasters. However, expanding cropland coverage is still the main 
                                                 
59 In 2003, federal budget authorized for FAPRAACC reached 300 million pesos (ca. US$26 million). This 
budget must add state disbursements, which may be additional 100 million pesos. 
60On 2003 due to frosts, Zacatecas requested resources to FONDEN and to FAPRACC, but given the fact 
that from May 2003 FONDEN is being responsible for exclusively public assets, the requisition was 
attended only by FAPRACC: Disbursed resources at MXP 19.8 million, from which, 13.9 from the 
federation and 5.9 from the state. Resources are said to be benefit 1,713 producers, equivalent to 6,356 ha 
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challenge of AGROASEMEX Fondos’. From its part, FAPRACC merit lays on targeting 
subsistence farmers, but 99% of its budget went to reconstruction financing. Moving 
from transitory-effect ex-post measures to more prevention initiatives seems to be 
FAPRACC’s main challenge. In reaching that, a closer coordination with the Ministry of 
Social Development to carry on mitigation works in marginalized rural areas may lead to 
more substantial results. In 2003, FAPRACC budget represented roughly 50% of 
AGROASEMEX budget.61 In other terms, the proportion of public resources spent in ex-
post to ex-ante instruments in rural areas was 2 to 1. Finally, these resources represent 
15% of FONDEN average annual expenditure over the period 1996-2001, still a low 
number if one considers the relative higher affectation from natural disasters in rural 
areas. 
 
 
Box 4.I: World Bank loan for disaster mitigation 
 
In 2001, the World Bank conceded a US $404 mill loan to Mexico aimed at 
mitigating natural disasters to reduce the country's vulnerability, and to support rapid 
recovery when natural disasters occur. Funds from the loan are expected to finance 
emergency and reconstruction through FONDEN. 62 The loan, to be disbursed over four 
years, is expected to finance disaster vulnerability studies proposed from the Ministries of 
Communications and Transportation, Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Development, 
Social Development, Public Education, Health, and Environment and Natural Resources, 
and the National Water Commission, especially those to provide improvements in land 
use, housing, insurance, road construction, farming practices and mapping. 
Complementary, the loan is expected to allow the government to assess viability of 
insurance and other financial instruments to manage disaster risk, in order to facilitate 
fast reconstruction and thereby rapid economic recovery. The loan has a five-year grace 
period with repayment in 15 years.  
As discussed along this chapter, few disaster mitigation measures have been 
undertaken in the country over the past four years. The disasters expenditure has been 
mostly spent in indemnities payments. In that sense, fulfilling the main aim of this loan 
for disasters mitigation is being failing mainly due to the lack of local disaster risk 
identification in the country, making this loan to serve as mere short-term disaster relief. 
 
 
4.2.5 PIARSE, productive reorientation 
A relevant criterion-decision to maintain long-term subsidy to crop insurance is 
the differentiation between risk to natural disasters and risk of bad management (Skees 
1999). In cases where crops were considered as bad or inefficient managed, insurer 
internalizes that risk by transferring it to the deductible. So, strong and close public 
surveillance is required in order to do not misuse this subsidy, evaluating land use, and to 
further redirect production from inappropriate agricultural practices. So, premiums and 
                                                 
61 AGROASEMEX: 349.3 million pesos; FAPRACC 178.6 million of pesos; FONDEN 3,500 million 
pesos, average period 1996-2001.  
62http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/news/pre 
ssrelease.nsf/673fa6c5a2d50a67852565e200692a79/fca66be072cc4cd1852569af00588381?OpenDocument   
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deductibles can be reduced, decreasing in turn the burden for the government from 
subsidies to insurance premiums –or even from rebuilding-, reducing the burden to the 
taxpayer in last instance. For instance, poor grape producers in the state of Zacatecas 
have not been eligible to get FAPRACC indemnities despite high disasters affectation 
given that droughts are disaster considered not that ‘natural’ given chronic drought state 
in this region. Instead, they are scheduled to be incorporated into a program for 
productive reorientation in order to change crop, adapting cropping to the comparative 
advantages in the region. After talking to Mexican authorities concerned to agriculture, in 
particular at the Ministry of Agriculture, they recognize that an agricultural insurance 
subsidy can become successful only if the public sector and producers undertake parallel 
structural changes. If farmers are to improve productivity by incorporating technological 
advances they need to be advised to decide for more economically rentable activities. The 
latter motivated the creation of PIARSE63, a program for sustainable agriculture and 
productive reorientation in recurrent disaster areas. This program supports projects to 
change land use where natural disasters have been so recurrent, that productivity keeps 
permanently low (DOF 2003). 
 
4.2.6 FOPREDEN 
The Fund for Disasters Prevention, FOPREDEN (Fondo de Prevención de 
Desastres) is a federal fund to provide financing to mitigation works and research on 
mitigation, which has so far been underemployed. Resources granting is based on 
efficiency and feasibility analysis. Projects should be proposed by state governments, 
federal ministries and/or federal organisms to scientific reviewing committee 
(ARFOPREDEN, Art. 9) for further approval from the Assessment Council (Art. 11). In 
case of state-proposed projects, FOPREDEN contributes with 70% of the project cost, 
and the state pays the remaining 30%, whereas the contributions accounts at 50-50% for 
projects proposed by federal organisms (Art. 5). Projects are restricted to one per year by 
proposing entity and up to the budgetary top of the program. In 2005 its budget reached 
ca. 40 million USD, but only 25% of that budget was implemented (Puente 2005). 
 
4.3. Public infrastructure: disasters mitigation and productivity enhancement 
 
After a natural disaster occurs, damaged physic infrastructure is repaired, replaced 
or retrofitted in order to minimize negative impacts from natural disasters. This work 
considers physical infrastructure the stock of capital equipment in a country, including 
factories, farms, roads, schools, and other tangible assets. Damages or losses in public 
infrastructure tend to slow down economic growth as it is not repaired or rebuilt in time. 
In the case of the agricultural sector, it contributes to increase uncertainty along with 
depressed prices of agricultural goods, discusses in the previous chapters. Some concrete 
examples of long-term impact infrastructure destruction are Hurricane Fifi in Honduras, 
where roads and agriculture infrastructure got severely damaged without fast recover, as 
well as electricity supply in San Salvador, and marine resources in Nicaragua and Peru 
(Caballero & Zapata). In the case of Mexico, the proportion of aggregate losses from 
natural disasters to GDP (1 to 1 000) suggests that natural disasters produce low impacts 
                                                 
63 Programa Integral de Agricultura Sostenible y Reconversión Productiva en Zonas de Siniestralidad 
Recurrente. 
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to the overall Mexican economy. However, the considerations explained along this work 
on agricultural vulnerability make us approach natural disasters as a factor of 
impoverishment. So, it is crucial to strengthen public infrastructure via mitigation works 
to make sure that public infrastructure resist disaster occurrence as much as possible as 
well as repairs are carried on prompt in case of high affectation.  
 
 
Box 4.II: Aversion to change and the endowment effect 
 
Public projecting must consider attitudes heterogeneity among economic actors before 
implementing public policies for vulnerability reduction. Aversion to change is frequent 
especially when the situation does not reach yet critical points. In Mexico, initial 
allocations of wealth are a very illustrative origin of the problem, though not unique. As 
in the in the short-run, property and land tenure issues seem to still be far from a viable 
solution, options to reduce vulnerability must act even upon productivity. The economic 
neoclassical theory holds that initial allocations of wealth does not matter as long as 
markets allow people to trade their stakes (Coase theorem). Also, neoclassical theorists 
support the statement that the people should be considered as rational economic agents. 
On the contrary, “behaviouralists” say that the people not always get their complicated 
sums right (maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint).  
 
Daniel Kahneman, awarded Nobel Prize on economics 2002, points out that in practice, 
people tend to judge their well-being relative to others, not in absolute terms; their 
actions depend on the way choices are represented; they fear loss more than they crave 
gain (prospect theory). In the same way, the “endowment effect” says that people place 
an extra value on things they already own. In that sense, although transferring labor from 
rural to urban areas seems to be economically viable, it implies high politic costs and 
traumatic social processes. In turn, even if we opt to promote crops-rotation in order to 
diversify the agricultural risk, it could not be successfully applied to all producers. As 
asymmetries about markets information makes clear differences among producers in both 
opportunities and desirability to expand trade, in a similar way not all producers might be 
determined to change crops and diversify markets, as usually recommended. John List, 
economist-researcher at the University of Maryland tested empirically the endowment 
effect and found that only more experienced traders (producers) are less prone to the 
endowment effect, and trade as keenly as neoclassical predicts. In this sense, we must 
consider, on one side, that producers in developed agriculture (or capitalist agriculture, as 
Rodriguez 1980 names it) are subject to work under market efficiency mechanisms, as 
well as to be expected to react to its incentives (included insurance contracting). But on 
the other side, we must to build particular strategies for traditional producers to reduce 
vulnerability to disasters, even if it seems to contradict market efficiency. 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Disaster mitigation and productive infrastructure 
There are three basic functions of public infrastructure: those related exclusively 
to keep or enhance productivity (i.e. roads, energy supply, etc.), to hedge from disasters 
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(i.e. regulators of river levels), and to both productivity and disasters (i.e. irrigation 
systems, green houses, etc.). Due to the duality of the latter function of public 
infrastructure, it is particular difficult to separate the amount of productivity-related 
investments from exclusively disasters mitigation works, as well as to separate their 
positive effects on productivity.   
 
To date, there exists few documented evidence of exclusively disasters mitigation 
works in Mexico. It is so mainly due to the fact that mitigation is many times included 
into infrastructure works, and as that, its tasks rely increasingly on local governments 
(state and municipal) at a large extent, as commented in section 1 of this chapter. It 
occurs with disaster risk mitigation works derived from current disaster instruments 
(mainly FOPREDEN and FAPRACC) as well, where the initiative has been left to state 
authorities upon request from the municipalities. 
 
4.3.2 Insurance versus Mitigation 
The viability of investing in disaster mitigation works depends on a cost-benefit 
analysis over a time period horizon. Insurance covers the risk during exclusively a 
contracted period, and over this period the money seems to be lost without modifying risk 
exposure. From its part, mitigation is a one-time large disbursement that reduces or 
eliminates risk exposure for a usually long period of time. A detailed cost-benefit analysis 
should be carried on to discount maintenance costs, depreciation and other associated 
cost a public work implies, from the benefit of the mitigation, as well as potential shocks 
of demand (change in preferences, substitute commodities, etc) for the related commodity 
or economic activity. Changes in assets profitability to the involved economic activities 
in a given region could turn negative benefits from the mitigation investment within an 
efficiency analysis64. 
 
Mitigation is also limited because of increasing marginal costs. Constructing the 
perfect mitigation work, which reduces to zero the associated risk to disaster can also be 
cost-benefit negative than mitigate until certain point (where marginal cost = 0) and from 
that point transfer the remaining risk (Freeman et al 2002). Even, some mitigation works 
can also reduce the risk until i.e. 98%, but reaching 100% can cost more than the physic 
asset itself. After ensuring human victims protection, it would be more financially desired 
to lose the asset than reduce 100% the risk. 
                                                 
64 Mitigation itself implies a risk. For instance, let us think on a mitigation work in a cotton cropping 
region, assuming also the availability of only two hedging options: mitigation and insurance. Mitigation 
investments at 40,000 USD are implemented to construct infrastructure to last for 30 years, eliminating risk 
from disasters. Alternatively, insurance premia accumulated over the same 30 years (at present value) cost 
75,000. In such conditions mitigation is the best option, and in fact it is so given the available information. 
Now, suppose a demand shock, which run out of business cotton producers in the 7th year, due to i.e. trade 
barriers to continue exporting or prices drop. Additionally, suppose that after a productive reengineering 
assessment, the region’s productivity will not depend anymore of this kind of mitigation work. Now, let us 
assume that insurance were cost 20,000 USD at present value accumulated to the seventh year. Under these 
conditions, contracting insurance for only 7 years would be more opportune than investing in mitigation. 
Unexpected contingences like that are externalities for individual project evaluation.  
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4.4 Conclusions 
 
Though there are remarkable efforts for moving from programs with transitory 
effects on incomes to more investments in improving assets of the poor, but improving its 
results requires a better oriented hazards management. Policy instruments to reduce 
economic vulnerability of the overall population to hazards are being increasingly 
implemented. The strategy to manage the increasing exposure of the agricultural sector to 
the ongoing trade liberalization process has recovered resources since 2002 after a 
significant drop over the 90s. But it is perhaps insufficient given the dismantling of 
crucial state-owned companies for agricultural support for production and 
commercialization and high subsidies in Mexico’s main trade partners. In addition, 
increasing occurrence and economic losses from natural disasters are threatening rural 
livelihoods as the current natural disasters strategy, though novel designed, implements 
few prevention measures. Though in 2003 the proportion of public expenditure in 
subsiding crop insurance to indemnities for reconstruction of farmers’ assets was 2:1, but 
that insurance coverage has not reach poor farmers and has reduced cropland coverage 
dramatically compared to the previous decades. 
 
  Subsidies to crop insurance premia have only been relevant to farmers in 10% of 
Mexico’s cultivated area during the 90s, whereas during the 80s the subsidy reached 40% 
of the area. In the 70s and 80s, agricultural insurance was inefficient due to a lack of 
surveillance, high moral hazard, and rent-seeking from some economic agents. In the 
current scheme the government does not insure directly, but is insurer of last resort to 
Fondos, mutual arrangements of farmers to manage self-insurance. Overall, the current 
crop insurance system presents a financial surplus, but 90% of cropland is uninsured. 
From its part, FAPRACC offers catastrophic insurance to subsistence farmers, but few 
state governments have contracted it so far, concentrating its expenditure in aid for 
reconstruction to farmers and leaving exposure to natural hazards unchanged. In general, 
expenditure in mitigation works has been minor. 
 
Despite its sophisticated design, there is a relatively low resources allocation in 
disaster prevention measures, and disbursements to deal with losses have not brought 
clear contributions to vulnerability reduction of the poor over the past two decades. There 
is a widespread recognition among governmental officials responsible for social 
programs about the relevance of integrating a disaster reduction strategy to meet overall 
goals of poverty reduction strategies. However, the main operative challenge for their 
implementation consists in combining risk and vulnerability analysis at municipal level. 
As risk identification and vulnerability analysis at municipal level are the main legal 
requirements to apply for financial resources to carry on mitigation works and insurance, 
the success of the disasters vulnerability strategy in the country depends on promotion 
from the municipal authority at a large extent. 
 
The contribution of investments in reducing vulnerability to natural disasters 
seems to be underestimated. In 2003, the expenditure on natural disasters management to 
the countryside represented less than 0.01% compared to that on social programs, as well 
as less than .02% compared to agricultural programs in Mexico. These proportions are 
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still low if one considers the relevance of natural hazards on incomes and, most 
important, on assets accumulation discussed along this dissertation, evidenced in the 
stakeholders’ interview in the next chapter and further tested through a spatial 
econometric model in chapter 6. 
 
 80
Appendix 4.I: International experiences on crop insurance systems 
 
In many developed countries is difficult to identify if subsidies to contract crop 
insurance are aimed to help farmers to manage risk or if they are designed simply as 
subsidizing mechanism. Given the new conditions to get access to subsidies via prices 
and income support programs, some interest groups65 are moving to obtain extra-benefits 
from risk management and insurance programs. Insurance subsidies become then more 
important as a country moves towards agricultural price subsidies lifting, like the WTO 
Green Box Criteria66 discussed within the European Union. For instance, the Agriculture 
Directorate-General at the European Commission considers the aim of a risk management 
policy to not just provide income support, but useful to also reduce fluctuations in 
agricultural income (European Commission 2001: 74, COPA/COGECA 2002: 4).  
 
Given that 88% of the Mexican Trade is with the USA, it is important to discuss 
how Mexico’s trade partners manage crop insurance subsidy, since decisions taken by 
them affect both the whole Mexican economy but specially the agricultural sector 
(Saldana-Zorrilla 2002: 161), under the current open-economy framework of the Mexican 
economy. Canada means 2% of Mexican total trade, followed by Germany (1.1%) and 
Spain (1%). In addition, this appendix describes briefly crop insurance systems in some 
developing countries to get a broader picture on how they manage their disasters risk 
under the restriction that very scarce resources imply. 
 
USA 
The 1996 Farm Bill removed traditional price and income supports to farmers in 
the USA. Instead, the crop insurance program expanded coverage from only covering 
losses from shortfalls in crop yield to cover losses in gross revenue (Skees 2000: 2). 
Solely in 2001, budget for crop insurance increased 40% compared to 1999. The crop 
insurance subsidy reached 3, 400 US million for that year in the USA, whereas in Mexico 
it did not exceed 32 million, 0.9% to the USA system. CAT coverage is totally 
subsidized, and the maximum subsidy accounts at 41.7% of premium price. Farmers in 
the USA can obtain a minimum level of insurance coverage (CAT coverage) for a 
nominal administrative fee (USD 60 in 1999). Crop insurance is used by 30-36% of 
farmers in the USA – and 69% makes use of a governmental program (Harwood 1999: 
Annex C1). Crop insurance subsidy embraces 75 different crops67. CAT pays indemnities 
if yield crop is below 50% of average yield and covers 55% of a maximum fixed price. In 
addition, producers can contract other premiums to hedge 50-75% of crop’s yield through 
private insurance. Since 1994, the CAT system includes a complementary crop disaster 
assistance program for non-insurable crops, which transfers risk through private 
reinsurance companies (Harwood 2000). 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 To make reference to this groups, Skees (1992) uses the term Rent-seekers, to mean those people who 
seeks the change the rules in a political economy so that they can obtain income streams from government.  
66 Subsidies for Crop Insurance Premiums are the only ones allowed by the World Trade Organization. 
67 However, some crops are excluded (e.g. citrus fruits, pears, peppers, plums and flax) 
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Canada 
 In Canada, three different programs provide basic coverage for yield and income 
risk in farming: the Crop Insurance Program (CI), the Net Income Stabilization Account 
(NISA), and the Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA). Province governments 
are responsible for management and operation of the subsidy to crop insurance. The 
federal government provides 60% of funding and provinces 40% (1.8 US billion in 
2000). Coverage varies between 70-90% of average crop yields over a 10 to 15 year 
period. Since its implementation, governmental support has represented 56% of total 
indemnities payments (OECED 2000: 37).  
 Canada experienced a failed incursion in implementing crop revenue-insurance 
programs. The Gross Revenue Insurance Plan (GRIP) provided indemnity payments to 
farmers based on the shortfall between market revenue and the target revenue for crops. 
The government financed 66% of the plan and farmers contributed with the rest. But over 
4 years of implementation, the plan accumulated a 1 billion deficit. Some critics identify 
its failure in the lack of market orientation, moral hazard, and costly for taxpayers (Hume 
et al 1997). 
 
Germany 
Germany has no direct crop insurance subsidy, but pays indemnities to farmers in 
case of disaster transferring the risk to the derivatives markets. Based on the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBT), the Warenterminbörse Hannover makes contracts of futures for 
agricultural commodities. The market includes potatoes, hogs, wheat, rapeseed, rapeseed 
meal and rapeseed oil. Nevertheless, the coverage seems to be still low in terms of traded 
volume. For instance, traded wheat and hogs (the most representative ones) in 1999 
reached only 2% and 3.5%, respectively, of the market (EC 2001: 22)68.  
 
Spain 
 In Spain, 40% of agricultural surface is covered by an insurance scheme, and the 
public subsidy to premium fluctuates between 8 and 45%. ENESA (Entidad Estatal de 
Seguros), the Public Insurance Agency at the Ministry of Agriculture, is responsible for 
establishing the parameters and for granting the subsidy.  Insurance contracts are 
delivered to framers by means of participating private insurance companies. These 
companies integrate Agroseguro (Agrupación Española de Entidades Aseguradoras de 
Seguros Combinados S.A.), which manages the system, sets specific tariffs, conditions, 
pool premiums and the subsidy amount (OECD 2000: 37). Independent experts hired by 
Agroaseguro assess and evaluate claims. Reinsurance is mainly provided by Consorcio 
de Compensación de Seguros, a public company –which also offers a broader reinsurance 
plan to private companies. Large international reinsurance companies reinsure the whole 
insurance system in turn. As most European Union countries, Spain has a long standing 
experience in mainly hail insurance, whereas futures, mutual funds and option markets 
are less implemented. 
 
 
                                                 
68 Although we should add German crops traded in international commodities markets abroad. For a 
detailed analysis see: European Commission (2001). Risk Management Tools for EU Agriculture – with a  
special focus on insurance. Directorate A. Economic Analyses, forward studies, evaluation. January.  
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Chile 
Chilean agriculture suffers of recurrent frosts, droughts and heavy rains. The 
Ministry of Agriculture established in 2000 the agricultural insurance, managed by 
Comite de Seguro Agricola (COMSA), and operated by private insurance 
companies.69Crop insurance in this country embraces climate and market risks by means 
of the Red de Seguridad Agricola (Agricultural Security Net) and Fondo de 
Estabilizacion del Seguro Agricola (Stabilization Fund for Agricultural Insurance), 
respectively. The subsidy consists of financing 50% of net premiums on average, plus a 
fix fee (ca. US$ 36) per insurance contract. For small-scale producers, the subsidy covers 
80% of the premium price; for medium 50%; and less than 50% for large scale farmers. 
The subsidy covers up to US$1,320 per farmer by agricultural season, covering most 
crops types, and it is expected soon to expand coverage to fruits, oilseeds, grapes, 
flowers, and livestock. The net weighted coverage of the subsidy is estimated at 54% in 
year 2001, and covered 26,214 hectares. US$ 400 mill were disbursed in premiums 
subsidies in 2001, similar compared to USD 350 mill in Mexico for that year, but too low 
in per capita terms - around one fifth of subsidy to Chilean farmers. 
 
India 
The National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) was introduced in 1999 to 
replace the former Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme in India. NAIS covers all 
crops types, regardless cropping scale70. Small-scale producers and marginal farmers are 
granted with subsidies at 50% of the premium, sharing the cost 50-50% State and Central 
Governments. The subsidy in premium is phased out over a five-year period. In 2001, 18 
of 36 Indian states had joint the scheme. Livestock insurance is provided by the General 
Insurance Corporation of India, and covers either an agreed insured sum, or up to 100% 
of the animal’s market price. NAIS covered over 6 million farmers during the agricultural 
season 1999-2000, equivalent to US$14 million expenditure from governmental budget 
to support premiums.  
 
Argentina 
Only 7.7% of cropland is covered by insurance in Argentina (2 of 26 million 
hectares), and the government is not subsidizing crop insurance mainly due to budgetary 
constraints in the country exacerbated after the recent economic crisis in this country. 
70% of existing insurance contracts cover exclusively hail, almost 29% multi-peril, and 
1% livestock. Despite the fast growing of the crop insurance market during the last three 
years (annual 12%), insurance coverage is still expensive for producers: premiums cost 
fluctuates between 3 and 6% of production costs. For the last five years, increasing 
pressure from social and economic actors demand the government to implement crop 
insurance subsidy in light of the increasing risk associated to the adoption of enhanced 
technologies in the fast-growing Argentinean agriculture. The exports boom of 
agricultural goods (mainly soy bean) and livestock to China over the past three years has 
                                                 
69 COMSA is a small agency (five professionals plus three administration personal), which works 
together with a Technical Commission, integrated with representatives from the government, 
farmers, and insurance companies 
70 Including food crops, oilseeds and horticultural crops. 
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generated unexpected revenues to the country, which is the main argument to give 
agricultural some subsidies in return. 
 
Uruguay 
Uruguay is a country without subsidies granting for crop insurance but with high 
coverage. During the 70s and 80s, self-insurance (autoseguro agricola) had been the 
most employed crop insurance instrument. Self-insurance is a shared-risk pool funded by 
farmer’s arrangements. This instrument has been covering especially hail risk of mainly 
winter crops. The increasing disasters occurrence experienced over the eighties 
demanded more complex instruments to face that higher hazard exposure. It motivated 
the emergence of new insurance companies to leave behind the state monopoly in the 
crop insurance market (Banco de Seguros del Estado). Uruguayan government does not 
provide any subsidy so far, but however insurance coverage is greater in Uruguay than in 
most subsidized agricultural schemes in the world. 
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CHAPTER 5: Stakeholders’ views in reducing vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how natural hazards and stressors 
derived from liberalized trade, affect agricultural livelihoods and the implications of these 
stressors upon the poor in the agricultural sector. Special emphasis is given to the effects 
of natural disasters on migration patterns. In addition, this chapter aims at assessing 
policy options to reduce the vulnerability of small-scale farmers (e.g. government-
supported insurance schemes) within the framework of the governmental withdraw from 
directly subsidizing the agricultural sector over the past 18 years. 
To further this aim, this part of the research makes use of stakeholders’ 
consultation and descriptive analysis in three communities in Southern Mexico, 
presenting how subsistence agricultural livelihoods cope with natural hazards and adapt 
to stressors derived from liberalized trade, suggesting stakeholders-based solutions.  This 
chapter aims at verifying at local level part the conceptual discussion and aggregated 
description of the previous chapters. In addition, the empirical evidence from this field 
work provides grounding to specify the spatial model presented in chapter 6. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Mexican rural population lives predominantly in poverty and is vulnerable to 
a number of increasing hazards in terms of variety, recurrence and severity. Rural poverty 
is a complex issue with ancient causes (e.g. entitlements system) but can also be 
explained by recent changes and dynamic processes (e.g. economic policy and weather-
related disasters). Analyzing the relations between rural poverty, natural disasters, trade 
and agricultural policies at national, regional and community levels is crucial in assessing 
vulnerability in a comprehensive manner. As discussed in chapter 2, vulnerability implies 
a coupled human-environment systems’ interaction, where hazards are considered threats 
to the system. There is an increasing number of scientific works underlying the relevance 
of analyzing these hazards as an interacting and integrated complex process, whose 
stressors and perturbations can be multiple and act simultaneously (Downing and 
Patwardhan 2003, O’Brien and Leichenko 2000). 
This chapter presents empirical results about the exposure to hazards derived from 
stakeholders’ interviews and a survey in Southern Mexico, highlighting the complex 
processes lying behind rural vulnerability and identifying priorities to attend. The survey 
was undertaken between October 2004 and January 2005 in three rural communities in 
the state of Chiapas based on questionnaires applied to subsistence farmers, as well as 
De los ranchos bajaba la gente a los pueblos; 
la gente de los pueblos se iba a las ciudades. 
En las ciudades la gente se perdía, se disolvía 
entre la gente. «¿No sabe ónde me darán 
trabajo?» «Sí, vete a Ciudad Juárez. Yo te 
paso por doscientos pesos... » 
JUAN FULFO, Paso del Norte 
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face-to-face interviews with community leaders and local authorities. The purpose of this 
survey was to assess the perception of stakeholders regarding farmers’ vulnerability, to 
analyze their preferred coping strategies, to investigate the scope and role of public 
intervention in dealing with their hazards, and to find possible stakeholders-based 
solutions. 
The core questions addressed in this chapter are: Do farmers perceive that natural 
disasters and trade liberalization are significantly affecting their incomes? What are the 
current roles of the government, the private markets (e.g., insurers), the farmers and other 
stakeholders in coping with the adverse outcomes from natural disasters and income 
uncertainty of subsistence farmers? Besides other factors, is disasters affectation 
influencing farmers’ will to emigrate? In their perception, how can the government 
contribute to reducing agricultural and disaster vulnerability, including public transfer 
schemes (poverty reduction and productivity support) and risk transfer and loss-sharing 
schemes? 
This survey’s emphasis is in capturing a spectrum of coping strategies as response 
to the negative effects from natural disasters under the framework of trade liberalization 
and limited governmental facilities to agricultural production, commercialization, and 
financial services in Mexico. The coping strategies encompass both immediate responses, 
e.g. sources of non-farm income, post-disaster financing sources, and emigration plans, as 
well as those more structural and long-term strategies, like productive re-orientation and 
productive infrastructure improvement. Also, some open questions are included to 
investigate the need and viability of implementing crop insurance, mitigation measures 
and productive re-orientation to reduce the vulnerability to disasters under the framework 
of uncertain rural incomes. These open questions were also highly valuable in providing 
highlights into the effectiveness of public policies on improving livelihood conditions. 
These results also show how farmers’ coping and adapting strategies are being highly 
conditioned by past policy decisions, in some cases even hindering farmers from 
overcoming poverty and amplifying the negative effects of the natural disasters. The next 
section of this work presents a brief description of the hazard exposure and policy context 
in order to identify the main hazards and stressors affecting farmers’ in Mexico. Both the 
third and fourth section presents subsistence farmers’ consultation. The third section 
describes methodology, and presents hazard exposure of the three surveyed communities 
to natural disasters and unstable markets. Section four shows the main results concerning 
preferred coping and adaptive strategies to deal with hazards. In this section, current 
public instruments to deal with natural disasters are also expound and it asses their 
implementation in the agricultural sector in Mexico. The fifth section summarizes 
farmers’ answers to open questions, presenting their main suggestions to reduce 
vulnerability. Section six discusses the views of the community and farmer leaders, and 
local authorities concerning exposure in this region, as well as their suggestions to reduce 
vulnerability. Within these sections, a variety of research work is quoted in order to make 
the need for inquiring into precisely these aspects as part of this vulnerability assessment, 
more understandable. Finally, section seven presents some final remarks and concludes 
with an integral view of the exposure, suggesting a possible path for an integral, 
participative and viable vulnerability reduction in this region derived from the consulted 
stakeholders. 
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5.2 Background 
Given increasingly adverse climatic conditions in Mexico most likely linked to 
climate change (Conde and Gay 1999), along with uncertain rural incomes derived from 
insufficient productive infrastructure, market uncertainty and price volatility (Eakin 
2003), subsistence farmers are highly vulnerable and have increasingly been adopting 
off-farm coping strategies, such as out migration, urban informal employment, among 
others (ECLAC 2001). That is perhaps not a viable long-term solution to counteract the 
problem, but just an immediate relief. There is then a need for investigating feasible 
strategies to reduce that vulnerability taking into consideration these hazards in an 
integral manner. 
If Mexico maintains current free trade conditions for agriculture, agricultural 
prices will likely be continuously depressed. In 1986, Mexico began a trade liberalization 
process. First, with the adherence of the country to the GATT (now WTO), and most 
important after NAFTA, agricultural prices have dramatically decreased, especially those 
of maize, the basis of Mexican agriculture. Despite the fact that low prices are an 
advantage to maize consumers, price drops have affected most farmers’ incomes given 
their technical and financial inability to change to more rentable crops (Yunez-Naude and 
Barceinas 2003).  
In addition, natural disasters are increasingly causing damages to Mexican 
agriculture, especially to subsistence farmers. Serious natural hazards include, roughly, 
droughts in the North of the country and flooding in the South. Weather-related events 
have caused 80% of total loss over the period 1980-2005, and agriculture has been the 
most damaged sector by these events. Data from the National Institute Statistics (INEGI 
2005) indicates that in Mexico, ca. 80% of harvested hectares are rained. This fact reveals 
a high dependence of agricultural production from meteorological phenomena. In 
addition, rural credit granting, commercialization services and crop insurance are no 
longer facilitated from the government (as until the 80s), and private sector mechanisms 
are taking their place. However, subsistence farmers are often not eligible, as the case of 
credit granting, or their prices are unaffordable to them, such as crop insurance primes, 
storages, freight, etc. Remarkably dramatic is the reduction in insured cropping area after 
the government withdraws from providing direct crop insurance services to farmers 
(Hernández 1997, Wodon and Velez 2000). Whereas during the 80s insured cropping 
area reached 40%, during the present decade it dropped to only 10%. 
As pointed out by Linerooth-Bayer and Vari (2004), the lack of a risk-sharing 
mechanism, i.e. cross-subsidization insurance from better-off farmers cropping in low-
risk areas, along with insufficient incentives to promote loss-reduction incentives, i.e. risk 
mitigation works, contributes to amplify the negative consequences from extreme events. 
Following disasters, subsistence farmers get directly affected given their net losses in 
capital stock and incomes flows, it is costly to the government as recurrently has to spent 
in relief to the poor and infrastructure rebuilding, and less resources are thus available to 
undertake public investments in the agricultural sector as a whole. 
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5.3 Communities profile and hazards exposure 
 
The selected communities are Cacahoatan, Escuintla and Cintalapa, located on the 
coast of Chiapas, the poorest state in Mexico, in the region known as Soconusco. The 
Soconusco region is located at the Pacific Ocean coast, bordering Guatemala, and is the 
gate of Mexico to Central America. Historically, the region has been highly affected by 
excess of moisture, and the most recurrent natural disasters have been (1) heavy rains; (2) 
winds; (3) hurricanes, and (4) landslides. The main crops in the region are coffee, maize 
and banana, which have suffered price reductions during the past 15 years.71 According 
to the Mexican National Council of Population, our three surveyed communities are 
classified as highly marginalized (CONAPO 2004). Also, 42% of the population in 
Cacahoatán and 50% in Escuintla and Cintalapa lives in extreme poverty according to 
estimations from the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL 2005).72 Both 
questionnaire description and communities profile below introduce to the further sub-
sections presenting the main quantitative results from multiple choice questions 
investigating coping and adaptive strategies. 
 
5.3.1 Questionnaire description 
The questionnaire was applied in Spanish language, anonymous, and comprised 
of five sections: the initial section is on general information of the interviewees, i.e. age, 
land tenure, access to irrigation and credit, etc.; the second section is about natural 
disasters affectation, financial response and coping strategies; the third section inquires 
into issues of foreign trade, commercialization and crops diversification; out migration 
patterns and trends are investigated in the fourth section, and a final section of the 
questionnaire was left to questions concerning farmers’ suggestions to reduce 
vulnerability. The questionnaire asked both multiple-choice and open-ended questions. 
The total number of questions is 35, distributed in 6 pages (see Appendix 2). Average 
time to answer the questionnaire was 40 minutes. In cases when the farmer was 
analphabet (ca. 1 in 20), answers transcript was done. Two thirds of the questionnaires 
were distributed to groups of farmers at the end of the 2 forums we held in auditoriums 
belonging the city hall (in Cacahoatan and Escuintla). The rest was distributed house by 
house (in Cintalapa), where the questionnaire was just left and one hour later picked it up 
and helped to make questions more understandable when needed. The survey sample is 
comprised of 151 households, mostly small land holders, who rely heavily on self-
consumption agriculture. A total of 66 questionnaires were applied in the community of 
Cacahoatán, 47 in Cintalapa, and 38 in Escuintla, which represents 15% of subsistence 
farmers’ population per community.73  
 
                                                 
71 Concerning real decrease of maize and other crops during the past 15 years in Mexico, see the World 
Bank assessment on economic performance of Mexico after 15 years of NAFTA implementation 
(Lederman et al 2003). 
72 Porcentaje de pobreza alimentaria municipal total. 
73 Confidence interval of 95% for land size: 5.17 +/- 3.58, in other terms, P (1.59 < μ > 8.75). 
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5.3.2 Communities profile 
Inhabitants of these three communities rely predominantly on subsistence 
agriculture cropping small farms. They make increasingly use of complementary sources 
of income as the farm size decreases. 
 
5.3.2.1 Land property and tenure 
The mean land size is 5.2 hectares, the mode is 0.1 hectares (13% of the sample), 
and 75% of interviewed farmers owns less than 5 hectares (see dotted line in Figure 14). 
In sight of these characteristics, one can consider that we are here dealing with mainly 
subsistence farmers.74 
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Figure 14. Land distribution 
 
 
However, land size distribution varies among communities. Cacahoatan has 
stronger small-scale farming: 98% of interviewed work 5 ha or smaller lands. Land size 
distribution in Cintalapa has more extreme values: 63% of interviewed hold less than 3 ha 
and the rest 9 ha or more. Finally, Escuintla’s land size distribution posses less extreme 
values, as seen in figure 15 below.   
 
                                                 
74 By “subsistence farmer” we mean an agricultural unit that provides enough food for the farmer and his 
family but not enough surplus for regularly trading or to make significant investments to enlarge production 
scale. In this regard, FAO considers subsistence agriculture as “a cropping system where farm production 
of the land is predominately consumed by the farmer and his extended family” (Eaton and Shepherd 2001). 
75% of 
cases 
25% of 
cases 
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Figure 15. Land size 
 
The predominant land tenure is ejido (80% of interviewed), which is a subtype of 
communal land, followed by private (13%). Eighty percent of the interviewed owned 
their land and 13% rented (see Appendix 3). 
 
5.3.2.2 Age and sex 
The mean age of the surveyed population is 43.7 years; 80% are 57 years old or 
younger. 72% are male and 26% female. The latter bias is due to the fact that in 
Cacahoatan and Escuintla the questionnaires were answered upon invitation to meet in a 
specified place. There came mostly men, since many women had to take care of the 
children at home. By contrast, in Cintalapa the questionnaire was delivered and picked up 
directly house by house, and in this case there was found an almost 50-50% sex 
proportion. After all, this bias to masculine may be even positive, since in this region men 
are the most involved in direct farming. 
 
5.3.3 Communities exposure 
 
The three surveyed communities have recurrent affectation from natural disasters, 
high marginalization conditions and subsistence agriculture is the predominant 
livelihood. Also, hard cropping conditions characterize these subsistence farmers, such as 
extremely small landholding, low technology usage, scarce access to credit and 
insurance, as well as they rely on mono-crop agriculture at a large extent. 
 
5.3.3.1 Natural hazard exposure 
In terms of natural disasters, historical registers show recurrent disasters 
affectation in the region, especially during the last fourth-month of every year. On 
September 1998, the communities of Escuintla and Cintalapa suffered of heavy rains and 
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flooding causing thousands of victims and millions of dollar in economic losses 
(CENAPRED 2001). Unlike these communities, Cacahoatan has less dramatic but more 
frequent natural disasters, experiencing economic losses from heavy rains on average 
once a year. In addition, in the last years this region has been experimenting unusual 
climatic conditions: drought years in coastal areas along with heavy rains in the 
mountains (Sierra Madre de Chiapas), which are turning more extreme. 
 
These three communities are characterized by a warm humid climate, with rains 
during most of the year in costal areas and usually affected by hurricanes in summer and 
autumn and by summer-autumn rainy season in the mountains. For instance, on last 
October 2005, as consequence of hurricane Stan, nearly 600,000 people in the whole 
region Soconusco got directly affected by flooding and sudden river overflowing. High 
economic losses were especially reported in Escuintla, but also in Tapachula, Motozintla 
and Huixtla.  
 
5.3.3.2 Exposure from low diversification  
Mono-crop regions are, on the one hand, positive in that of exploiting local 
comparative advantages (as in the standard model of trade based on David Ricardo 
postulates –Krugman and Obstfeld 1997), producing scale economies, as well as due to 
the benefits derived from high specialization in the sense of the work division of Adam 
Smith, particularly emphasized by the economic neo-classical approach.  
-
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Figure 16. High dependence from maize and coffee 
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On the other hand, mono-crop implies risk when the respective commodity 
markets turns highly volatile or price drops dramatically. As Benson and Clay (2002) 
point out, mono-crop economies must face vulnerability from not only natural disasters, 
but also those associated to world trade uncertainty due to non-diversified export 
products of primary commodities. The main agricultural products of the interviewed 
sample are maize (46%) and coffee (41%) –see Figure 16. The latter can be considered a 
vulnerable point to this group, given the decreasing prices of maize and coffee 
experienced during the last 15-20 years. Also, only 13% and 17% of the interviewed has 
access to irrigation and credit granting, respectively. 
 
From the total interviewed in our three communities, 43% has an alternative 
source of income other than agriculture. Rural services are the main alternative activity 
(28% of alternative activities), which means working for other farms. The second 
alternative activity (16%) is construction activities, which usually means working as a 
building worker in the nearest urban area. The third alternative activity (12%) is 
remittances, 5% of the total interviewees listed this as an alternative sources of income. 
Most people that receive remittances have relatives abroad. They, themselves, have plans 
to emigrate from the community. Less important alternative sources of income are 
business, technical assistance and trade (see Figure 17). 
 
Bars show  percents
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percent
business
cattle
chauf f eur
commerce
construction
carpentry
cattle
electrician
f otographie
procampo
priv ate security
remittences
rural serv ices
technical assistence
teaching
trade
taxi
urban serv ices
ad
di
nc
57%
3%
1%
1%
1%
7%
1%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1%
5%
12%
2%
1%
2%
1%
1%
Source of additional income
 
Figure 17. Sources of additional incomes 
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Another observation concerning additional income is that as the farm size decreases, the 
dependence on agriculture derived income also decreases. Figure 18 shows graphs where 
on the horizontal axis the farm size, and the vertical axis the number of cases of the 
respective dependence on agricultural income. Farmers whose rely less on agricultural 
income are those with relatively small farms. As further addressed in section 3.4.2, this 
income structure is crucial after natural disasters affectation given subsistence farmers’ 
little access to credit granting. Thus, they have difficulties in replacing their lost in stock 
of capital and upgrading their capital goods (machinery, tools, etc.). Subsistence farmers 
cannot then crop more intensively after disasters –given their lack of access to credit- nor 
more extensively -given their full land usage. Their need to find an alternative job is thus 
grater on small farms. 
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Figure 18. Importance of agricultural income at different production scales 
 
 
5.4 Farmers’ coping and adaptive strategies 
 
In the sustainability science, an important component in vulnerability assessments 
is coping and adaptive capacity. Coping capacity can be defined as the ability of a unit to 
respond to a harm occurrence as well as to avoid its potential affectation, and adaptive 
capacity is the ability of a unit to gradually transform its structure, functioning or 
organization to survive under hazards threatening its existence (Kelly and Adger 2000). 
After persistent or major natural disasters, coping and adaptive capacity of the most 
vulnerable economic units is taken to the limit. If they do not have access to credit or to 
further mechanisms to re-activate their production or to restructure their productive 
processes towards less vulnerable conditions, as usually happens with subsistence 
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farmers after disasters, when their expectations of future incomes become pessimistic. 
The present section investigates preferred coping and adaptive strategies in these 
communities, exploring the scope of farmers’ coping strategies, like emigration (Section 
4.1), family and neighbor’s solidarity and institutional financial support to cope with 
negative outcomes from natural disasters (4.2), expounding the main public financial 
instruments to deal with natural disasters in Mexico. Section 4.3 assesses the contribution 
of social programs in improving living conditions and expectations. Section 4.4 addresses 
farmers’ perception regarding foreign trade as stressor in the region. Section 4.5 analyzes 
potential benefits from productive re-orientation, e.g. crops diversification, as an adapting 
strategy. 
 
5.4.1 Emigration  
One of the main findings is that communities recurrently damaged by natural 
disasters but without formal financial mechanisms to respond tend to have more 
pessimistic expectations about future incomes. In turn, they consider out migration more 
seriously as a coping mechanism. These communities were even more pessimistic than 
those with lower assets. So, migrating is not a question of just poverty, but of 
expectations. Also, in these communities the presence of „travel agencies“ aimed at 
transporting emigrants to Tijuana (3,5000 km away from these areas) was stronger, which 
is the pass to cross the Mexican border to the USA, as evidenced in Cacahoatan, state of 
Chiapas.    
Emigration as a coping strategy thus seems to correspond more to expectations of 
future incomes rather than to poverty itself. These findings provide empirical evidence to 
postulates on emigration by Todaro (2000). According to Todaro, migration is primarily 
an economic phenomenon, which for the individual migrant can be a rational decision 
despite the existence of urban unemployment. The Todaro model postulates that 
migration proceeds in response to rural-urban and national-international differences in 
expected income rather than actual earnings. That decision is taken in order to maximize 
their expected gains in life and, for a given time horizon the urban sector or jobs abroad, 
respectively, result more convenient. In other words, if coping and adaptive capacity of 
vulnerable economic agents is exceeded in their locations, they find emigration to higher 
income regions as their best alternative –even despite the presence of restriction to labor 
mobility and hard conditions to cross borders illegally in the case of international 
migration.  
 
Emigration patterns  
At national level, out migration in Mexico has increased over the past two 
decades. The Population Census of 1990 reports that 0.24% of Mexican population was 
residing abroad, whereas in the 2000 Census this figure rose to 0.41% (INEGI 2005). 
Currently, Mexico is the first country of origin of migrants to the USA, where nowadays 
1 of each 3 migrants was born in Mexico (ca. 12 million), integrating the first majority 
migrating community in the whole USA and in 31 of the 50 states of the American Union 
(Center of Migration Studies of Washington 2003, US Census Bureau 2002).  
The share of population living abroad in the municipality of Cacahoatan (0.53%) 
is clearly higher than the national average in year 2000, whereas the municipality of 
Escuintla has a lower level (0.36%), though both cases above levels of out migration in 
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the state of Chiapas (0.15%). Total emigration (domestic plus international) in 
Cacahoatan and Escuintla reaches 1.48% and 1.34%, respectively.75  
 
In general, 41% of the interviewed stated current plans to emigrate. The 
correlation between people with plans to emigrate and those affected by natural disasters 
is only 0.77. However, the correlation increases until statistically significant values in the 
case of the variables “number of natural disasters in the past 10 years” and “relatives 
migrated due to natural disasters.” In this case the correlation is 0.25, which is significant 
at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) (see Table 10 below).  
The correlation coefficient between the variables “Plans to emigrate” and 
“Relatives living abroad” is 0.321, significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) under Pearson’s 
correlation test. However, the test of correlation of “plans to emigrate” shows higher 
values when tested with the variable “relatives migrated due to natural disasters”. The 
latter variable represents the presence of relatives which have used emigration as a 
coping strategy after loss of assets and/or productivity due to natural disasters. The value 
of the correlation test for these variables is 0.341, slightly higher than having relatives 
abroad in general.  
These correlations provide empirical evidence that support: (1) natural disasters 
have increased emigration; (2) farmers’ plans to emigrate are influenced by the presence 
of relatives living abroad, but that influence is even higher if these relatives emigrated 
due to disasters, and (3) recurrent natural disasters in the past ten years together with 
relatives emigrated due to disasters increase the probability of farmers’ plans to emigrate. 
Emigration is thus an important coping strategy by people in these communities. 
 
Table 10: Correlations between plans to emigrate, disasters, and relatives living abroad 
  PlansEmigr RelatAbroad 
RelativsEmi
grDis MNatdis3 
PlansEmigr Pearson Correlation 1 .321(**) .341(**) .077 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .001 .001 .426 
  N 123 112 91 110 
RelatAbroad Pearson Correlation .321(**) 1 .378(**) .051 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .001   .000 .600 
  N 112 122 93 109 
RelativsEmigrDis Pearson Correlation .341(**) .378(**) 1 .251(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000   .013 
  N 91 93 105 98 
MNatdis3 Pearson Correlation .077 .051 .251(*) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .426 .600 .013  
  N 110 109 98 133 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
                                                 
75 Own estimations with data from Sistema Municipal de Bases de Datos, INEGI (www.inegi.gob.mx ). 
One must also take into consideration that official registers tend to hide migratory moves taking place in 
two stages, that is, migrants that first move on to domestic cities and after a while move on abroad. 
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Of the interviewed sample with plans to emigrate, 95.6% also gave a preferred 
place to emigrate. The most popular destination is the United States of America (USA), 
which was 15% of the total interviewed population, and 37% of the interviewed 
population with intention to emigrate (see chart below). One third of the total interviewed 
would recommend a relative to emigrate given the current conditions. 
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Figure 19. Preferred destinations to emigrate 
 
The interviewed were also asked whether they have relatives living abroad. To 
this question, 37.75 answered positively, of which 96% said they live in the USA, equal 
to 36% of the total. It reflects the clear concentration of Mexican emigrants in the USA.  
Also, from the interviewed farmers with plans to emigrate, 83% and 92% did not 
have access to irrigation and credit granting, respectively, and 94% had no export crops. 
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Figure 20: Residence of relatives abroad 
 
5.4.2 Financing sources for disaster risk and vulnerability reduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, economic vulnerability is the susceptibility of an 
economic agent to absorb negatively exogenous shocks, given its assets possession and 
productive capacity, its level of knowledge and information, and its implemented options 
to avoid, manage, or smooth negative effects from a particular shock, under the 
framework of an entitlement system. Reducing economic vulnerability consists basically 
on implementing the due changes in time to minimize negative effects from exogenous 
shocks upon economic agents’ assets by strengthening constituting elements of 
vulnerability and/or improving risk management strategy (Saldaña 2004). In the concept 
of risk, the susceptibility of the exposed unit is something given, and for that reason risk 
reduction focus more in prevention, preparedness and in general in measures to reduce 
the probability of harmful outcomes, but which do not imply major changes to the 
exposed unit itself. However, vulnerability reduction embraces these measures and 
additionally integrates changes to the exposed unit, such as strengthening its coping and 
adapting capacity, which involves multiple socioeconomic interactions, i.e. entitlements 
systems, empowerment, assets distribution, as well as human-environmental relations, i.e. 
land use change, water management strategies, etc. The present sub-section focuses rather 
in risk reduction, what will be integrated in the last two sections into the broad 
vulnerability analysis. 
 
5.4.2.1 Financing sources in surveyed communities 
Given the variety of public financing sources to reduce disaster risk in the country 
presented in chapter 4, how important have they been compared to community-based 
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sources in the views of our interviewees? So, the questionnaire asked farmers about the 
importance of different financing sources to recover from natural disasters. The chosen 
options in order of importance to them are as follows (for further details on questionnaire 
contents, see Appendix 2):  
 
a) Help of relatives from the community  
b) Governmental humanitarian aid 
c) Neighbor solidarity 
d) Possessions sale 
e) Help of relatives from other places in Mexico 
f) Help of relatives from abroad  
g) Governmental fund for property rebuilding 
h) Private Humanitarian aid (associations, donors, etc.) 
i) Land sale 
j) Communal loans 
k) Private loans 
l) Public loans 
m) Private insurance 
n) Public insurance 
o) Insurance fund (Fondos) 
p) Public subsidized Insurance 
q) Other 
 
The interviewees evaluated their disaster financing sources by specifying from 1 
to 5, where 1 means irrelevant and 5 very important. This ranking is shown in Figure 21 
below. “Relatives in the community” was the most important post-disaster financing 
source, receiving the highest summed score (332), followed by governmental aid (270) 
and neighbor solidarity (266). Less important was the sell of property (207); 
governmental fund (173); the sell of land (170), and community loans (161). The 
importance of relatives living in the same community and aid from the government 
underlines the high dependence on ex-post financial instruments. Finally, the four types 
of available insurance –private, public, Fondos and subsidized- were ranked as the lowest 
disaster financing source.76 Also, governmental repair of public infrastructure was 
perceived as governmental aid by an important share of the interviewed. 
  
                                                 
76 Consider that no major natural disaster had affected this region between FAPRACC establishment in 
2002 and the application of this questionnaire in January 2005. After the flood tragedy in September 2005, 
this community perception –about relevance of governmental support and public insurance- could have 
changed depending on the performed governmental response following this disaster. 
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Figure 21 Relevance of post-disaster financing source 
 
 
5.4.2.3 Perception of responsibility to reduce vulnerability  
As shown in Figure 22, the interviewed population perceived the government as 
mainly responsible for reducing vulnerability to natural disasters in the region. The 
Federal government was considered as most responsible even over the state government, 
with summed ranking of 601 and 550, respectively. That perception could be attributable 
to the fact that until the early 90s the Federal government centralized heavily the public 
intervention. In fact, such a perception does not contradict the current state of the risk 
management in Mexico, since the Federal government transfers most of the resources for 
disaster reduction to local governments (state and municipal). As discussed above, local 
governments are required to identify disaster risk and vulnerability under this system as 
condition to obtain federal funds to carry out prevention measures under FOPREDEN 
and FAPREACC. Derived from comments of farmers’ leaders and local authorities, we 
also found that in practice local governments do not make use of those available federal 
resources mainly due to the lack of concrete research on risk and vulnerability at state 
and municipality levels (further details in section 5 below). 
  
 99
Who should provide support to reduce vulnerability to disasters?
242
601
550
185
150
62
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Community Federal Gov. State Gov. Priv. Insurance Fondos others
Sc
or
e
 
Figure 22: Views on responsibility to reduce vulnerability 
 
It is noteworthy that Fondos received a relatively low score, which may reflect the 
lack of promotion and uptake of Fondos insurance among subsistence farmers in this 
region. In a subsequent question, the interviewees were asked to specify which other 
authorities should be responsible. Most answered “municipality,” which reflects the 
explicit demand of these people to get municipal authorities more involved in the 
reduction of disaster vulnerability given that they know better the local concerns.  
These results keep some similarities with the public survey in Hungary from 
Linerooth-Bayer and Vari (2004), which shows the strong presence of paternalistic views 
from the citizens about the state assuming responsibility of their well-being, and more 
concretely concerning flood risk reduction. As in the present study, Hungarian 
interviewees considered the central government as the main responsible rather than the 
own population living in disaster prone areas. 
 
5.4.2.4 Insurance versus credit granting in inhibiting out migration 
Having insurance appears not to make a difference in the intentions to emigrate. 
71% of farmers with some percentage of crops insured still have plans to emigrate. 
However, access to credit seems to be relatively more important in lessening emigration 
plans.77 Only 28% of farmers with credit granting expressed a will to leave the 
community. It should be kept in mind, however, that the number of farmers with access 
to credit in the sample is 2.5 fold higher than that with insurance. Second, unlike farmers 
in commercial cropping, crop insurance seems to still be a less explored strategy among 
                                                 
77 These results coincide with those from Saldaña-Zorrilla and Sandberg (2005), who found positive 
regression parameters of disasters recurrence and low credit granting in explaining emigration in a spatial 
econometric analysis at municipal level in Mexico. By contrast, insurance and poverty resulted not to be 
relevant in explaining spatial patterns of emigration for the said study. 
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subsistence farmers. In general, insurance is not considered an investment among 
farmers. Credit, from its part, is more tangibly perceived in improving assets position.78  
 
5.4.3 Scope of governmental social programs  
Programs aimed at reducing poverty tend to increase transfers, but they do not 
affect the long-term lack of assets in the current case of Mexico (Attanasio & Szekely 
1999). Assets can be defined as the stock of wealth used to generate well being (Vatsa & 
Krimgold 2000). This concept is important when considering the effects of natural 
disasters, which may decrease the capital assets of households and businesses. Families 
have an initial asset, which generates an output. This output varies widely, depending on 
market price of the produced factor, and on the productivity of its use (profitability). As 
families pursue strategies to maximize their assets, they are in better position to enlarge 
their risk pool and reduce vulnerability. For authors like Vatsa & Krimgold (2000), 
vulnerability is a broader and more dynamic concept, which involves the poor, but also 
households living above poverty line at risk of falling below in case of an income shock 
(new poor).  
Despite recent efforts of anti-poverty programs in Mexico to raise income and 
consumption beyond mere flows, their contribution to strengthen assets is still 
controversial. ECLAC (2001, p. 32) points out that social programs of poverty reduction 
in Mexico are merely of aid character, though if these programs were more substantial 
and long-term sustained, these additional resources could increase assets, as well as for 
instance improve ability to invest on education and other long term variables, which 
directly modify assets and in last instance income.  
Currently, a wide variety of programs in Mexico are aimed at increasing assets 
from different fronts. Social Programs are integrated into the coordinating strategy 
Contigo, which is managed by the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) and 
encompasses projects to support education (i.e. CONAFE, INEA, DIF), health (i.e. 
IMSS-Solidaridad), nutrition to poor households living in poor rural areas (LICONSA, 
TORTIBONO and DICONSA), among others. However, the problematic of poverty in 
the country is profound –especially in rural areas, as here discussed- and some negative 
effects from the economic policy, discussed further, seem to exceed these efforts. 
Most of the interviewed (79%) perceive that, in general, the governmental support 
does not reach its targeted population, and 53% of them would also encourage a relative 
to emigrate from the community (see Table 11 below). Surprisingly, encouragement to 
emigrate is higher (65%) in the interviewed population stating the opposite –that the 
support reaches its targeted population.  
 
  
                                                 
78 Regarding this aspect, the prospect theory (Kahneman and Amos 1979) provides some explanations 
about behaviors, which like this one, seem to be irrational at simple judge. However, according to this 
theory, some economic agents valuate assets more in function of their tangibility (as in this case insurance 
versus credit), security (e.g. trading with a small risk but with higher gains versus keeping secure low-
income self-consumption), or immediate profit (long- versus short-return investments), rather than in 
function of pure gains. 
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Table 11.  Governmental support reaches target population and encouragement to emigrate 
 
RecomEmigr  GovSupReach * RecomEmigr 
Crosstabulation   0 1 Total 
  
% within 
GovSupReach 46.2% 53.8% 100.0%
% within 
RecomEmigr 83.3% 76.1% 79.3%
0 
% of Total 36.6% 42.7% 79.3%
  
% within 
GovSupReach 35.3% 64.7% 100.0%
% within 
RecomEmigr 16.7% 23.9% 20.7%
GovSupReach 
1 
% of Total 7.3% 13.4% 20.7%
  
% within 
GovSupReach 43.9% 56.1% 100.0%
% within 
RecomEmigr 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total 
% of Total 43.9% 56.1% 100.0%
 
 
The latter can be interpreted both as pessimism about the return of governmental 
supports on future incomes regardless of their perception of accountability about the 
public, as well as could suggest that current support is still insufficient to counteract 
current structural weakness in the countryside, and that emigrating seems to be a more 
viable coping strategy. As discussed below in section 5, farmers’ leaders and local 
authorities also see with some skepticism the achievements of social programs in light of 
current affectation from low productivity and depressed prices in the agricultural sector 
besides high disasters affectation and lack of financial and technical support. These facts 
suggest a more cross-sectional projecting and coordinated mobilization of resources 
between the rural development, disasters management and the social development 
strategies. 
 
5.4.4 Foreign trade  
Despite surprisingly significant increases in exports due to signed trade 
agreements, its gains have been unequally distributed in Mexico. In some cases, as in 
traditional agriculture, it has even contributed to drive producers out of business, as 
discussed in chapter 2.  
 
5.4.4.1 Perception about NAFTA 
The 62% of interviewed farmers expressing an opinion about the benefit from NAFTA 
perceived a negative impact. Only 14% considered the trade agreement as indifferent to 
their welfare, and only one farmer (0.66%) found the agreement positive. 
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Figure 23: Perceptions on NAFTA impact 
 
5.4.4.2 Foreign competitors 
As shown in Figure 24, most of interviewed farmers did not answer whether there 
is a particular country of origin of imports threatening their production and 
commercialization. However, 15% of the total believed Brazilian imports affected them. 
This answer is probably due to the fact that over 40% of interviewed farmers are coffee 
growers (mainly in Cacahoatan), and Brazilian coffee is competitor. The USA is 
considered the second country in this ranking (9%) mainly due to its maize imports, 
followed by Guatemala and Costa Rica due to coffee-, and Japan got a fourth place due 
mainly to its rice production. Finally, coffee and maize seems to be the most exposed 
crops to foreign competition in the surveyed region, whose vulnerability to fluctuations in 
world prices is higher compared to other crops. There is a demand –expressed both in the 
open questions as well as in the forums organized as part of the present project- for 
reducing uncertainty in their prices and improving access to both local and foreign 
markets.  
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Figure 24. Perceptions on origin of concurring imports 
 
5.4.4.3 Exports, credit and emigration 
Only 9% of interviewed farmers have reportedly exported their crops, but 
curiously none of them reports access to credit from banks. Only 16% of total 
interviewed farmers have some credit, but none of them has exported. In addition, only 
2.2% of interviewed farmers rely on an export union, and only one-third of them have 
exported. So, neither credit granting nor export unions are crucial in supporting exports in 
the region. Exports appear to be due to the presence of intermediaries rather than to 
permanent financial / institutional mechanisms. From this perspective, credit serves self 
consumption and domestic-oriented production. In fact, 40% of exporter-farmers have 
plans to emigrate abroad. 
 
5.4.5 Productive re-orientation as an adaptive strategy 
As discussed in chapter 3, the theory of Terms of Trade provides valuable 
elements for understanding the relevance of adverse foreign trade conditions in 
increasing vulnerability in the agricultural sector. To adapt to negative terms of trade 
within the agricultural sector, productive reorientation seems to be the due response, 
which means both diversifying crops to reduce the probability of getting affected given 
sudden prices drops in the mono-crop, as well as moving to more rentable crops, that is, 
whose sale prices are relatively higher, with a more stable demand and suitable to 
regional environmental and climatic conditions. In this regard, Gay et al (2004) analyze 
the high vulnerability in a coffee production region in Southern Mexico to extreme 
climatic conditions, which is being increasingly affecting the region, and warns about the 
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low viability of growing coffee in these regions once internalized some negative effects 
of policy changes and market instability for this sector. 
Given current trends of decreasing prices of traditional agricultural products, 58% 
of interviewed farmers have plans to diversify to higher profitability crops. As seen 
above, over 87% of farmers crop maize and coffee, whose prices have been decreasing 
over the past ten years. In counterpart, fruits and vegetables would have a higher 
profitability to the farmers in this region given favorable climatic conditions and relative 
prices.  
Based on research carried out by the World Bank, fruits and vegetables were 
found to have higher comparative and competitive advantages to the Mexican agricultural 
sector, especially to export to North-America in the framework of the NAFTA. Even 
when freight and insurance costs are greater in the South to export to the USA and 
Canada, the relative greater water availability in the South make it still very rentable 
(Lederman et al 2003). 
 
5.4.5.1 Crops Diversification and emigration plans 
However, as stated by most interviewed farmers and local leaders of farmers’ 
unions, lack of coordination between farmers and authorities impedes to get the right 
information and knowledge to change crops. As shown in Figure 25, Escuintla has the 
most farmers with plans to change crop (77%). This may be due to their relatively higher 
proximity to markets through the Pacific Costal Highway, as well as to better information 
because of proximity to the municipality’s capital. Also, farmers from this community are 
less prone to emigrate: 38% compared to the 52% mean value. By contrast, Cacahoatan’s 
farmers have the lowest propensity to diversify crops (44%), and are the most prone to 
emigrate (58%). It follows encouraging crops diversification might improve expectations, 
and could help to increase rural incomes in the region and lesser out migration 
tendency.79 
 
5.4.5.2 Crops diversification and foreign trade 
Only 30% of interviewed farmers have chosen an additional new crop in order to 
diversify. Maize and coffee were their preferred options (27% of cases). Since maize and 
coffee prices have dropped, this choice could be interpreted that farmers fear more the 
risk of cropping something new more than they crave the gains. This choice can also be 
explained by the lack of available information among farmers concerning more viable 
crops. Farmers are conscious that maize and coffee are less profitable. Coffee and maize 
are planed to be phased out by 85% of farmers with plans to leave a crop, especially in 
Cacahoatan, which is located at the hearth of the coffee axis of Chiapas. That is 
particularly important in sight of the total elimination of tariffs to agricultural imports 
from Canada and the USA to take place by the end of 2008 in accordance with the 
NAFTA. This is not a big concern in the case of coffee, for which these trade partners do 
not represent competition, but for maize, where the USA has a much higher productivity 
and subsidies than Mexico, as remarked by Yunez-Naude (2001). 
                                                 
79 In this regard, it would be helpful monitoring prices for those suitable crops to this region in order to 
choose those crops which increase farmers’ incomes (moving to high-surplus crops) at the time of reducing 
risk to both price fluctuations and natural disasters. 
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Figure 25. Diversification and emigration plans 
 
5.5 Farmers expectations and suggestions to reduce vulnerability: open questions 
 
The intent of the open-ended questions was to identify expectations in the sample 
communities, as well as to gain some insights into possible community-based solutions to 
reduce that vulnerability. 
 
5.5.1 How are you expected to recover from next disaster? 
Both poverty conditions and past post-disaster financing provided in the region 
seem to have created adverse incentives to decrease vulnerability. Responding to the 
question “how are you expected to recover from the loss from the next natural disaster,” 
36% of the farmers who answered stated they expected governmental support, whereas 
31% said they will work more intensively or look for better trade conditions (price 
improvements). Further, 22% said they had no plans, and most of these respondents 
hoped for God’s help. Only 3% expected to receive credit. Very few of the interviewed 
farmers mentioned insurance as an instrument to recover from disasters (see Figure 26). 
Only a few interviewed farmers (3%) expected to reduce their potential loss from 
the next natural disaster because of current disaster prevention measures (especially 
warning systems). Only 2% of respondents maintained any of the following ways of 
preventing and recovering from the next disaster: indemnity payment from their 
insurance contracts, help and solidarity from the community, and reducing the risk by 
means of crop diversification. 
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The hope for governmental post-disaster financing is widespread, especially in 
farmers over 40 years of age. Credit and insurance were the expected response of farmers 
under 52 years of age. By contrast, crop diversification and prevention arise from 
relatively younger farmers, aged 29 on average. 
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Figure 26. Expected financing sources to forthcoming natural disasters 
 
A similar moral hazard behavior is also reproduced in the case of municipality 
and state authorities, since they rely too much on Federal government support, basically 
on financing rebuilding, and undertake few steps towards vulnerability and risk reduction 
both of their own assets as well as of those from their civil population, as discussed in the 
section below describing the results of interviews with local authorities at the three 
governmental levels of the country (municipal, state and federal). 
 
5.5.2 How would you suggest that the government reduces vulnerability to natural disasters in your 
community? 
The answers to this open-ended question can be classified in four groups: those 
related to (i) mitigation works, (ii) insurance and credit granting, (iii) production factors, 
and (iv) warning systems. 
(i) Mitigation works  
Farmers in the community of Cintalapa insisted in the need for constructing a 
retaining wall at the edge of the Cintalapa River (see Figure 27 below). On average, this 
river overflows once in four years. The last overflow in 1998 washed away dozens of 
crops and buildings in the community, including houses, a school, and a hospital (picture 
2). Farmers of this community complained in their questionnaires about the lack of 
response from the government about their demands for a mitigation work (e.g. to channel 
the river, retaining wall) to prevent the river from overflowing in the rainy season. 
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Many of interviewed suggested that they serve as voluntary workers to build the 
mitigation work. In such a case they would require only machinery and raw materials 
from the government.  
 
  
 
There are concerns about the lack of continuity in mitigation works after a new 
public administration comes in office. Some farmers suggested direct governmental 
Figure 27: Flood risk 
in Cintalapa, 
Escuintla. As seen in 
the picture, when rains 
in the highlands 
increase, the river 
flows through the 
rocky area (low-right 
side of the image), and 
inundates the 
community. 
Figure 28: Devastated 
area by the Cintalapa 
River overflowing in 
1999. Previously, there 
were dozens of houses in 
this area, which were 
washed away by the flow 
taking a number of 
human victims. The red 
dotted line shows the 
seven meters of land lost 
to the flow in the 
community Cintalapa. 
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assessment to identify assets at risk and to establish a fund and corresponding program to 
provide raw materials and technical support to retrofit, redesign, and/or strengthen weak 
infrastructure even after the administration changes. Some farmers reported on the visit 
of engineers to initiate public works, but they never got materialized. This may be due to 
the lack of continuity after changing public administration in the region.  
 
(ii) Insurance  
A frequent suggestion mainly in the community of Cacahoatan was insurance to 
reduce farmers’ asset vulnerability from natural disasters. However, some farmers 
expressed their willingness to establish micro-insurance only if the government pays 
100% indemnity in case of disaster. This reflects a lack of understanding of Fondos and 
FAPRACC. If these farmers would have information about the existence of these 
instruments, they would not have to suggest its creation, but rather to improve their 
access to the funds. 
 
(iii) Production and credit granting 
Even though the three communities have humid climates, many perceived the 
climate to be changing, making rain falls increasingly unpredictable. Given the current 
lack of technical advice to change to crops with less intensive water requirements, 
irrigation is also considered a valuable measure to reduce vulnerability to droughts in the 
communities of Escuintla and Cintalapa. Improved seeds (resistant to heavy rains and 
wind) and machinery lending were suggested mainly by farmers with larger land 
extension, especially in Escuintla. Greenhouses and crop training were also suggested.  
In line with opinions of farmers’ leaders, further discussed, farmers in these 
communities expressed concern about the lack of a rural development bank in the region 
to support investments in reducing their risk to disasters as well. In some cases, they 
suggested, it could replace even direct governmental intervention in crop insurance. In 
addition, there is a general perception in the interviewed farmers about the lack of 
competent personal involved in the implementation of rural development initiatives. 
 
(iv) Warning systems 
Lack of access to communication media means higher vulnerability. Most farmers 
living in coastal areas expressed feeling at risk because of their relative isolation from the 
main towns of the region and its associated lack of communication and warning in case 
of hurricanes and other weather-related disasters. Farmers living in low areas said to need 
warning systems, e.g. an alarm, to avoid disasters from heavy rains in the mountains 
resulting in river flows that threat on low regions, as in years 1999, 1998, 1995, 1988, 
and so on. Some farmers complained about the delayed governmental aid in their 
communities, as well as about complicated formalities to apply for support. Farmers also 
expressed their interest in training to form community disaster prevention brigades, 
which could also serve as rescue workers. One farmer suggested creating a municipal 
map of risks. Based on this map, the municipality should apply for state and federal 
resources to carry out mitigation works, to offer insurance schemes and to extend the 
awareness capacity in the region.  
The rest of demands on the government to reduce disaster vulnerability includes 
expanding post-disaster aid and immediate relief to the poor, e.g. shelters, food, medical 
services, indemnity payments, raw materials for housing reconstruction, etc.  
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5.5.3 How should the government to improve agricultural incomes? 
(i) To enhance demand and trade 
Some farmers suggested a governmental strategy to connect farmers with 
enterprises in Mexico and abroad, making productive linkages forwards and backwards. 
Many farmers mentioned the need for increasing demand at better prices by food 
industries and supermarkets. For instance, one farmer suggested making a law to obligate 
supermarkets to buy local agricultural production, and not supply final consumers with 
imported products if they are produced in the region. Another farmer remarked that with 
such law, the productive chain could integrate local subsistence farmers into the 
economic dynamic. 
Some interviewees suggested encouraging a food industry in the region, either 
private or state-owned. It could create more stable demand for agricultural products, 
could stabilize farmers’ incomes, and increase the ability to invest in mitigation to natural 
disasters. This would push downwards insurance costs (due to reduced expected risk), 
making insurance more affordable to the average farmer. The farmers thus recognized 
that so vulnerability to disasters can be tackled on two fronts: directly by promoting 
disaster strategies and indirectly by increasing opportunities to better and more stable 
rural incomes. 
 
(ii) Subsidies to inputs, credit and commercialization 
A number of farmers requested support from the government in the form of direct 
subsidies as well as indirect intervention in reducing input prices, such as herbicides, 
veterinary costs, machinery and tools, grain storage, seeds, and energy costs, among 
others. In Cacahoatan and Escuintla, improving the availability of credit was of especial 
interest to farmers with larger cropping land, and some interviewees expressed their 
disappointment due to the sudden withdraw of rural development banking in the region, 
suggesting the creation of a solid rural bank. Most of interviewed complained about the 
dissolution of CONASUPO, BORUCONSA and LICONSA, the state owned companies 
responsible of providing grain storage, warranty prices and securities, freight, and 
commercialization services to the agricultural sector in general.  
 
One farmer suggested market mechanisms to regulate the distribution of 
subsidies: to grant the subsidy both in high-offer season as well as during depressed 
demand times; to lift the subsidy when prices and/or demand go up. He also said that the 
government must complementary open the crop insurance market to foreign companies in 
order to get a more competitive insurance market providing cheaper crop insurance. 
 
(iii) Foreign trade 
In general, farmers view the reduction of imports as the solution to raising prices 
for their crops. Some farmers complain about smuggling, which decreases the price of 
traditional crops, such as maize, bean and rice. Some coffee growers also blamed the 
Mexican custom administration (federal government) for allowing coffee imports from 
non-NAFTA countries, like Vietnam, whose imports –they say- prevent them from 
supplying crucial clients, like Nescafe and some supermarkets. 
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(iv) Less price uncertainty 
In general, farmers would like to see the government intervening more actively, 
for instance, to buy and sell in the agricultural markets in order to keep more stable 
prices. Some farmers suggest governmental arbitrage to keep crop prices stable, which, 
they say, could give them more certainty about diversification and investment decision-
taking, especially in those crops with high investment requirements, e.g. coffee. Other 
farmers pointed out they do not benefit when prices go up due to the presence of 
intermediation and speculators (coyotes). 
 
(v) Institutional support 
There is a general desire for more government involvement in agricultural and 
rural development, with a more social oriented system of subsidies. Also, they consider 
the governmental support should embrace training to farmers to learn them to choose 
high-profitability crops.  
Farmers also worry about lack of efficient self-organization, and urged the 
establishment of trade unions to reduce intermediation costs. They reported a lack of 
representation, as well as under-representation in the parliament and in governmental 
negotiations. Farmers appear to regard their leaders as inefficient and, perhaps, even 
worst, as corrupt. 
 
5.6 Views of community leaders, farmers unions’ representatives, and local authorities 
 
This part of the survey consists of 25 interviews carried out in the three 
communities, in the capital of the state of Chiapas, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, and finally in 
Mexico City, in order to capture the views of community leaders, as well as of farmer 
unions leaders and authorities at the three administrative levels: municipal, state and 
national (see list of interviewees in Appendix 1). The interviews were face to face, 
recorded in audio tapes. 
In general, authorities are aware about the relevance of hazards in the region, but 
they differ in their views about possible solutions depending on the group they represent, 
their administrative level, as well as on their geographic location. Leaders of farmers with 
higher incomes have much clearer views on the need for reducing their vulnerability to 
disasters and for improving trade conditions. In fact, they are obtaining some post-
disaster financing from the government. In contrast, subsistence farmers’ leaders have 
little notion about the existence of these programs. In turn, farmers’ leaders at municipal 
levels suggested more ideas to reduce vulnerability than those at higher geographic 
jurisdictions. 
 
5.6.1 Income uncertainty 
INMECAFE 
There is a common agreement between local authorities and leaders in coffee 
regions about the lack of governmental support to coffee growers. Since the dismantling 
of the Mexican National Institute of Coffee (INMECAFE) in 1989, which was a 
governmental agency aimed at supporting technologically and financially coffee growers 
as well as keeping prices stable, recurrent drops in coffee prices have affected incomes 
level in the region (see Box 1). In absence of affordable pesticides and crop insurance 
coverage, the presence of plagues and natural catastrophes have triggered farmers’ 
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decision to abandon, first, coffee growing and, further, the countryside at all. As 
mentioned, low coffee prices –below production costs- along with low yield due to 
disasters has accelerated out migration in the region. The municipal director for rural 
development of Cacahoatan, Mr. Victor Alfonso, reckons that roughly 30% of coffee 
production in this municipality is lost due to natural disasters, which recurrently affects 
3,000 local producers. In the view of local authorities, the absence of alternatives to cope 
with these undesired outcomes is what is devastating local agriculture. 
 
 
Box 5.I: INMECAFE, a dismantled support institution for coffee growers 
 
As in other important coffee producing countries like Brazil, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Colombia, Uganda, Kenya and Indonesia, coffee regions in Mexico are located 
in highly marginalized regions. In Mexico, coffee is produced in twelve of the 31 states. 
Coffee plantations cover over 700,000 hectares, making Mexico the sixth largest coffee 
producing country in the world. The main producing states are Chiapas, Veracrúz and 
Oaxaca (SIACON 2005), where more than 3 million people rely on coffee production as 
main livelihood (Emanuel, R. and Greenberg, J. 2000). 
When coffee international prices started to soar during the 40s, the Mexican federal 
government implemented a strategy endeavored to encourage coffee exports. As part of 
these efforts, the government established the Mexican Institute of Coffee, INMECAFE 
(Instituto Mexicano del Café), a state owned company aimed to act as intermediary 
between producers, exporters, and merchants. During the 70s, the government tried to 
reduce the excessive debt burden of small-scale farmers to coffee merchants, and 
INMECAFE began by purchasing coffee directly from farmers, though it was unable to 
grant farmers with sufficient credit in time as coffee merchants did.  
The liberal economic policy of the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–
1994) led to the restructuring and further dismantling of INMECAFE in 1989, what left 
two options to small-scale coffee growers: either marketing their coffee though the local 
intermediaries (coyotes) or participating in small cooperatives, which failed in supplying 
them with credit and commercialization services. Currently, as most of Mexican coffee 
growers have no means to transport their production to export centers, they are forced 
again to make use of networks of local and regional intermediaries (Emanuel, R. and 
Greenberg, J. 2000).  
In fact, the government in 1989 argued that the dismantling of INMECAFE was a 
decision based on cost-benefit analysis, which found negative net benefit from cropping 
coffee and onerous for the government, suggesting re-orientating local production. 
However, the latter has not been yet implemented, bringing some of the negative effects 
pointed out by farmers’ leaders and local authorities in this survey. 
 
 
Emigration from the countryside 
In general, for both local authorities and farmers leaders, variability in farmers’ 
incomes depends on climatic conditions as well as on economic policy. The latter shifted 
to less credit granting to farmers after agriculture began to contribute less to the national 
economy. As a consequence, currently approximately 50% of farmers’ sons are 
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immigrating to the USA, reckons Mr. Indalecio Flores, local leader of the National 
Confederation of Farmers (CNC80). In the same street in Tapachula on which the 
headquarters of CIOAC81 –the main organization of subsistence farmers in the region- is 
located, six travel agencies make two trips monthly to the USA border, which means 400 
members of this union leaving the country per month, mainly males. So, nowadays 
women are becoming the majority among members in this organization, cried Marco 
Suarez, CIOAC local chair. 
 
5.6.2 Natural disasters 
The flooding tragedy in 1998 affected 154,000 hectares of crops in the region, 
reckons CNC regional leader Indalecio Flores, from which farmers cannot yet recover. 
Also, municipal authorities in Escuintla affirm that this event damaged the regional 
economy at such a great scale that to date, 6 years after, economic activity still do not 
recover to pre-disaster levels. In addition, drought in coastal areas and hail in the 
mountains keeps extremely low yields, they state. Neither local authorities nor leaders in 
the region have contingent fund or have plan to establish one.  
 
Ignorance about public insurance and mitigations schemas 
Except for transnational companies, like Del Monte, Chiquita, and La Moderna 
Tobaccos Co., private crop insurance is practically not contracted in the region. From its 
part, Fondos is an unused instrument among middle- and low income farmers in the 
region.  
Without exception, local authorities ignored the existence of FAPRACC, and only 
some of them knew about FONDEN. However, these authorities in Escuintla believed its 
usage would eventually imply diverting money from the municipal budget. That may 
explain why municipal authorities in Escuintla have refused in the past attending farmers 
demands concerning disasters losses and have not undertaken vulnerability reduction 
measures –as a number of farmers remarked through the questionnaires.  
In Cacahoatan, municipal authorities seem to have been comparatively more 
active in responding to natural disasters, and complain that federal government does not 
respond to their resources request to compensate crops losses due to natural events. One 
year before the interview, the municipality of Cacahoatan had requested to the Ministry 
of Agriculture (SAGARPA) funding to compensate farmers’ losses from heavy rains, but 
without response to that date, as pointed out Victor Alfonso, director of rural 
development of this municipality. When the interview explored the possibility of getting 
some support from AGROASEMEX, the governmental agency for crop insurance, 
municipal authorities expressed wondering if it still exists. 
                                                 
80 CNC is the Spanish acronym for National Farmers Confederation (Confederación Nacional Campesia) is 
a national organization grouping mainly middle and low incomes level farmers, affiliated to PRI, the 
political party which ruled Mexico between 1929 and 2000. CNC is one of the four sectors which integrate 
PRI, with a permanent quota of candidates to representatives and senators to the Mexican parliament, 
whose vote is considered base of the hard vote of this party, in other words, of the share of unconditional 
votes which goes to the party in every election. 
81 CIOAC is the Spanish acronym for Independent Union of Agricultural and Peasants Organizations 
(Central Independiente de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Campesinos), which groups mostly 
subsistence farmers from highly marginalized regions, most of which linked to leftist organizations. 
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In fact, it seems to be a lack of due coordination between municipal, state and 
federal levels of government. One has to accept that the decentralization in Mexico has 
brought benefits in terms of administrative simplification, but currently some needs are 
still insufficiently addressed at local scale, as the case of the disasters strategy. Antonio 
Ruiz, Deputy Minister of Rural Development at the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Rural Development (SSDR-SAGARPA), points out the lack of interest of 
some state governments in adopting disaster prevention measures available through 
FAPRACC, among other vulnerability reduction instruments to the countryside. He also 
warned on the moral hazard derived from the dependence of post-disaster resources 
supply of some states from the federation. On the one hand, it has led to disincentive state 
investments in disasters mitigation, and, on the other hand, it has led to specialization of 
state governments in systematically demanding federal resources. So, if the federation 
has the due programs and available funds to reduce disaster vulnerability; but 
stakeholders at municipality level state they are not implemented; then state governments 
seem to be insufficiently active in dealing with this issue. 
 
Joint responsibility in reducing vulnerability 
All interviewed agreed the need for joint responsibility between farmers and 
government in reducing vulnerability to natural disasters. It has proved some success in 
past disasters events in Cacahoatán, where farmers could divert their grants from a 
governmental fund for loans (Apoyo a la Palabra) to finance recovery from natural 
disasters. However, only farmers granted with this subsidy were able to do that. Local 
authorities in this municipality believe that applying this kind of mechanism to 
prevention measures could be highly beneficial if extended to all agricultural producers. 
In cases where such mechanisms are not applied, the recovery from the next disaster will 
have to be requested again to the state and federal government, with high risk of no 
response, warned Mr. Gutiérrez. Complementary, they emphasized the need for getting 
farmers more involved in finding solutions, since usually the municipality calls farmers 
for meetings to address agricultural issues and they usually do not attend. 
 
Responsibility to reduce vulnerability 
From its part, there is a common agreement that insuring common infrastructure 
would be very positive for all stakeholders. Also, when inquiring about who should be 
responsible for vulnerability reduction, all interviewees agreed that this should be both 
the exposed population and the authorities. They emphasized the need for more 
leadership from the federal government to encourage these measures, as well as to 
implement loans obtained from multinational financial institutions to reduce 
vulnerability, since federal resources to reduce disasters vulnerability do not reach this 
region despite being historically one of the most affected by natural hazards in the 
country. 
 
Crop Insurance after mitigation and credit for subsistence farmers 
Subsistence farmers’ leaders regarded crop insurance with some skepticism, and 
they showed in general more confidence in mitigation measures and credit. For instance, 
the state leader of CIOAC replied to our suggestions on expanding crop insurance 
penetration among CIOAC members, people here scarcely have money to eat, thinking in 
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contracting insurance sounds illusory. Instead of crop and property insurance, in past 
events community solidarity has been their key for reconstruction. Once we explained 
how FAPRACC can pay indemnities to subsistence farmers for lost crops, he considered 
the system as useful but insufficient, suggesting rather to undertake public works to 
mitigate disaster risk and facilitate access to credit. Once guaranteed that, we can start 
contracting crop insurance, he added. These arguments are consistent with those by 
Kunreuther and Linnerooth-Bayer (2003) as they point out the contribution of disaster 
mitigation works in reducing insurance premium prices. 
 
Experience with FAPRACC in a neighbour region 
In Mazatán, a municipality in the region Soconusco but different from our three 
communities where we applied questionnaires to farmers, a leader of middle income 
farmers, Gilberto Santos, expressed that they have been making relatively more use of 
public post-disaster instruments. After the recent drought, losses of soy bean producers 
(without crop insurance) in his region were high, and SAGARPA was required to pay 
indemnities for economic losses based on FAPRACC. At that time, FAPRACC was in 
process of reimbursing the value corresponding 5 ha of crops to farmers owning up to 10 
ha. It is valuable in that of alleviating a farmers’ part of debt contracted following 
disasters, though most of their investments are net loss and will take even years to 
recover.82 Also, he adds, subsidies to insure crops values have been effective in the past: 
when the price paid to the producer is below a minimum benchmark, the government 
(ministry of Agriculture) paid the difference (maize, soy bean, sorghum). He also 
reported the existence of the Fondo Belisario Domínguez,83 which contracts crop 
insurance with private companies (Seguros America and Seguros Tepeyac) and get 
premium subsidy from AGROASEMEX. Police covers up to 70% of losses. Mr. Santos 
also expressed sorrow due to the fact that neither he nor his represented farmers from his 
ejido are eligible to get into that Fondo given their lack of solvency. 
 
5.6.3 Trade 
Excessive intermediation 
In the view of Marco Suarez, local leader of the subsistence farmers union 
CIAOC in Tapachula, in the past the (social) fight was for land, today it is for markets. 
Among CIOAC farmers, only ca. 30% of their cropping land is being productive, the rest 
has been abandoned, he reckons. In addition, Salvador Vazquez, Sheriff of ejido 
Tapachula, points out that failures in domestic markets, i.e. excessive intermediation 
levels, lead to unsustainable commercialization conditions of agricultural products.  
 
Until the 80s, hundreds of local producers in Cacahoatan exported over 20,000 
ton of coffee yearly, but currently very few intermediaries corner all production and 
monopolize exports. There are only some exceptional coffee export unions in the region, 
which allow small coffee growers to export and to reduce intermediation levels. These 
are producers of organic coffee in the highlands, which work under the schema of the so 
called fair trade organizations, mainly supported by NGOs (Martínez 2002). Unless these 
                                                 
82 However, after the calamity in the region last September 2005, this recovery process must have been 
postponed again for some more years. 
83 Established by soy and maize producers in a coastal region. 
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unions, which represent just a small farmers’ minority, foreign trade does not benefit 
others than speculators, said Gabriel Alvarez in Tapachula, farmers’ leader in Tapachula. 
 
Trade agreements and foreign competition 
In general, interviewees underline that imports from the USA are responsible of 
keeping low prices of maize and other grains in Mexico. Also, local authorities consider 
NAFTA to bring benefits in the region to exclusively coffee intermediaries in that of 
allowing them to access the USA and Canadian markets, but NAFTA implies only 
negative effects to farmers. 
 
Among social organizations representing farmers in the region, OPEZ, the 
Proletarian Organization Emiliano Zapata by its acronym in Spanish language,84 holds 
that falsly designed economic policy has led the country to sign free trade agreements to 
the detriment of farmers. In their view, NAFTA has been responsible for increasing 
poverty, worsening Mexican agriculture as imports displace local agricultural products, 
and stimulating farmers to move to the USA. They oppose the eventual signature of 
FTAA, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and suggest canceling the agricultural 
chapter of the NAFTA so long as NAFTA doest incorporates a chapter to allow free labor 
mobility. 
 
Local authorities in coffee growing regions blame Vietnamese coffee of 
displacing domestic producers from domestic markets. At the end of the 80s, Vietnamese 
agricultural engineers visited the region to learn local coffee processes –that time this 
region was the world leader in coffee yield-, and they are now exporting coffee even to 
Nescafe Mexico, whose production aims to Mexico and USA markets. So, Vietnam and 
transnational companies make high profits from NAFTA as the former put its products 
and the latter triangulates markets. 
In the case of vegetables, where the region has a comparative advantage, imports 
from Central America supply domestic markets, wasting so one important opportunity to 
improve domestic incomes. In general, authorities are aware about the need for more 
projects to orientate production to higher prices products, to add value to products and to 
crop more vegetables given regional comparative and competitive advantages. 
 
5.6.4 Crops diversification  
Crop diversification is considered clearly positive to local farmers’ leaders, but it 
does not make sense unless commercialization conditions turn favorable, as stated by 
Gilberto Santos, leader of farmers union “Emiliano Zapata” (adhered to the CNC). In the 
opinion of local authorities in Escuintla, there is a need for relying less on coffee 
production and to change to more rentable crops, i.e. vegetables, exotic fruits (as litchi 
and rambutan), etc. Although replacing coffee production means leaving behind a long-
standing activity, as well as physical fix investments these plantations implies (the so 
called head beaches), i.e. shade trees to filter sun rays for coffee plants, but all 
stakeholders shown enthusiastic to re-orientate production. 
                                                 
84 OPEZ is part of the ONP (Organización Nacional del Poder Popular), a social organization grouping 
workers, farmers and students. 
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As the Deputy Federal Minister of Rural Development, Antonio Ruíz, emphasized 
there is a need for making a productive reorientation based on identification of regions 
under desertification process. He points out that one cannot call natural disasters to the 
permanent droughts state in these regions, but typical natural conditions, and must rather 
adapt agriculture through changing to less water demanding crops. To achieve that, the 
Ministry of Finance is implementing the Program of Productive Reorientation in 
Recurrent-Drought Areas (Programa de Reconversion Productiva en Zonas de Desastre 
Recurrente85), which works mutually excluding respect FAPRACC (summarized in 
section 5 above) and is expected to be adopted by more state governments in the country 
in the forthcoming months. 
 
5.5 Suggestions to reduce vulnerability 
Overall, there is a widespread opinion among governmental delegates to Chiapas 
and Soconusco that the failure of governmental intervention in reducing farmers’ 
vulnerability to market and disasters shocks is due to the passive attitude in farmers 
themselves, who rely too much on governmental paternalism and have almost no 
initiative towards reducing their own vulnerable conditions. Farmers’ leaders say that it is 
difficult to come up with initiatives given current low levels of education and adverse 
endowments. The former impedes them in getting right with solutions and the latter 
obstacles their initiatives, if any, in getting progress. Also, some governmental officials 
report the lack of interest of local leaders in promoting vulnerability reduction measures 
arising from either farmers or the government unless it brings them some personal 
monetary benefit. 
 
Despite the above discrepancies, there is a common agreement about the need for more 
and better institutional support in three axes: (i) financial support, (ii) productive re-
orientation, and (iii) replacing assistance paternalism by investments in infrastructure. 
 
(i) Financial support 
Financial support implies facilitating financial services, e.g. through a specialized 
bank or financial agency for agricultural production and rural development, providing 
credit to increase productivity and finance risk reduction measures. There is also a 
concrete need for seizing current agricultural funds to recover from natural disasters, 
but most important, to undertake prevention measures. Crop insurance coverage 
should expand in those crops more resistant to current adverse climatic conditions. 
On the other hand, replacing highly fragile crops is crucial before disbursing in crop 
insurance subsidies, what implies making good use of FAPRACC and FOPREDEN. 
 
(ii) Productive reorientation.  
Productive reorientation means both diversifying crops to reduce the probability of 
getting affected given sudden prices drops in the mono-crop, as well as moving to 
more rentable crops, that is, whose sale prices are relatively higher, with a more 
stable demand and suitable to regional environmental and climatic conditions. In this 
regard, most interviewees recommended on the one hand abandoning maize 
                                                 
85 Operated through the fund FINCA (Spanish acronym of Fondo de Inversión y Contingencia para el 
Desarrollo Rural For further details consult: http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/sdr/progs2003/papir03.htm  
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production due to its high production costs, low prices and yield, and on the other 
hand increasing fruits and vegetables production, where the region has more 
productivity and better access to markets. In addition, farmers’ leaders demand more 
public intervention to regulate agricultural markets in order to reduce dramatic price 
variability. 
Also, there was a recurrent proposal from authorities to reduce unfavorable terms of 
trade: to add value to local agricultural products. That would make them less 
vulnerable to the trend of depressing primary goods prices. In this regard, farmers’ 
leaders rather suggest a law to connect local producers with retailers and the industry. 
 
(iii) Paternalism vs. infrastructure 
In the view of most local authorities, current reduction in paternalism from the 
government is benefial in overcoming the absence of surveillance of the past. 
Paternalism has damaged beneficiaries because it has made them dependent on 
assistance and social programs, and this must change to make public intervention 
more productivity oriented. Public works in productive infrastructure is becoming too 
scarce and is insufficient in light of the seriousness of current issues affecting the 
countryside. Support to the rural poor is important in that of avoiding massive 
starvation in some regions, but it keeps them just above surviving levels due to the 
incapacity of resource flows contributing to enlarge or improve asset accumulation. 
Besides, most of the interviewees’ opinion considered that the government should 
make huge investments in productive infrastructure based on production and risk 
analysis, what certainly would generate positive externalities in farmers’ livelihoods. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents results from a survey in rural Mexico, showing the variety 
of stressors and perturbations determining farmers’ vulnerability. Low rural incomes in 
this region are considered a result of a complex economic-climatic process, whose 
solution should embrace not only social programs and post-disaster aid, but also issues of 
inequity, productive reorientation and implementation of disaster prevention instruments. 
In the stakeholders’ views, there is also a widespread feeling concerning the absence of 
an effective and long-term sustainable strategy to strengthen the coping and adaptive 
capacity of subsistence farmers in this region to external shocks, which is an obstacle for 
accumulating assets. The survey analyzes farmers’ preferred coping strategies, and 
evidences that the absence of public intervention in an interconnected manner has limited 
its effectiveness. Stakeholders warn about the need of public intervention beyond poverty 
alleviation programs, which though perceived as valuable, but considered ineffective to 
solve local problematic in the long-run. There is a general agreement among the 
interviewed stakeholders about the increasing negative impacts from natural disasters, as 
well as about the contribution of the current economic policy in amplifying the negative 
consequences from weather-related events. From its part, despite its innovative and 
thorough design, public instruments to deal with disasters losses (e.g. FAPRACC and 
FOPREDEN) showed lack of penetration. 
The survey presents evidence that vulnerability to disasters can lead to the 
collapse in the Mexican agriculture. The prevailing conditions of marginalization in this 
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region, along with insufficient government investments in infrastructure, limited credit 
granting, insufficient subsidies to crop insurance, and lack of investments in more 
rentable crops, greatly reduces the communities’ coping capacity when hazards strike, 
which in turn triggers migration. 
 
The preferred farmers’ financing sources to cope with disasters in the region have 
been assistance from relatives and neighbors, as well as governmental aid. Pre-disaster 
financing instruments, such as savings and insurance, have not been used by these 
farmers. Local authorities expressed difficulties in accessing state and federal financial 
support after disasters, as well as showed ignorance concerning available federal 
instruments to reduce disaster vulnerability in the region. In general, the low 
implementation of public disaster prevention instruments in the surveyed region can be 
explained by the insufficient promotion from the federation and state government, but, 
most important, it is due to the scarce risk analysis carried out by the state government. 
 
Given their increasing losses from disasters, farmers’ expectations of improving 
living conditions for the future are becoming increasingly undermined. As observed in 
answers to the questionnaires, those farmers most determined to emigrate are not 
necessarily the poorest ones, but their income expectations are more pessimistic given, in 
line with the spatial analysis in the next chapter 6. As vulnerability to disasters reduces 
farmers’ expectations of future agricultural incomes, it increases their wish to emigrate. 
Also, the availability of post-disaster credit is very low, and the transfer of public 
resources does not substantially reduce the farmers’ will to leave the community. In 
essence, the availability of rural credit is decisive in the farmers’ wish to abandon their 
agricultural livelihoods. Also, the lack of mechanisms to diversify crops seems to play a 
crucial role, as emigration is the preferred response of those farmers who are 
comparatively less prone to diversify their crops. Crop diversification appears to be the 
option most preferred by farmers with optimistic expectations; emigration is the preferred 
option for pessimistic farmers; working harder is preferred by the rest. 
 
Non-agricultural income in urban areas is a recurrent coping strategy of small- 
scale farmers dealing with climatic extreme events. However, this strategy is limited by 
the scarce capacity of the urban economy to provide them with jobs. Reported off-farm 
income increases as land size is smaller, as farmers with bigger land extensions can crop 
more extensively to compensate hazards losses i.e. from natural disasters. However, 
small farmers are constrained by limited land. It forces them to look for off-farm jobs. 
Most stakeholders agreed that expanding access to credit, and thus to more efficient 
technologies, can contribute to crop more intensively even in small croplands, reducing 
farmers need for off-farm income. That is the reason most stakeholders consider 
subsidized credit to small landholders as a positive policy response. This may be 
complemented with technical assistance and orientation to crop more rentable products. 
For most consulted stakeholders, crop insurance was considered second only to the 
guaranteed access to credit. 
 
Prevailing high intermediation levels for commercialization and credit are also 
considered crucial stressors to subsistence farmers in this region since the relevant state 
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companies were dismantled at the end of the 80s. After the withdraw of intervention of 
the government from directly providing commercialization and financial facilities to 
farmers, the indirect intervention which has substituted it has been insufficient given 
current trade conditions and hazard exposure. It has forced farmers to rely on depressed 
prices (even when benchmark prices soar) and costly credit from intermediaries.  
 
There is a general agreement among farmers’ leaders and local authorities on the 
prejudicial effects derived from changes to the foreign trade policy implemented along 
the past two decades in the country. Current trade liberalization in Mexico is not 
perceived by surveyed farmers as an opportunity to export as they scarcely have means to 
commercialize. By contrary, it has meant more difficulties to even sell their production 
domestically. In sum, local stakeholders perceive the liberalization to foreign competition 
in the agricultural markets to just benefit a few intermediaries and to reduce job 
opportunities in urban areas as imports limits the expansion of regional industry as well. 
 
Finally, there is a widespread demand from farmers for more active involvement 
by the authorities in promoting vulnerability reduction measures in the region. 
Governmental intervention should be more coordinated and anticipate negative outcomes 
from the prevailing uncertain trade conditions and increasing weather-related disasters in 
the region. This intervention should contribute to strengthening farmers’ adaptive and 
coping capacity through mechanisms aimed at facilitating assets accumulation, enabling 
favorable endowments and orienting to a more profitable production. Authorities, in turn, 
request more initiative from the farmers’ leaders. These initiatives should be based on an 
evaluation of communal needs in a realistic and inclusive manner beyond personal 
opportunism. Both farmers and authorities require a better understanding of local needs 
to optimize the allocation of public resources to reduce vulnerability to hazards, as well 
as increase the profitability of farm assets. All agree that this would improve farmer 
incomes and reduce poverty in this region of Mexico. 
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Appendix 5.I: List of interviewees 
 
Farmers’ and community leaders and local authorities (2004-2005) 
 
Mr. Marco Antonio Suárez Vargas 
CIOAC - Independent Union of Farmers and Peasants Organizations (Central 
Independiente de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Campesinos) 
Regional Delegate (Region Coast-Soconusco) 
 
Mr. Juan Pérez Pérez 
CIOAC - Independent Union of Farmers and Peasants Organizations (Central 
Independiente de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Campesinos) 
State Chair (Chiapas). 
 
Mr. Gilberto Santos Galicia 
CNC - National Confederation of Farmers (Confederación Nacional Campesina) 
Local farmers’ leader – Unión de Ejidos Emiliano Zapata 
 
Ing. Indalecio Flores B. 
CNC - National Confederation of Farmers (Confederación Nacional Campesina) 
Regional Coordinator (Soconusco) - Liga de Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos 
Campesinos del Estado de Chiapas. 
 
Lic. Celso Humberto Delgado 
CNC - National Confederation of Farmers (Confederación Nacional Campesina) 
National General Secretary 
 
Mr. Pablo Velasco Alfaro 
OPEZ - Organización Proletaria Emiliano Zapata (Proletarian Organization Emiliano 
Zapata) 
Political Direction at the Council of the State of Chiapas 
 
MVZ. Henar Galicia Negrete 
SDR - Ministry of Rural Development, Government of the State of Chiapas 
(Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural) 
Region Director of Rural Development in Soconusco at the  
 
Ing. Juan Ignacio Pliego Tamayo 
CDFCC - Comission for Development and Promotion of Coffee in Chiapas 
(Comisión para el Desarrollo y Fomento del Café en Chiapas) 
 
Ing. Victor Alfonso 
Municipality of Cacahoatán 
Director of Agriculture 
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Lic. Josías Magdiel Santos Jiménez 
Municipality of Cacahoatán 
Municipal Judge 
 
Lic. Jorge Antonio Saldaña Ríos  
Municipality of Cacahoatán 
Municipal Trustee 
 
Ing. Gabriel de Jesús Álvarez Guzmán 
Municipality of Escuintla 
Deputy Director of Agricultural Encouragement  
 
Mr. Salvador Vázquez Cárdenas 
Sheriff of Ejido Tapachula 
 
Mr. Porfirio Gutiérrez Verdugo  
Sheriff of Ejido Cintalapa 
 
Mr. Wilmar Sánchez 
Deputy Sheriff of Ejido Cintalapa 
 
Profr. Luís Guadalupe Morales Ángeles 
Local leader in Ejido Cintalapa 
 
Mr. Ricardo Gutierrez Morales 
Leader of independent farmers in Cintalapa 
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Interviewed policymakers (2003) 
 
Ing. Antonio Ruiz-Garcia 
SAGARPA – Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Vedelopment, Fisheries and Food 
(Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación) 
Deputy Minister for Rural Development 
 
Ing. Victor M. Celaya del Toro 
SAGARPA – Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Vedelopment, Fisheries and Food 
(Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación) 
Director General of Rural Development Studies  
 
Lic. Salvador Mayoral 
AGROASEMEX – State-owned Crop Insurance Company 
Director General 
 
Lic. Luis Francisco Mejia Piña  
SEDESOL – Ministry of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social) 
National Coordinator of Social Programs 
 
 
Lic. Hugo González Gutiérrez 
FONDEN – Fund for Natural Disasters (Fondo de Desastres Naturales) 
Director General 
 
Lic. Ignacio Bermeo Juárez 
FONDEN – Fund for Natural Disasters (Fondo de Desastres Naturales) 
Legal and Operation Director 
 
Ing. Roberto Quaas-Weppen 
CENAPRED – National Center for Disasters Prevention (Centro Nacional de Prevención de 
Desastres) at the Ministry of the Interior. 
Director General 
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Appendix 5.II: Questionnaire to small-scale farmers 
 
Region: South Mexico. 
State: Chiapas. 
Municipalities: Escuintla and Cacahoatán. 
Communities: Escuintla, Cacahoatán, and Cintalapa 
Main regional crops: coffee, cocoa, banana, maize, bean and sorghum.  
Interviewer: Sergio O. Saldana-Zorrilla. 
Date: December 1-22, 2004; January 4-25, 2005 
 
 
Instituto Avanzado de Vulnerabilidad a Cambio Climático Global 
 
Proyecto: 
Reducir Vulnerabilidad Económica frente a Desastres Naturales y Liberalización 
Comercial en la Agricultura Mexicana 
 
Cuestionario para pequeños agricultores 
Por favor, procure contestar con letra de molde clara. Si requiere de más espacio, use el espacio que está 
hasta el final del cuestionario. Cualquier duda, por favor, no dude en preguntar. ¡GRACIAS! 
 
Municipio:__________________________ 
Fecha:_____________________________ 
Principales cultivos regionales:____________________________________ 
 
1. INFORMACIÒN GENERAL 
 
Sexo: M____ F____ 
Edad: ____________ 
Propiedad de su predio: Propia_____ Rentada_____ Otra____________________ 
Tenencia de la tierra: Privada_____ Comunal_____ Ejidal_____ 
Otra_________________ 
Acceso a irrigación: Si_____ No_____ 
Acceso a crédito: Si_____ No_____ 
Tamaño del predio (hectáreas):_____________ 
 
1. Por favor, numere sus productos producidos (maíz, carne de puerco, etc.) por orden 
de importancia económica 
1. _________________________________  
2. _________________________________ 
3. _________________________________ 
4. _________________________________ 
5. _________________________________ 
 
2. ¿Qué parte de su ingreso total procede de la agricultura? 
♦ Todo mi ingreso 
♦ La mayor parte 
♦ La mitad 
♦ Menos de la mitad 
♦ Sólo una pequena parte 
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3. ¿De qué actividad no agrícola obtiene ingresos adicionales? 
 
4. ¿Cuál considera usted el principal obstáculo para la generación de ingresos en su 
comunidad? 
 
2. DESASTRES NATURALES 
 
5. ¿En su punto de vista, qué tipo de desastre natural es el que más le ha afectado a 
usted su patrimonio e ingreso? 
 
6. ¿Cuántas veces ha sufrido de desastres naturales en los últimos 10 años? 
 
7. Por favor, califique en escala de 1 a 5 qué tan importante han sido para usted las 
siguientes fuentes de financiamiento de desastres naturales 
 
Escala: 1=irrelevante, 2 = poco importante, 3 = útil, 4 = importante, 5 = muy importante 
FUENTE CALIFICACIÒN 
(1-5) 
Ayuda de los vecinos  
Ayuda de familiares de:  
     a) la comunidad  
 
     b) otro lugar de Mexico  
     c) el extranjero 
         (dónde residen?________________) 
 
Ayuda humanitaria:  
     a) gubernamental 
 
     b) Privada (asociaciones, donativos, etc.)  
Aseguradoras:  
     a) privada 
 
     b) pública  
     c) privada subsidiada  
d) fondo de aseguramiento  
Fondo gubernamental para reconstrucción de 
propiedades 
 
Préstamos:  
1. Privados 
 
2. Públicos  
     c) Comunales  
Venta de propiedades 
a) Animales, vehículos, herramienta, etc. 
 
b) Tierra  
Otro  
 
 
8. ¿Cómo piensa cubrir los costos de recuperarse del próximo desastre natural? 
 
9. ¿Dispone la comunidad de algún fondo contingente para enfrentar desastres?  
Si sí, ¿como funciona? 
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10. ¿Dispone usted actualmente de algún tipo de seguro agrícola? Si sí, ¿con quién lo 
tiene contratado? 
1. Aseguradora privada (sin subsidio) 
2. Aseguradora privada (con subsidio) 
3. Aseguradora pública 
4. Fondo de aseguramiento 
5. Otro________________________________ 
 
11. ¿Qué parte de su area total de cultivo (%) se encuentra actualmente asegurada? 
 
12. ¿Existen medidas de su comunidad para reducir riesgos, tales que hagan que los 
daños de un desastre sean más diferenciados, por ejemplo, diversificación de cultivos o 
patrimonio?  
 
13. ¿Le otorgan crédito (o fiado) los comerciantes debido a un año de desastre? 
 
14. En su opinion, ¿de dónde debe venir la ayuda para reducer la vulnerabilidad a 
desastres? 
(numere del 1 al 6 en orden de importancia) 
____   Asistencia comunitaria 
____   Asistencia del gobierno federal 
____   Asistencia del gobierno del estado 
____   Aseguradoras privadas 
____   Fondos de aseguramiento no lucrativos 
____   Otro (por favor, 
especifique)_____________________________________________ 
 
15. ¿Quien cree que debería ser responsable de proveer fondos para la recuperación 
del sector privado: los hogares y negocios mismos o el gobierno? Por favor, explique su 
respuesta 
 
3. COMERCIO EXTERIOR 
 
16. ¿Alguna vez ha exportado? Si_____ No_____ 
Si sí, ¿directa o indiractemente?__________________ ¿A dónde? _______ 
 
17. Aproximadamente, ¿qué porcentaje del valor total de su producción se exporta? 
 
18. ¿Forma usted parte de alguna cooperative exportadora?  
Si_____ No_____ Si sí, de cuál? 
 
19. ¿Cuál es el costo promedio del flete para exporter su producto (por ejemplo, por 
contenedor, tonelada, trailer, etc.)? 
 
20. País de origen de las importaciones que más compiten con sus productos en México 
(ordene por importancia) 
1) _______________ 
2) _______________ 
3) _______________ 
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21. En su punto de vista, ¿como ha impactado su bienestar el TLCAN y otros acuerdos 
de libre comercio? 
 
22. ¿Tiene usted planes de diversificar sus cultivos? Si_____ No_____ Si sí, ¿que 
planea producir (adicionalmente)? _______   ________   _________ 
 
23. ¿Qué cultivos planea usted abandonar? ________   _________   ________ 
 
24. ¿Alguna vez ha recibido asesoría gubernamental acerca de diversificación de 
cultivos?  
Si_____ No_____ ¿A través de qué dependencia? ________________ 
 
25. ¿Qué recomendaría usted para mejorar la comercialización agrícola en su región? 
 
4. MIGRACIÒN 
 
26. ¿Ha imaginado alguna situación donde pudiera abandonar su comunidad (por 
ejemplo, si los precios siguen cayendo, desastres naturales, etc.)? 
 
27. ¿A dónde iría? 
 
28. ¿Han tenido que migrar o cambiar ocupación familiares o conocidos suyos debido a 
desastres naturales? Si sí,  ¿a dónde han migrado o a qué han cambiado? 
 
29. ¿Tiene familiares viviendo en el extanejro? Si ____ No____ Si sí, 
¿dónde?_____________ 
 
30. ¿Tiene usted actualmente planes de emigrar de su comunidad? Si____ No____ 
Si sí, ¿a dónde? Otra comunidad rural___ Zona Urbana ____  
En México____ En el extranjero_____ ¿A dónde exactamente?_______________ 
 
31. ¿Cuál es la causa de su deseo de emigrar? 
 
32. ¿Dadas las actuales condiciones, recomendaría emigrar a algún familiar? 
 
5. PREGUNTAS FINALES 
 
33. ¿Considera usted que el apoyo gubernamental realmente llega a su población 
objetivo y logra su cometido? Si____ No____ ¿Por qué?  
 
34. ¿Que le pediría al gobierno implementar en su comunidad para reducir su 
vulnerabilidad a desastres naturales? 
 
35. ¿Que le pediría al gobierno implementar para reducir la vulnerabilidad a 
fluctuaciones de precios agrícolas en su comunidad? 
 
COMENTARIOS PERSONALES  
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Appendix 5.III: Communities profile 
 
Table 12: Land size 
 
 Statistics 
size  
Valid 133N 
Missing 18
Mean 5.168
Std. Error of Mean .7785
Median 2.000
Mode .1
Std. Deviation 8.9776
Variance 80.597
Range 69.9
Minimum .1
Maximum 70.0
Sum 687.3
 
Table 13: Land tenure 
 
Valid Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 missing 6 4.0 4.0 4.0 
 communal 4 2.6 2.6 6.6 
 ejidal 120 79.5 79.5 86.1 
 Other 2 1.3 1.3 87.4 
 private 19 12.6 12.6 100.0 
 Total 151 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 14: Land property 
 
Valid Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 missing 9 6.0 6.0 6.0 
 own 119 78.8 78.8 84.8 
 other 3 2.0 2.0 86.1 
 rented 20 13.2 13.2 100.0 
 Total 151 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 29: Land size distribution 
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Figure 30: Age distribution 
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Table 15: Relevance of post-disaster financing source for reconstruction 
 
(1)            
Variable 
(2)        
N 
(3)    
Score 
(4)     
Mean 
(5)         
Std. dev. 
2. RelatComm 126 332 2.63 1.714
5. AidGov 126 278 2.21 1.530
1. Neigh 126 266 2.11 1.465
14.  SellProp 126 207 1.64 1.323
3. RelatMex 125 194 1.55 1.110
4. RelatAbr 125 174 1.39 .975
10. FundGov 125 173 1.38 .974
6. AidPriv 124 169 1.36 .868
15. SellLand 126 170 1.35 .915
13. LoanCommu 125 161 1.29 .749
11. LoanPriv 125 160 1.28 .848
12. LoanPub 125 148 1.18 .530
7. InsurPriv 125 145 1.16 .627
8. InsurPub 124 142 1.15 .489
16. InsurFund 125 143 1.14 .549
9. InsurSubsi 125 140 1.12 .433
17. Other 58 62 1.07 .525
Valid N (listwise) 58     
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Figure 31: Sex distribution 
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CHAPTER 6: Spatial model of incomes and migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico is a country of great human-environmental diversity. The disparities 
between the rich and poor are great. There are many municipalities vulnerable, especially 
in the southern part of the country, with a very high percentage of the population with 
incomes below the minimum salaries while some municipalities are relatively rich. In 
terms of vulnerability, in this dissertation defined as the susceptibility of an economic 
agent to absorb negative hazards, given its assets possession and entitlements system 
(coping capacity), and its implemented risk management and protection measures 
(adaptive capacity), we assess the effect of economic losses from natural disasters during 
the 1990's on the income level in 2000 at the municipality level. Mexico is in many 
places still dominated by agriculture and during the last 25 years weather-related disasters 
have accounted for about 80% of the economic losses in Mexico, with largest effects on 
the agricultural sector. In addition, this chapter tests empirically the negative effects of 
hazards in triggering out- migration. The chapter therefore mainly concentrates on factors 
related to agriculture. Control variables used during estimation are the degree of 
marginalization, assets, insurance, credit, irrigation, education, distance to major cities, 
incomes variation, changes in agricultural prices for the product mix, and spatial 
dependence. 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The negative impacts of natural disasters on household incomes are analyzed 
throughout the national territory at the municipality level, along with production 
limitations, trade-related hazards, and adaptive instruments. In the light of adverse trade 
conditions, recurrence of extreme climatic events, and lack of affordable instruments to 
hedge against disaster risk, municipalities of predominantly subsistence farmers cannot 
leave behind pre-existing marginalization conditions. It keeps them in a vicious circle 
with high vulnerability, insufficient disasters management instruments, and low incomes. 
As incomes expectations turn pessimistic to economic agents due to these hazards 
threatening future incomes, it also stimulates out- migration. During the period analyzed, 
the limited capacity of the rural economy to provide opportunities has also increased 
emigration flows remarkably from the most affected regions to large cities, as well as to 
the USA. It leads to a complex process which could be avoided if productive conditions 
and disaster prevention are strengthened. 
Despite the increasing frequency and economic cost of natural disasters in Mexico 
(Saldana 2006), the economic impacts on incomes and migration have to date not been 
En años pasados llegaron las heladas y acabaron con 
las siembras en una sola noche. Y este año también. Por 
eso se fueron. Creyeron seguramente que el año 
siguiente sería lo mismo y parece que ya no se sintieron 
con ganas de seguir soportando las calamidades del 
tiempo todos los años y la calamidad de los Torricos 
todo el tiempo. 
JUAN RULFO: La Cuesta de las Comadres 
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formally addressed. Among the existing literature addressing the economic aspect of 
natural disasters in the whole country are the registering of disasters losses (Bitran 2001), 
and the assessment and projecting of insurance markets (Kreimer et al 1999). Further 
research is rather focused on very concrete issues, far from providing an integral view. 
As natural disasters disrupt production and damage assets, it gives us reasons to 
presume them to turn into a significant external shock on incomes. However, as damages 
from disasters differ from country to country in terms of scale, damaged economic 
activities and coping capacity, the subsequent effect on the whole economic activity is 
still under debate within the disaster research community. For instance, Albala (1993) 
points out the negligible long-term impact of disasters on the economy in developing 
countries. Other authors find positive relations between frequency of natural disasters and 
economic growth (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969); however this conclusion ceases to be 
valid for Mexico as their analysis is limited to developed economies. Other works 
consider natural disasters to have a positive effect on the economy as the destruction is 
biased to the side of obsolete capital stock, pressing for adoption of more efficient 
technologies, pushing up average industrial productivity and, in turn, production 
(Skidmore and Toya 2002). However, we discard that approach because, as shown in 
Chapters 2-5 of this dissertation, the historically most affected population in Mexico lives 
in poverty and is mostly unable to get credit to upgrade their technology. In counterpart, 
some authors’ results show a negative economic development from natural disasters. 
Some of the case studies are however based on small islands, as well as small economies, 
like Dominica, Fiji, Vietnam and the Philippines (Benson and Clay 2000). Due to their 
size, these economies seem too small to be able to draw any conclusion for the Mexican 
case. Caballeros and Zapata (1995) asses the impact of natural disasters on economic 
performance, finding that relatively small Latin-American economies like Nicaragua 
suffer disasters’ effects at a greater scale and for a longer period compared to large and 
more diversified economies. In the case of Mexico, they state that the 1985 Mexico City 
earthquake did not have any noticeable long-term negative effects on macroeconomic 
variables, though it leaves non-major but frequent disasters events out of analysis. 
We affirm natural disasters to have a negative impact on the economy, directly in 
certain economic sectors and regions, but with a damaging spillover effect expanding 
over other parts of the economy and the country. The present work does not analyze GDP 
growth given the negligible low proportion of average economic losses from natural 
disasters to GDP, 1:1000. In turn, most damages can be attributed to the agricultural 
sector, which contributes with less than 4% to total GDP. However, disaster losses are 
crucial to agricultural livelihoods and rural incomes, which involve around one-quarter of 
the nation’s population. Therefore, the present research analyzes household incomes 
instead of GDP and focuses the analysis on the agricultural sector instead of the overall 
economy. Depressed rural incomes might be due to the destruction of capital stock and 
productive disruption derived from natural disasters along with increasing pressure from 
economic stressors. 
The present work provides a spatial econometric analysis to test the following 
hypotheses: 
(1) High natural disasters incidence has a negative impact on income levels. In 
addition, prevailing adverse production-trade conditions and low access to risk 
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management instruments are spatially relevant in explaining spatial distribution of low-
income regions, with spill over across municipalities. 
(2) Recurrent natural disasters, along with lack of credit granting and decreasing 
incomes do stimulate out migration in Mexico. So, we attempt to prove that migration is 
not a question of poverty itself, but rather of incomes expectations. As recurrent disasters 
affectation and absence of financing reduce economic agents’ estimation of returns of 
future investments for a time horizon, they have more incentives to leave their 
communities. 
(3) Spatial dependence is present. Given that we are looking for relevant relations 
between disasters affectation and income, we must take into account that the nature of 
natural disasters posseses a geographic conditioning across regions. In this case the 
absolute location of the municipality is of interest. Also, as a number of authors have 
pointed out, for instance in the economic growth literature regional growth may be 
dependent on the growth in other regions, giving more relevance to those regions 
geographically closer (i.e. Sandberg 2004, Le Gallo et. al. 2003, Fingleton 2003, Rey and 
Montouri 1999, Fujita and Krugman 1995, David 1984). In our case the location of a 
disaster struck municipality relative to the location of other regions/municipalities in 
geographical space matter. This phenomenon of spatial contiguity implies that 
municipalities influence each other and create spatial spillovers. In addition, geographic 
clusters of natural disasters occurrence across regions may be related to low income 
regions in Mexico. The use of spatial econometrics is therefore vital for correct 
estimation and for studies of these relations in more detail, identifying clusters of regions 
recurrently affected by disasters without financial measures for disaster prevention 
related to clusters of low income workers. 
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following way. Section 6.2 consists of a 
discussion of vulnerability in general. Section 6.3 describes concretely the nature of 
vulnerability to trade, production and natural disasters in Mexico. The incomes model is 
introduced and estimated in section 6.4. In section 6.5 the emigration model is studied. 
Section 6.6 concludes the chapter with conclusions and a discussion. 
 
6.2 Vulnerability 
As abundantly discussed in Chapter 2, the approach of vulnerability of the present 
dissertation is based on Turner’s (et al 2003) concept of vulnerability. Though it may be 
erroneous to consider the poverty of the population as a synonym of being vulnerable to 
natural disasters, but in fact the most vulnerable population is usually the poor, whose 
assets destruction impedes them of improving welfare. A number of empirical research 
points in this direction that the poor are the worst-off to respond to natural hazards, like 
hurricane Katrina in the USA (O’Brien 2005), the tsunami in South-east Asia (WB 2005), 
El Salvador Earthquakes in 2001 and 1986 (ECLAC 2001, Moisa and Romano 1995), 
Honduras with hurricane Mitch (Vatsa and Krimgold 2000), and the Dominican Republic 
with hurricane Georges (Butterfield 1998), among others. 
Increasingly, scholars argue that poverty is not only a lack of income or 
consumption, but also a lack of assets (Haveman and Wolff 2000, Oliver and Shapiro 
1990, Sherraden 1991). Assets are the key variable to understand households’ 
impoverishment, which can be defined as the stock of wealth used to generate well-being 
(Vatsa and Krimgold 2000). This concept is important when considering the effects of 
natural disasters, which may decrease the capital assets of households and businesses and 
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subsequently reduce the possibilities for them to generate income/outcome. The output 
also varies widely, depending on market price of the produced factor, and on the 
productivity of its use (profitability). As families pursue strategies to maximize their 
assets, they are in a better position to spread their capacity to reduce their vulnerability. 
Among other authors, Chambers (1989) cautions about the relevance of increasing assets 
in low-income families, since this improves human conditions beyond poverty not only in 
terms of flows, but also structural vulnerability. He affirms that vulnerability is even 
more interlinked with net assets than poverty. For authors like Vatsa & Krimgold (2000), 
vulnerability is a broader and more dynamic concept, which involves the poor, but also 
households living above the poverty line at risk of falling below in case of an income 
shock (new poor). Factors that obstruct asset accumulation are, in turn, impeding poverty 
reduction and also putting additional population into poverty. As shown throughout the 
present chapter, losses from natural disasters act in a similar way as depressed 
agricultural prices in that of impeding rural households in accumulating assets. It creates 
a vicious cycle of inefficient risk management strategy, low productive levels, low 
savings and reinvestment, and increased economic vulnerability. 
 
6.3 Vulnerability to natural, production and trade-related hazards in Mexico 
Though social programs in Mexico have been well intentioned to tackle poverty, they 
seem to render as transitory resource flows, since poverty is a structural issue indeed 
explained by the way the entire economic structure works. As presented in Saldana 
(2006), the increased frequency of natural hazards over the past 35 years in Mexico has 
implied increasing economic losses as well. From its part, the current productive structure 
and trade-related hazards in the countryside have contributed to stressful living 
conditions, amplified by insufficient public response to anticipate their derived negative 
impacts. 50% of the total population in Mexico live in poverty, mostly concentrated to 
the rural areas, with shares as high as 74% of the population (WB 2002). 
 
6.3.1 Natural hazards exposure 
Weather related disasters have been the most recurrent, especially floods, 
hurricanes and droughts, responsible for 80% of economic losses during the period 1980-
2005 in Mexico. They mostly affect the agricultural sector.86 Droughts are increasingly 
affecting the whole country, and in some regions in the north a process of desertification 
has started. This has consequences for the economy. Alone in 2005, the per capita 
agricultural GDP growth was negative, mainly explained by the severe hurricane season 
and rainfalls delay, reducing 34% of the cropping area (INEGI 2006). The most affected 
population is the small-scale rain-fed farmers of traditional crops, e.g. maize, beans, 
coffee (ECLAC 2006). 
Over the past 15 years the irrigated area has been fairly constant covering only 
24% of harvested area (INEGI 2006). This is another factor that makes agriculture highly 
vulnerable to climatic conditions. Alone during the past decade 14 million hectares were 
lost to natural disasters and less than 10% of that area was insured (La Red 2004). 
                                                 
86 Earthquakes and mudslides have been more destructive in urban areas, ironically damaging slums of 
immigrants from the countryside who, in many cases, left their agricultural livelihoods due to recurrent 
disasters affectation (Saldana 2004). However, labor transfers from rural to urban areas have historically 
exceeded economic systems capacity of employment, impeding solving significantly the poverty issue. 
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6.3.2 Production and trade-related hazards 
Current adverse economic conditions are contributing to the stress of small-scale 
farming in Mexico. Between 1993 and 2004, per capita GDP growth in the agricultural 
sector was 0.3%, compared to 1.2% in the overall economy. In turn, low-income farmers 
represent 67% of total farmers, but contribute only 22% to the overall agricultural 
production. The deterioration of terms of trade of the agricultural sector, discussed in 
Chapter 3, seems to explain the long-term declining tendency of agricultural prices. 
Additionally, in the short-term the lower prices of agricultural goods in Mexico’s trade 
partners, most likely due to high subsidies, has resulted in higher agricultural imports, 
accelerating the downward trend of agricultural prices over the past 20 years. The high 
deficit in balance of trade in the agricultural sector (ca. 20% of traded value) is mainly 
explained by grains imports from the USA (ECLAC 2006). After the implementation of 
NAFTA, only a small share of the farmers, those with access to technology, has re-
oriented their production to higher-priced exportable crops. Whereas exports of 
vegetables, mainly from tech-farmers, have grown significantly (9.6%) during the period 
1994-2004,87 the exports of grain, cropped mainly by non-tech-farmers, have practically 
remained unchanged. However, grains imports grew 7% during the same period (ECLAC 
2006). 
The productive structure of Mexican agriculture in some regions does not exploit 
local competitive advantages. Persisting cropping of grains (i.e. maize) in climatic and 
environmentally non suitable regions contributes to low productivity (Gay et al 2005). In 
addition, these crops have predominantly low prices, wasting opportunities to improve 
farmers’ incomes by changing to more profitable crops e.g. vegetables (ECLAC 2006). 
Rural credit granting and commercialization services were facilitated by the 
government until the 1980s, increasing incomes uncertainty of farmers after their 
withdrawal. As part of the large reforms implemented over the past 20 years, agricultural 
policy has since then shifted towards less support and subsidies, aiming at the emergence 
of a private-sector-driven rural economy and largely liberalized markets. It has implied 
less public intervention in the agricultural market through dismantling state-owned 
companies for agricultural production and commercialization support. However, 
subsistence farmers are particularly susceptible to absorb negatively that withdrawal 
since they are often not eligible for private credit and the cost of key production and 
commercialization services turn unaffordable to them, e.g. freight, fertilizers, storages, 
and crop insurances. In fact, credit for the agricultural sector has decreased by 80% over 
the last ten years, representing only 2.5% of total credit (ECLAC 2006). Finally, high 
transport costs and bad roads have been crucial in dropping framers’ competitiveness. 
Freight costs in Mexico are higher than those of Mexico’s main trade partners. For 
instance, the average price of one ton-kilometer of terrestrial freight is 20% more 
expensive in Mexico than in the USA, 0.035 and 0.029 USD/ton-km, respectively 
(Moreno 2004). 
 
6.3.3 Public intervention to reduce vulnerability 
Despite the current availability of novel governmental instruments to prevent 
disasters in Mexico, the public disasters management has been mainly reactive and few 
                                                 
87 Most likely due to their growing demand in the USA 
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projects to reduce the risk of future disasters have been carried out –discussed in Chapter 
4. The government rebuilds not only public infrastructure, but also housing, and provides 
some relief to the poor after disasters. Loss sharing has been based on a combination of 
ex-post instruments, like budget diversion, foreign credit, etc. Risk transfer has been used 
on mainly ex-ante instruments like insurance, mitigation, and more recently a contingent 
fund and a catastrophe bond. However, there is a high concentration on ex-post 
instruments, mainly on rebuilding, and fewer resources have been invested in prevention 
measures. Unlike current insurance cross-subsidization in the UK (Linerooth-Bayer and 
Vari 2003), the Mexican government started reducing fiscal burden to farmers cropping 
in low-risk areas since the beginning of the 1990s, who in fact were subsidizing those 
farmers settled on high-risk areas through flat-premiums. Although the current subsidy 
system of crop insurance is financially much healthier than during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the insured cultivated surface in Mexico has decreased from 40 to 10% between 1990 and 
2000. As discussed in Chapter 4, during the same period the damaged crops due to 
natural disasters doubled (Saldana 2006). Despite the sophisticated design of current 
disasters mitigation instruments, their resource allocation has been negligible over the 
past two decades. The contribution of investments in reducing vulnerability to natural 
disasters seems to be underestimated. In 2003, the expenditure on natural disasters 
management to the countryside represented less than 0.01% compared to that on social 
programs, as well as less than 0.02% compared to agricultural programs in Mexico. 
These proportions are still low if one considers the relevance of natural hazards on 
incomes discussed in this dissertation. 
 
6.4 The incomes model 
This section analyzes the contribution of economic and natural hazards in 
explaining low incomes regions in Mexico. Derived from our data analysis we observe 
that municipalities of predominantly low-income population tend to be most exposed to 
hazards and at the same time those with less favorable conditions to cope with them, 
shaping regions of high economic vulnerability. Attanasio and Szekely (1999) argue that 
income is a function of four elements: i) the stock of assets to produce income, ii) the 
usage rate of these assets, iii) the market price of the assets, iv) transfers to face shocks. 
In a similar fashion, our model tests the spatial dependence of a low income population 
on assets value (depicting stocks of assets), irrigation (depicting assets usage rate, and 
access to technology),  agricultural prices variation (representing assets market price), 
distance to the nearest trading centre (influencing assets market price), economic losses 
from natural disasters (external shock), and low crop insurance coverage (the typical risk 
reduction instrument).88 Given the high dependence of agriculture on weather conditions 
underlining this work, the equation differentiates with a dummy variable between two 
economic sectors: agricultural and non-agricultural. The model controls for two particular 
forms of assets: human and social capital. The model uses the level of secondary 
education to depict human capital. More education is assumed to contribute to increasing 
labor productivity and business skills (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Becker 1995). 
The municipal marginalization rate is used to depict social capital, as it embraces access 
                                                 
88 Though some models describing incomes include other relevant variables as well, i.e. monopoly degree 
(Kalecki 1954), relative prices structure (Robinson 1956), etc., but the corresponding data sets are not 
spatially available for this work’s spatial approach.  
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to public services, communal facilities, and social cohesion, among others. Social capital 
has a positive effect for generating incomes in that of a favorable collective framework 
facilitates individuals in using their physical and human assets. 
 
The regression analysis is based on data at the municipal level. Mexico is a 
country comprised of 2,443 municipalities (INEGI 2000). Data sources regarding natural 
disasters are DesInventar, La Red, and CENAPRED. Data on household incomes, assets 
value, credit, geographic distances, insurance and irrigation is collected from the National 
Institute of Statistics and Informatics of Mexico (INEGI), corresponding to the registers 
from the agricultural and economic national census implemented in 1990 and 2000. Data 
on agricultural prices arise from SIACON, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. 
 
The base model is a standard linear formulation, estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS): 
          
LnLIP = α0 + β1LnFA + β2LnD + β3 ΔPA + β4LnDIST + β5LnINS + β6LnIRR + 
β7LnEDU + β8AGR + ε,        (1) 
 
Equation (1) is then expanded to include the two kinds of spatial dependence, thus 
making explicit the n municipalities of our case of study. The spatial models may then be 
expressed as equations (2) and (3), more detailed explained in Appendix 6.I.  
     
LnLIPi = ρCiLIPi + α0 + β1LnFAi + β2LnDi + β3 ΔPAi + β4LnDISTi + β5LnINSi + 
β6LnIRRi + β7LnEDUi + β8 AGRi + ε ι,                  (2) 
 
LnLIPi = α0 + β1LnFAi + β2LnDi + β3 ΔPAi + β4LnDISTi + β5LnINSi + β6LnIRRi + 
β7LnEDUi + β8 AGRi + εi,                    (3) 
 
ε
 
i
 
= λCεi + μ  
 
i = 1, 2, 3, … , n (municipalities)            
 
Where C is a row-standardized first order contiguity matrix, ρ and λ  are the 
spatial autoregressive coefficients, and μ  is a vector of i.i.d. errors with variance σ2. 
In addition to these specifications, included will also be a Spatial Durbin Model 
that in addition to equation (2) contains spatially lagged exogenous variables, and a 
model specification adjusted for structural change (the data divided in two subsets based 
on a category variable – in our case marginalization) to receive two parameter estimates 
for each variable. The variables names starting with Ln are expressed in logarithms. The 
variables included in the regression analysis are defined as follows:  
LnLIP, Low Income Population. This variable represents the municipal share of 
total workforce (from 12 years old) with incomes up to the two official minimum salaries 
in Mexico in year 2000. Roughly, it equals incomes below 3 USD a day. It is calculated 
based on the National Minimum Salary, which is the monetary estimation of incomes 
from current flows of resources accounting for salaries, wages, gains, and/or 
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entrepreneurial utilities as well as of net transfers from the government and relatives, 
among others. This (municipal) data gathering is done by INEGI every ten years by 
means of household level surveys. 
 
LnFA, Fixed Assets Value. It is the 1989 aggregated value of municipal per capita 
physical fixed assets, i.e. buildings, greenhouses, machinery, etc. Data source is INEGI. 
In general, high per capita assets values are expected to be associated with lower levels of 
low household incomes, that is, with less poverty. 
 
LnD, Losses from Natural Disasters. This is the logarithm of the ratio economic 
losses from natural disasters (constant prices 2002) to population during the period 1990-
2000. This variable concerns estimated per capita economic losses due to exclusively 
natural disasters, both direct and indirect. This estimation is done by complementary 
assessment agents: scientists networks (i.e. La Red), local and federal governments (i.e. 
CENAPRED), NGO’s, aid organizations, among others. In some cases, there is no 
estimation of monetary losses from disasters in our registers.  However, I used registers 
of lost cropping area due to disasters to complement information blanks.89 This variable 
is relevant as it impedes increasing assets accumulation as well as reduces incomes 
inflows in the affected region for an uncertain period of time, especially of regions with 
lesser insurance coverage and other measures to cope with the losses. 
 
ΔPA, Changes in Agricultural Prices. This variable represents the change in the 
mean weighted prices of crops by municipality, that is, change in pesos/ton between 1990 
and 2000. It is calculated from a matrix obtained from multiplying the price of the over 
440 different crops by their respective production volume by state. The latter are 
weighted by their respective participation in the total state production. This variable 
allows us to estimate the value of an average unit of agricultural production by state. This 
variable does not depict the declining agricultural prices themselves over the analyzed 
period, but those municipalities relatively more vulnerable given their production 
structure. High values of this variable mean improvements in production value over the 
1990s in the municipal agriculture, the contrary for low values. 
 
LnDIST, Distance to nearest trading center. The variable is calculated as the 
Euclidean distance between each municipality and the geographically closest major 
trading center. The 50 most important trading centers represents the main markets for 
agricultural producers either because its consumption or because through them their 
products get traded. Included are 25 state capitals, 12 maritime ports, the 8 most 
important border crosses (7 to the USA, 1 to Guatemala), and 5 other large cities. This 
variable allows us to account for the effect of the distance in dropping competitiveness to 
local production because of increasing transport costs and isolation from technological 
centers.90 
                                                 
89 I multiplied the mean weighted yield ton/ha of the agricultural production by the mean weighted price 
MXP/ton (with data from SIACON, Ministry of Agriculture) in order to obtain the mean weighted price of 
crop hectare, which was summed up to the registers of monetary losses. Turn to Appendix 6.4 for further 
details. 
90 See list of selected cities in Appendix 6.IV. 
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LnINS, Insurance. Share of municipal agricultural units with insurance in 1990. 
This variable represents the share of economic units, out of the total by municipality, with 
insurance at the census year. It represents in this model the preparedness degree of 
individual economic agents to respond to climatic events and trade uncertainty. Areas 
with high insurance coverage are expected to smooth income variability. This variable is 
comprised of private, government-subsidized and mixed schemes. 
 
LnIRR, Irrigation. Share of agricultural units with access to irrigation 
infrastructure in 1991. This variable reflects the share of agricultural units which make 
use of irrigation infrastructure. The variable values range from 100 to 0; 100 if all 
agricultural units have access to irrigation infrastructure in a given municipality; 0 if they 
do not have any access to irrigation infrastructure. 
 
LnEDU, Secondary level education. This is the share of municipal population 12 
years and older who has absolved secondary studies. Education is assumed to enable a 
fast individual response to changing conditions, i.e. to natural disasters, price volatility, 
inputs prices changes, technological change etc.  
 
AGR, Agriculture. This is a dummy variable to indicate whether a municipality 
has an agricultural sector or not. 47 of the 2,443 municipalities have no agricultural 
activities at all. Given that agricultural municipalities are predominantly rural and non-
agricultural urban, including this variable enables us to adjust for the differences in rural-
urban prices and remunerations. 
 
6.4.1 The incomes model specification 
We first estimate the model of equation (1) by OLS. The OLS residuals are then 
used to test for possible spatial dependence, and to provide guidance on how to proceed 
towards the final model specification. The model specification improved the goodness of 
fit from 57%, using OLS, to 70%, with ML-Durbin (Sq. Corr.). The regression results 
may be found in Table 16. 
 
The OLS regression results, column 1, yield expected parameter estimates. 
However, the results are influenced by problems of heteroskedasticity and spatial 
dependence. Since the Lagrange Multiplier tests (LM) indicate that the spatial 
dependence problem may be solved by an error correction, thus the model specification 
of equation (3), we begin with this correction. The results corrected for spatial error 
dependence is presented in the second column. The parameter estimates stay mostly the 
same as one would expect from this simple error correction. The Loglikelihood increases 
significantly, but the common factor hypothesis (Burridge, 1981) is rejected. This means 
that the model is misspecified in its current form and that we need to include spatially 
lagged explanatory variables as well. The spatially lagged variables consists of spatial 
averages of neighboring, determined by the previously specified spatial weights matrix C, 
values for each observation. The parameter estimates of the spatially lagged explanatory 
variables are interpreted as the average influence that the neighbors have on the income 
level in each municipality. This model, the spatial Durbin model, is considered as an 
error model expressed as a lag model since it also has a lagged dependent variable 
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included in the equation. The regression results without and with correction for 
groupwise heteroscedasticity are included in columns 3 and 4, respectively. In order to 
solve detected heteroskedasticity the data was categorized into two groups to decrease the 
overall variances by allowing them to deviate between two groups. The categorization 
was based on the notion of marginalization. This officially constructed categorization of 
the municipalities was then treated as dichotomous. Groups 0 contain those 
municipalities who are not marginalized and group 1 contain those who are marginalized.  
 
The spatial lag dependence parameter estimate (ρ) is positive and significant and 
indicates that municipalities with a high (low) degree of low (high) income earning 
population tend to lie clustered together and spillover to each other since they are 
influencing each other in their incomes creation. The parameter estimates can be 
interpreted as elasticities thanks to the logarithmic scale. The group variances within each 
group are quite different from each other, as shown in column 4. This can bee seen from 
the group variances directly, but also from the Likelihood Ratio test rejecting the null 
hypothesis of similar variances. Compared to the OLS regression model the spatial 
Durbin specification clearly improves the goodness of fit with an almost doubling of the 
Loglikelihood value.  
 
 
Table 16: Spatial regression results of low income (ln2MS_00), global model 
 
Variables/tests(*) (1) OLS 
(2) 
ML-Error 
(3) 
ML-Durbin 
(4) 
ML-Durbin, Het 
ρ   0,350*** 0,268*** 
λ   0,775***   
Constant 4,088*** 4,017*** 3,224*** 3,709*** 
LnFA -0,070*** -0,047*** -0,054*** -0,042*** 
LnD 0,035*** 0,035*** 0,041*** 0,028*** 
LnDIST 0,011*** 0,008*** 0,010*** 0,002 
LnINS -0,012*** -0,011*** -0,008 -0,006* 
LnIRR -0,042*** -0,011*** 0,000 -0,005* 
LnEDU -0,080*** -0,060*** -0,053*** -0,049*** 
ΔPA -0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** 
AGRIC 0,154*** 0,045*** 0,201*** 0,163*** 
C_ LnFA   -0,041*** -0,027*** 
C_ LnD   -0,027*** -0,014*** 
C_ LnDIST   -0,010*** -0,012*** 
C_ LnINS   0,024*** 0,009 
C_LnIRR   -0,044*** -0,025*** 
C_ LnEDU   -0,012 -0,015 
C_ ΔPA   0,001*** 0,001*** 
C_ AGR   -0,474*** -0,46*** 
Gr. Variance_0    0,092*** 
Gr. Variance_1    0,009*** 
R2 0,57 0,28 0,70 0,41 
R2adj 0,57    
Sq.corr  0,55 0,71 0,70 
LIK 891,70 1527,27 1332,71 1733,81 
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AIC -1765,41 -3036,53 -2629,42 -3431,62 
Sig-sq 0,028 0,015 0,019  
Hetersk. Random 
(Koenker Basset) 
299,51***    
Heterosk. Marginalization 
(Spatial Breuch Pagan) 
 936,86*** 704,99***  
Lik. Ratio. Marginalization    802,20*** 
Lm-Error 1427,63***    
LM-Error, Robust 967,48***    
LM-Lag 515,55***    
LM-Lag, Robust 55,40***    
     
Common Factor (Wald)  645,01***   
     
Lik. Ratio. weight matrix  1271,13*** 484,19***  
LM on sp. Lag  1,51   
LM on sp. Error   350,10***  
(*) *** if prob. < 0.001; ** if prob. < 0.01; * if prob. < 0.05; blank otherwise 
 
  
Controlling for marginalization 
Now, let us disaggregate the model into two subsets of municipalities: 
marginalized and non-marginalized. Hence we allow the parameter estimates for the two 
categories to vary across space, cf. spatial heterogeneity.  The model specification 
changes into: 
      
LnLIPi,j = α ij + β1 ij LnFAij + β2 ijLnDij + β3 ij  ΔPAij + β4 ij LnDISTij + β5 ij LnINSij + β6 ij 
LnIRRij  +β7 ij LnEDU + +β8 ij AGR + εij,       (4) 
 
with the addition of similar spatial adjustments as mentioned above when necessary. 
 
i = 1, 2, 3, …, n (municipalities) 
 
j = 0, if i is a non-marginalized municipality 
j = 1, if i is a marginalized municipality 
 
The marginalization index form the governmental National Council of Population 
(CONAPO) is used as a category variable in this model. The composite index integrates 
measures of access to health, housing conditions, access to public services (i.e. drainage, 
clean water, etc), among others.91 Its composition identifies the absence of enough 
individual and collective asset accumulation. 
 
                                                 
91 For details about the implemented methodology of the CONAPO marginalization index, see: 
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/publicaciones/indices/pdfs/006.pdf  
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Table 17: Spatial regression results of low income (ln2MS_00) by marginalization subsets 
 
 Variables/tests(*) (1) OLS 
(2) 
ML-Error 
(3) 
ML-Durbin 
(4) 
ML-Durbin, Het 
ρ   0,257*** 0,247*** 
λ   0,584***   
Constant 3,645*** 3,513*** 2,904*** 2,933*** 
LnFA -0,037*** -0,032*** -0,034*** -0,034*** 
LnD 0,023*** 0,026*** 0,033*** 0,033*** 
LnDIST 0,012*** 0,012*** 0,012*** 0,012*** 
LnINS 0,003 -0,017** -0,019** -0,019 
LnIRR -0,030*** 0,001 0,019*** 0,019** 
LnEDU 0,045** -0,019 -0,027 -0,026 
ΔPA -0,001*** -0,001*** 0,001 0,001 
AGR 0,06 0,146*** 0,212*** 0,209*** 
C_ LnFA   -0,055*** -0,055*** 
C_ LnD   -0,022*** -0,021** 
C_ LnDIST   0,007 0,007 
C_ LnINS   0,047*** 0,047*** 
C_LnIRR   -0,064*** -0,064*** 
C_ LnEDU   0,130*** 0,131*** 
C_ ΔPA   -0,001** -0,001 
N
O
N
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R
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C_ AGR   -0,466*** -0,459*** 
Constant 4,375*** 4,36*** 3,82*** 3,85*** 
LnFA -0,043*** -0,036*** -0,036*** -0,036*** 
LnD 0,022*** 0,021*** 0,024*** 0,024*** 
LnDIST -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
LnINS -0,016*** -0,006 -0,007 -0,006* 
LnIRR -0,026*** -0,011*** -0,005* -0,005** 
LnEDU -0,067*** -0,053*** -0,050*** -0,049*** 
ΔPA 0,000 0,000 -0,001* -0,001** 
AGR 0,096*** 0,083*** 0,160*** 0,157*** 
C_ LnFA   -0,022*** -0,023*** 
C_ LnD   -0,011*** -0,010*** 
C_ LnDIST   -0,012*** -0,011*** 
C_ LnINS   0,004 0,003 
C_LnIRR   -0,020*** -0,020*** 
C_ LnEDU   -0,013 -0,014 
C_ ΔPA   0,001** 0,001** 
M
A
R
G
IN
A
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D
 
C_ AGR   -0,489*** -0,470*** 
 Gr. Variance_0    0,032*** 
 Gr. Variance_1    0,009*** 
 Chow Test: 165,64*** 1179,17*** 1182,50*** 766,35*** 
 Constant 147,20*** 232,05*** 118,31*** 62,98*** 
 LnFA 0,86 0,65 0,17 0,10 
 LnD 0,04 1,60 3.75* 1,85 
 LnDIST 24,43*** 34,58*** 28,54*** 17,32*** 
 LnINS 6,05** 1,98 1,60 0,77 
 LnIRR 0,58 4,54** 12,77*** 6,05** 
 LnEDU 33,39*** 3,57* 1,26 0,59 
 ΔPA 30,70*** 0,02*** 4,51** 2,32 
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 AGR 0,62 2,17 1,13 0,57 
 C_ LnFA   9,76*** 4,97** 
 C_ LnD   3,21* 1,62 
 C_ LnDIST   13,68*** 7,27*** 
 C_ LnINS   10,77*** 5,44** 
 C_LnIRR   22,77*** 11,06*** 
 C_ LnEDU   26,46*** 12,39*** 
 C_ ΔPA   8,91*** 4,65** 
 C_ AGR   0,08 0,01 
 R2 0,74 1,06 0,80 0,80 
 R2adj 0,73    
 Sc.corr  0,71 0,80 0,80 
 LIK 1477,03 1939,52 1808,95 1982,88 
 AIC -2918,05 -3843,04 -3547,89 -3895,75 
 Sig-sq 0,018 0,011 0,013  
 Hetersk. Marginalization 
(Koenker Basset) 
185,67***    
 Hetersk. Marginalization 
(Spatial Breuch Pagan) 
 2896,02*** 526,77***  
 Lik. Ratio, Marginalization   327,26*** 347,86*** 
 Lm-Error 751,37***    
 LM-Error, Robust 519,58***    
 LM-Lag 308,25***    
 LM-Lag, Robust 76,47***    
 Common Factor (Wald)  504,62***   
 Lik. Ratio. weight matrix  924,98***   
 LM on sp. Lag  -   
 LM on sp. Error   169,03***  
(*) *** if prob. < 0.001; ** if prob. < 0.01; * if prob. < 0.05; blank otherwise 
 
As before let us begin with the OLS regression, presented in column 1 of Table 
17. This time the results are not so clear-cut as before. Some of the coefficients do not 
have the expected signs and they also differ in magnitude between the two categories. 
According to the Chow test we may conclude that the two categories lead to significantly 
different outcomes. And for the individual parameter estimates we may conclude 
statistically significant differences for distance, insurance, level of education and price 
variation. 
As was the case in the previous section, the LM tests indicate Spatial Error 
dependence. This problem addressed by the Spatial Error Model and the results are given 
in column 2. Once more we have an indication that this model is after all not the optimal 
one since the common factor hypothesis is again rejected. We therefore continue with the 
spatial Durbin model given in columns 3 and 4, with and without heteroskedastic 
correction. The groupwise variances are significantly different between the two groups 
and we will therefore concentrate on commenting on the results in the last column. The 
overall (the same for both categories) spatial lag dependence parameter (ρ) is positive 
and significant with a parameter estimate of about 0.25. The intercepts for the two 
categories, 2.93 and 3.85, show in a very simple way that the amount of people with 
incomes below 2 minimum salaries is very different in non-marginalized and 
marginalized municipalities. This difference is also confirmed by the Chow test.   
 143
In terms of goodness of fit, this model explains about 80%, and the Log likelihood 
value of 1983 is a clear improvement compared to the biased and inefficient OLS 
regression results which yielded a Log likelihood value of just 1477.  
 
6.4.2 Results interpretation 
In sum, the main determinants of incomes in our model are asset value, losses 
from natural disasters, prices and education. They seem to be spatially significant, 
especially higher in the agricultural sector, and crucial to determine incomes of both 
marginalized and non-marginalized regions. Expanding insurance, irrigation, education 
and favorable prices has a relatively stronger impact to reducing low-incomes across 
marginalized municipalities. From its part, reducing economic losses from natural 
disasters and shortening distances to main trading centers keeps relatively a higher impact 
in non-marginalized regions. One has to warn that that distinction may be rather 
attributable to the differential involvement in the monetary economy among these groups, 
thus to their production value. 
The results from the global model, presented in table 16, shows that a 10% 
increase of fixed assets per capita reduces the share of low income population by 0.4% 
(column 4). That relation turns clearer when differentiating between marginalized and 
non-marginalized municipalities. As observed in table 17, the impact of fixed assets is 
relatively higher in marginalized municipalities.  
The negative coefficient for fixed assets in the spatially lagged explanatory 
variables in Table 17, C_LnFA, suggests that municipalities with neighbors of higher 
levels of fixed assets in general have lower shares of low-income population. Thus they 
help decrease the number of poor people in municipalities close by. This is the case of 
both marginalized and non-marginalized municipalities, though the magnitude is higher 
for the former.  
The positive disaster parameter of natural disasters in the global model shows 
that ceteris paribus reducing by 10% disasters losses may lead to reducing by 3% the 
share of people with low incomes. The impact of disasters is similar and positive for both 
marginalized and non-marginalized municipalities.  
The spatially lagged explanatory variable of disasters losses, C_LnD, has a 
negative parameter sign. It follows that if the neighbors of municipality i experienced 
heavy losses then that has a somewhat surprising stimulating spillover effect on the 
economy of municipality i leading to reduced shares of low-incomes population. That 
effect may be explained by the benefit obtained if neighbors had losses but they did not. 
When analyzing marginalization, one can observe this relation to be stronger for non-
marginalized municipalities, most likely due to their comparatively higher participation 
in the monetary economy. As non-marginalized municipalities have historically been less 
affected by natural disasters, this relation seems to be contributing to enlarging inequity 
in the country. To help reduce the share of low-income people we also find availability of 
insurance, irrigation and the share of people with secondary education helpful. 
Most likely due to the progressive government withdrawal from subsidizing crop 
insurance in the country during the 1990s, the insurance variable shows low significance 
on explaining low incomes for year 2000 in the global model. The parameter estimates 
for insurance is not statistically different between the two categories, although the 
parameter estimate is slightly more significant for the marginalized municipalities.  
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From its part, a non-marginalized municipality surrounded by municipalities with 
low insurance coverage has a less poor workforce. This relation is similar to the one of 
disasters since these municipalities usually compete for markets and the net income 
losses tend to be lower in municipalities with better response and therefore faster 
productive reactivation. The relation in the opposite way suggests that if the neighbors of 
the non-marginalized municipality i have more insurance levels, it enlarges poverty in i. 
For sure, that is not a cause-effect relation but just a simple question of comparative 
response. A possible explanation may be that non-marginalized municipalities are rich 
enough to afford insurance while the parameter estimate for marginalized municipalities 
is insignificant. It follows that though non-marginalized municipalities are per se better 
off, and do not get affected by having neighbors comparatively less insured, whereas 
marginalized municipalities do not clearly benefit from having better insured neighbors. 
As a whole, lacking irrigation increases the number of people living in poverty in 
a given municipality. The coefficient for irrigation is surprisingly significant and positive 
for the non-marginalized category but negative and significant for the other group. The 
positive coefficient may be explained by the need for irrigation to have an agricultural 
production at all in those municipalities but that are vulnerable to certain types of 
disasters which irrigation is not enough to counteract (i.e. floods). The analysis of the 
lagged explanatory variables shows that having neighbors with high degree of irrigation 
is good for both kinds of municipalities. 
Just by comparing variables coefficients, the return on poverty reduction from 
increasing assets is the highest compared to the rest of the variables. However, among 
marginalized municipalities, assets value and lowering disasters losses imply practically 
the same returns. As the cost of implementing these strategies surely differs, the resulting 
less costly strategy at present value seems to be the economic criterion for decision in 
further research carried out at municipality level. Investing in loss reduction instruments 
which at the same time increase assets value and other favorable variables can maximize 
the overall benefit from public investments for poverty reduction. For instance, investing 
in a levies-channels-irrigation system might reduce losses from floods and droughts, 
increase assets value, expand irrigation coverage, reduce the average disaster risk in a 
given region and consequently reducing the corresponding insurance premiums with a 
parallel favorable spillover effect on neighbor municipalities. From its part, given the 
difficulties for an eventual renegotiation of the agricultural chapter of the NAFTA in the 
short term, one feasible mechanism to cope with declining agricultural prices is 
increasing competitiveness through moving to more profitable agricultural production 
sites, lowering transport costs as well as improving education for a better individual risk 
management among farmers. 
In the global model, municipalities with increases in the value of their agricultural 
production –given the current prices structure- during the 1990s are associated to lower 
poverty levels. This fact is more relevant for marginalized municipalities. It suggests that 
a productive reorientation toward higher value cropping brings the most significant 
benefits among those more marginalized municipalities. 
Education is very important in explaining low-income workforce, especially in 
marginalized municipalities. In turn, being surrounded by municipalities with high 
educative levels contributes to reducing poverty levels in marginalized municipalities. In 
non-marginalized regions, the spillover effect of neighbors with high educative levels is 
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less clear. However, one should be careful with this conclusion since the Chow test does 
not reject the null hypothesis of similar parameter estimates. 
Municipalities with agricultural activities compared to those who have none, 
have a much higher share of low-income population. As deduced from the negative sign 
of the spatially lagged variable, being surrounded by agricultural municipalities is 
associated to reducing shares of low-income population, driven by the strong effect of 
high-incomes non-agricultural municipalities surrounded by low-incomes agricultural 
regions. 
Overall, the further the location of a municipality is from a trading center the 
higher is its low-income workforce share. However, it is only significant for non-
marginalized municipalities implying that increased distances to major centers increase 
the amount of low-income population. It may be reasonable to assume that municipalities 
that are marginalized are probably not influenced in a particularly high degree by being 
more distanced from the trade centers if one considers that they tend to rely less on trade 
and more on self-consumption as they are more marginalized. However, marginalized 
municipalities tend to benefit from having neighbors with shorter distances to trading 
centers. Thus, improving transport infrastructure might bring higher direct benefits to 
those non-marginalized, but with a positive spillover on marginalized municipalities. 
The shown spatial impact of natural disasters on incomes level allows us to state 
them to be significant in impeding poor households going out of poverty. However, can 
we state that impact to be strong enough to accelerate out-migration? 
 
6.5 The emigration model 
Migration patterns of plants and animals are changing around the world in line 
with climate conditions (Gordo et al 200592, Pitelka 199793). In the recent history of the 
earth, the sensibility of human societies to climatic variations has been less studied 
compared to other species, mainly explained by the widespread adoption of sedentary 
means of productive organization. However, the increased occurrence and severity of 
natural hazards seems to be altering some human migratory patterns again. Most of the 
attention of the impact of climatic events on human migratory patterns has centered on 
geologic-anthropologic registers, e.g. Pleistocene out migration from Africa (McNobb 
200594), and post glaciations out migration (Allen et al 1999). Less attention has been, 
however, conceded to analyzing impacts of climatic events on recent migratory flows.95 
                                                 
92 Gordo et al (32005) provides evidence that the spring arrival of long-distance migrants trans-Saharan 
birds is more likely to be influenced by climate conditions in wintering areas given their direct impact on 
the onset of migration and its progression.   
93 Pitelka (1997) provides pre-historic and present evidence on plant migration. He emphasizes the 
contribution of human activities through habitat fragmentation to interfere in plant migration to adapt to 
global climatic change.  
94 Based on an archaeological study of  hominin colonization associated with the Early-Middle Pleistocene 
transition, McNabb (2005) points out that climate change and especially shifts in local aridity are 
explaining factors of migratory moves out of Africa. However, the Achealean behavioral repertoire did not 
change much across Africa and Europe over a million years of time. It merely adapted to local conditions, 
he concludes.  
95 Among the scarce research on this relation, McLemann (2006) examines the influence of natural 
environment on human migration and settlement patterns of rural population. He analyzes households’ 
response in a period of adverse climatic conditions in rural eastern Oklahoma during the 1930s. Focus was 
in those that adapted by migrating to rural California.  
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Through an out migration model I test the second hypothesis of this chapter, that is, 
recurrent natural disasters, along with decreasing incomes and lack of access to credit, 
have stimulated out migration over the past decade in Mexico. In addition, we show that 
migration is not a question of poverty itself, but rather of income expectations. As 
recurrent disasters incidence and absence of credit reduce economic agents’ current 
incomes as well as their estimations of returns of future incomes for a time horizon, they 
have more incentives to leave their communities. Migration is here thought of as an 
economic phenomenon that an economic unit implements to respond to harmful events. 
 
Emigration as response 
An important component in vulnerability assessments are coping and adapting 
capacities in response to hazards. Coping capacity can be defined as the ability of a unit 
to respond to a harm occurrence as well as to avoid its potential insidence, whereas 
adaptive capacity is the ability of a unit to gradually transform its structure, functioning 
or organization to survive under hazards threatening its existence (Kelly and Adger 
2000). After persistent or major hazards, coping and adaptive capacity of the most 
vulnerable economic units is taken to the limit.96 If they do not have access to credit or to 
further mechanisms to re-activate their production or to restructure their productive 
processes towards less vulnerable conditions, their expectations of future incomes 
become pessimistic. The latter leads us to consider migration not as a mere function of 
poverty, but of dropped expectations.  
 
Emigration can function as coping or adaptive strategy. According to this works 
approach, migration functions as coping strategy if after a disaster at least one member of 
an economic unit leaves the community and sends remittances. In such a case, a share of 
that emigrant’s income becomes subsidiary to the economic unit (at home), contributing 
this unit to subsist as agricultural livelihood. Having members abroad might even become 
an asset for a given economic unit if they return home frequently, bringing knowledge, 
education or innovative ideas to increase assets profitability. Unlike the previous 
example, migration functions as adaptive strategy if the economic unit has to disintegrate 
as that in its original location. In other words, emigration serves in such a case as a 
surviving alternative once the unit’s self coping capacity got exceeded. Something 
remarkable in this case is the inability of the system in which a given economic unit is 
located to provide assistance in order to maintain him in the community. 
 
At the national level, out migration in Mexico has increased over the past two 
decades. The Population Census of 1990 reports that 0.24% of the Mexican population 
was residing abroad, whereas in the 2000 Census this figure rose to 0.41% (INEGI 2000). 
As currently about one-quarter of Mexico’s labor force is still employed in agriculture, 
and as conditions in the countryside are each time getting worse, rural workers do not 
                                                 
96 Coping strategies include neighbors and relatives’ solidarity, off-farms jobs, access to credit, among 
others. Unlike solidarity support and off-farm jobs, credit is the strategy most capable of providing 
resources in the needed amount and time. Credit is also the only institutional coping strategy, as well as the 
one with more data availability. In Saldana (2006) the utility of coping strategies is investigated in its broad 
spectrum. 
 147
have incentives to stop out migration not only to urban Mexico, but also to urban and 
rural USA (Robinson et al 1995). 
 
In absence of credit and other instruments to finance recovery, regions where 
natural disasters and adverse economic conditions occur more frequently tend to maintain 
low rates of capital accumulation, often even negative. It leads to, other things equal, 
reduced capital-labor ratio and in turn to decreased marginal product of labor (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995). Assuming salaries to be determined by the marginal product of 
labor, these regions tend to decrease mean salary. As other regions have higher salary 
levels, they stimulate the labor force to emigrate first to higher incomes regions inside the 
country (Krugman and Obstefeld 2006), and further abroad if these regions are unable to 
fulfill their future incomes’ expectations. 
 
For Todaro (2000), migration is primarily an economic phenomenon, which for 
the individual migrant can be a quite rational decision despite the existence of urban 
unemployment. The Todaro model postulates that migration proceeds in response to 
urban-rural differences in expected income rather than actual earnings. That decision is 
taken in order to maximize their expected gains in life and, for a given time horizon 
urban areas might therefore be a rational alternative. In other words, if coping and 
adaptive capacity of vulnerable economic agents is exceeded in their locations to get their 
expected earnings, they find emigration to higher income regions to be their best strategy, 
even despite the presence of restriction to labor mobility and hard conditions to cross 
international borders. 
 
As emigration determinants, our model includes changes in share of population 
earning up to 2 minimum salaries, access to credit, natural disasters frequency, cropping 
advantages, education level, and distance to the closest trading center. Unlike the 
previous model, we are here emphasizing disasters recurrence to underline the relevance 
of disasters repetition in influencing expectations. The empirical evidence of the previous 
chapter of this thesis shows that a municipality can register high economic losses but they 
may be due to just one major event affecting incomes but households do not necessarily 
perceive it as a threat for the future. If that is a low-frequency-disaster municipality, 
disasters are not necessarily altering future incomes expectations. For that reason, we use 
cumulated number of disasters reports instead of economic losses. Credit availability in 
those regions may counteract the chain-reaction triggered by recurrent disasters, 
regenerating expectations of future incomes. Access to credit is included to account for a 
representative (financial) coping strategy which may counteract reductions in the 
capital/labor ratio following disasters and improve expectations. An adverse productive 
structure is depicted through high ratios of (price-dropping) grains to (price-rising) 
vegetables, included in the variable GRAVE. Education level and distance to trading 
centers are included in order to examine the propensity to emigrate of the less educated 
population and the role of proximity to urban centers in facilitating out migration. 
So, the model of emigration, EM, is shown in equation (5) below: 
 
LnEMi = α0 +β1iΔLIPi   + β2iLnCREi + β3i LnNDRi + β4iGRAVEi + β5iLnEDUCSECi +  
+ β6iLnDISTi + εi           (5) 
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The model variables are defined as follows: 
LnEM, Emigration. This variable is an estimation of the share of municipal 
population 12 years and over which has emigrated between 1990 and 2000, according to 
the 2000 national household survey of INEGI. 
 
ΔLIP, Low Incomes Population Increase. This variable depicts impoverishment 
increase. It is the increase between 1990 and 2000 in the percentage of municipal 
workforce with incomes below two minimum salaries (2000 constant prices). In fact, this 
variable does not reflect poverty itself, but the deterioration in individuals’ incomes. 
Indeed, the greatest incomes reductions took part in the less marginalized regions of the 
country (see Appendix 6.II) though their repercussions on emigration are greater among 
the most marginalized, as shown below. 
 
LnCRE, Credit. It represents the number of agricultural units out of the municipal 
total with access to credit. This variable depicts the access of agricultural units to 
financing, which is crucial after natural disasters to rebuild and continue making use of 
their assets, as well as to face price fluctuation and in general incomes uncertainty. Credit 
access has a negative impact on emigration, most likely due to its virtue in re-stimulating 
expectations of future incomes within the same location as it allows continuity in assets 
usage. 
 
LnNDR, Number of Disasters Reports. This variable is the count of natural 
disasters which have hit a municipality over the period 1990-2000, that is, the recurrence 
level of disaster affectation by municipality. Regions with higher frequency of natural 
disasters are more prone to out migration. If instead, one runs the model with per capita 
economic losses from natural disasters, the coefficient is positive as well but statistically 
insignificant. Indeed, these two variables measure different things, since whereas the 
latter has a clear impact on incomes, confirmed in the low-incomes model, the former is 
capable of influencing the perception of natural disasters in the community. It is verified 
in Chapter 6, where communities with comparatively lower economic losses but more 
frequent natural disasters more interviewee have plans to emigrate. In contrast, in 
communities with even higher economic losses but less frequent disaster events, the wish 
to emigrate is smaller. 
 
GRAVE, Ratio Basic Grains to Vegetables. It is the ratio of production in tons of 
the five main grains of the Mexican agriculture to the ten main vegetables. Given the 
structure of the Mexican agriculture, the grain producers are worse-off to compete by the 
remarked decline in price of grains and the dramatic increase in imports of the same 
commodities from the USA. From its part, the country presents clear comparative  and 
competitive advantages in vegetables. High values in this variable mean weak trade 
competitiveness in a municipality, as well as low values mean even potential to export, as 
the country has clear advantage in vegetables compared to the USA and Canada (see 
Lederman 2003). Indeed, this variable may also depict a kind of intra-branch negative 
terms of trade, given the declining trend of the relative price of grains to vegetables along 
the past two decades in Mexico (ECLAC 2006).  
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LnEDU and LnDIST are the variables of secondary education and distance to 
trading centers as defined in the previous model. 
 
6.5.1 The emigration model specification 
As in the incomes model we begin with the OLS regression. There are clear 
indications of spatial dependence, dominated by spatial error dependence, and also 
heteroskedasticity. However, once again the spatial error model is not the correct one 
since the common factor hypothesis is rejected. This leads us to estimate a spatial Durbin 
model, adjusted for groupwise heteroskedasticity, grouped by the two categories of 
marginalization. The goodness of fit is initially 25%, and 55% (Sq.corr) after 
specification correction. 
 
 
Table 18: Spatial regression results of emigration, global model 
 
Variables/tests(*) (1) OLS 
(2) 
ML-
Error 
(3) 
ML-err, 
Het 
(4) 
Spatial 
Durbin 
(5) 
Spatial 
Durbin 
Het 
ρ    0,672*** 0,671*** 
λ   0,699*** 0,698***   
Constant 0,479*** 0,679*** 0,666*** 0,021 -0,004 
ΔLIP 0,007*** 0,006*** 0,005*** 0,005*** 0,005*** 
LnCRED -0,054*** -0,011 -0,010 -0,003 -0,003 
GRAVE 0,000 -0,000 -0,000 0,000 0,000 
LnNDR 0,099*** 0,107*** 0,103*** 0,107*** 0,104*** 
LnDIST 0,001 -0,007 -0,006 -0,005 -0,005 
LnEDU 0,30*** 0,203*** 0,206*** 0,191*** 0,194*** 
C_ΔLIP    -0,003** -0,003*** 
C_LnCRED    -0,030** -0,030** 
C_GRAVE    0,000 0,000 
C_Ln_NDR    -0,084*** -0,086*** 
C_LnDIST    0,011 0,012 
C_LnEDU    -0,006 -0,003 
Gr. Variance_0   0,184***  0,181*** 
Gr. Variance_1   0,157***  0,155*** 
R2 0,25 0,15 0,15 0,44 0,43 
R2adj 0,25     
Sq.corr. 0,27 0,24 0,24 0,55 0,55 
LIK -1846,84 -1372,20 -1236,15 -1349,81 -1347,80 
AIC 3707,69 2758,39 2486,30 2727,62 2723,60 
Sig-sq 0,27 0,16  0,16  
Heterosk. Random, (Koenker-
Basset) 
16,99***     
Hetersk. Marginalization, 
(Koenker-Basset) 
4,74**     
Heterosk._Random 
(Spatial Breuch Pagan) 
 24,22***  66,82***  
Heterosk_Marginalization 
(Spatial Breuch Pagan) 
   3,93**  
Lik. Ratio. Heterosk.   272,09***  4,02** 
 150
LM-Error 1265.83***     
LM-Error, Robust 73,81***     
LM-Lag 1247,12***     
LM-Lag, Robust 55,10***     
Common Factor (Wald)  37,46***    
Lik. Ratio. weight matrix  949,30***  883,96***  
LM on sp.Lag  18,16***    
LM on sp. Error    101,91***  
(*) *** if prob. < 0.001; ** if prob. < 0.01; * if prob. < 0.05; blank otherwise 
 
Controlling for marginalization 
The data was for this estimation divided into two subgroups based on the 
categorization of marginalization, shown in Table 19. The test of the residuals from the 
OLS estimation points to a spatial lag model. For completeness, we also estimate a spatial 
Durbin model to capture exogenous spillovers.  
 
 
Table 19: Spatial regression results of emigration by subsets of marginalization 
 
 
 
 Variables/tests(*) 
(1) 
OLS-Marg 
(2) 
ML-Lag 
(3) 
Spatial 
Durbin, 
Marg 
ρ  0,633*** 0,648*** 
Constant 1,704*** 1,03*** 1,443*** 
ΔLIP 0,001 -0,004 -0,005 
LnCRED -0,064*** -0,014 0,010 
GRAVE 0,001 0,000 0,003* 
LnNDR 0,196*** 0,114*** 0,126*** 
LnDIST 0,004 -0,009 -0,008 
LnEDU -0,103* -0,062 -0,045 
C_ΔLIP   0,002 
C_LnCRED   -0,045 
C_GRAVE   -0,003 
C_Ln_NDR   -0,037 
C_LnDIST   -0,016 
N
O
N
-M
A
R
G
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A
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ZE
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C_LnEDU   -0,161* 
Constant 0,263*** -0,089 -0,256** 
ΔLIP 0,006*** 0,002*** 0,005*** 
LnCRED -0,035*** -0,014* 0,002 
GRAVE 0,001 0,000 -0,000 
LnNDR -0,031 -0,003 0,054** 
LnDIST 0,018** 0,010* 0,005 
LnEDU 0,326*** 0,207*** 0,209*** 
C_ΔLIP   -0,004*** 
C_LnCRED   -0,020 
C_GRAVE   0,001 
C_Ln_NDR   -0,115*** 
C_LnDIST   0,024*** 
 
M
A
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C_LnEDU   0,018 
 Chow Test: 21,90*** 87,02*** 112,19*** 
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 Constant 34,47*** 32,73*** 39,18*** 
 ΔLIP 2,40 5,85** 9,51*** 
 LnCRED 1,68 0,00 0,08 
 GRAVE 0,37 0,01 1,64 
 LnNDR 29,64*** 12,46*** 3,47* 
 LnDIST 1,63 4,55** 1,89 
 LnEDU 44,80 27,76*** 21,37*** 
 C_ΔLIP   2,69 
 C_LnCRED   0,43 
 C_GRAVE   2,76* 
 C_LnNDR   1,79 
 C_LnDIST   5,89** 
 C_LnEDU   3,79** 
 R2 0,29 0,46 0,47 
 R2adj 0,29   
 Sc.corr  0,55 0,57 
 LIK -1772,09 -1327,60 -1294,26 
 AIC 3572,17 2685,21 2642,52 
 Sig-sq 0,25 0,16 0,15 
 Hetersk. Marginalization, 
(Koenker-Basset) 
0,00   
 Heterosk_Marginalization 
(Spatial Breuch Pagan) 
 0,05 0,06 
 Lm-Error 1151,86***   
 LM-Error, Robust 65,08***   
 LM-Lag 1156,86***   
 LM-Lag, Robust 70,08***   
 Lik. Ratio. weight matrix  888,97*** 801,86*** 
 LM on sp. Lag    
 LM on sp. Error  9,40*** 66,80*** 
(*) *** if prob. < 0.001; ** if prob. < 0.01; * if prob. < 0.05; blank otherwise 
  
6.5.2 Results interpretation 
Regions historically more frequently affected by natural disasters with relatively 
higher impoverishment and cropping price-declining products, register higher emigration 
rates. In addition, the higher emigration occurs in regions with higher educative levels 
from marginalized regions, confirming the presence of drain of population with higher 
human capital. The classical believe that reducing exceeding levels of workforce leads to 
increasing the marginal product of labor must be taken carefully in light of these results, 
given that the workforce remaining in the community is the least skilled. In addition, the 
distance is not a real obstacle to emigrate, given that most emigration arises from far 
communities.  
The positive sign of ΔLIP suggests that those municipalities whose workforce 
experienced higher moves down from superior wages levels to below the 2 minimum 
salaries line are more prone to out migration. From the regression results, the larger the 
impoverishment over the 1990s, the greater the emigration rate between 1990 and 2000. 
This coefficient is higher across non-marginalized municipalities. Indeed, they 
experienced comparatively less changes and decreases in incomes. However, 
marginalized municipalities have usually so low levels of wealth that additional incomes 
decreases turn asymptotically smaller, but compared to their assets value even a small 
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decrease might bring dramatic effects for their subsistence. Out migration is limited by 
factors in the surrounding municipalities, for instance, increasing poverty in neighboring 
municipalities of municipality i influences people not to migrate from i. 
The relevance of credit in stimulating emigration is not statistically significant in 
the global model. As the case of insurance, agricultural credit availability has 
dramatically decreased along the 1990s (ca. 80%), reducing its connection with incomes. 
For the though insignificant but positive sign of credit along marginalized regions we 
have some reasons to presume lack of credit to stimulate workforce emigration given that 
they recur directly to out migration to cope with adverse conditions as they cannot 
account for credit as a feasible coping strategy. 
However, we can observe a significant negative coefficient for the spatially 
lagged variable in Table 18. This means that having neighbors with comparatively higher 
credit access helps to maintain low emigration rates. As credit conventionally facilitates 
means to increase the risk pool, helping to smooth negative effects from hazards, a 
positive spillover effect from having neighbors with low losses may facilitate getting off-
farm jobs in the nearby, and not to recur immediately to out migration.  
Our results shows that high disasters frequency push people to move out from 
their municipalities, especially in non-marginalized regions. Other things equal, if the 
frequency of disasters increase by 10% the emigration rates rises 1% in that region. Out 
migration is limited by factors in the surrounding municipalities, captured through the 
negative coefficients of the corresponding spatially lagged variables in Table 18. For 
instance, a large number of disaster reports in surrounding regions influence people not to 
migrate, most likely due to the catch-up they can do, if they are less affected, after some 
producer prices of crops increases for scarcity.  
In turn, the frequency of natural disasters tends to make non-marginalized 
population comparatively more prone to out migrate, especially due to their combined 
characteristics of higher educational levels, and therefore more skilled to build a coping 
strategy given the absence of credit and other alternative financing sources. 
Though the ratio basic grains to vegetables (GRAVE) provides negligible results 
for the global model, the marginalization partition suggest that those non-marginalized 
regions cropping predominantly grains tend to significantly increase emigration levels. It 
is most likely explained by their greater involvement and participation in trade, whereas 
the most marginalized rely on self-consumption at a larger extent. Other things equal, a 
decrease of 10% in the ratio grains/vegetables in the less marginalized municipalities 
leads to a 3% decrease in out migration. 
As observed, education is positively related with emigration. So, emigrants arise 
from regions with comparatively higher educative mean. It suggests that less educated 
population is less prone to implement migration to cope with hazards either because they 
are more averse to change residence, has less means to do it, or has a resignation position 
given the recent past hierarchical governmental organization, more remarkable upon 
marginalized population –in many regions still going on. The prevailing fatalistic way of 
life of most subsistence farmers with low educative levels, abundantly expound in 
Thompson (et al 1990), provides further grounding for these results. 
In the marginalized municipalities, high out migration rates take place if they 
experienced remarkable increases in low-income population combined with high 
educative levels. Derived form the spatial Durbin model, for the non-marginalized 
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municipalities the amount of educated people within the surroundings reduces out 
migration. This could be because higher educated neighbors generate more economic 
activity and hence jobs in the region, or that the opportunities at home are already quite 
good. 
One had expected marginalized people close to big cities to keep higher proclivity 
as their distance and transport costs tend to decline as one approach large cities. 
Surprisingly, marginalized population from regions farer from trading centers seems to be 
more prone to emigrate. In light of the relative low access to transport in remote 
marginalized areas, that fact reflects the crucial role of migration networks. 
In sum, incomes lowering, disasters frequency and education proved to determine 
emigration with much sounder results than the rest of the variables in the global model. 
Roughly, the prototype of an emigration-prone municipality in this country may be result 
of the following characteristics combination: incomes substantially dropped over the past 
ten years, frequently affected by natural disasters, relatively more educated, marginalized, 
grains-intensive producer, and located in far regions with low access to credit. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
The models approached in this chapter confirmed the hypotheses. Economic 
losses from natural disasters, along with the adverse addressed economic conditions in 
the agricultural sector, have thus a negative economic impact with a spillover effect 
across this country. In a similar way as regional growth may be dependent on the growth 
in other regions, so the negative effect of disasters on local incomes has spillover on 
incomes in other municipalities. Disaster effects are significant in explaining incomes 
along with possession and usage of assets, as well as with the availability of coping and 
adaptive instruments. The most vulnerable regions to natural disasters also experience an 
amplification of their negative consequences given their low insurance and irrigation 
levels, positively related with maintaining low-incomes. Having less vulnerable 
neighbors seems not to be a benefit for those more vulnerable. Derived from these 
evidences, it cannot be expected to get filtered some benefits from better- to worst-off 
population just by laissez faire. The current entitlements systems in the country may lye 
behind that. Strengthening risk transfer (e.g. insurance) and risk reduction (e.g. irrigation) 
instruments besides building a more favorable productive environment (e.g. productive 
reorientation) is particularly valuable for marginalized municipalities. Failing in these 
tasks seems to have been crucial in impeding sufficient physical and human capital 
accumulation during the 1990s, and probably over the present decade too since these 
conditions have not significantly changed. 
From its part, enhancing terms of trade and transport infrastructure may greatly 
benefit both groups, but apparently more remarkably to the less marginalized as they are 
comparatively more involved in the monetary economy. Once reduced substantially the 
vulnerability to disasters and production of subsistence farmers, the next step should be to 
integrate them rapidly into the commercial agriculture. It may allow sharing more equally 
the benefits of any large investment in transport infrastructure and further trade facilities, 
as well as raising their incomes based on a more profit-oriented productive structure. It 
may allow them in accumulating assets and so to enlarge their risk pool to cope better 
with forthcoming hazards. 
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Emigration was proved in this model to be a result of expectations of future 
incomes. Emigration is a rational decision the economic agents take based on their own 
estimated future returns of their assets, accounting for expected net assets and incomes 
losses after internalizing available financial resources. Municipalities with higher 
emigration rates have been those with greater incomes decreases, each time more 
recurrently affected by natural disasters over the 1990s. The model suggests that 
expanding access to agricultural credit may reduce the stimulus to emigrate, most likely 
as it reduces the negative hazards impacts inside the affected region. The most 
significantly prone segment to out migrate is that with higher educative levels, 
marginalized and living far from trading centers, underlining the role of networks in 
facilitating labor mobility despite remoteness. As the current transport infrastructure is 
proving not supporting them sufficiently to compete as economic agent, they are using it 
rather to emigrate. 
This works geographic identification of vulnerable regions may support public 
decisions for future investments in expanding crop insurance coverage, credit access, and 
promoting more public works in infrastructure in vulnerable areas. As observed in these 
models, the contribution of natural disasters to incomes is, by far, exceeding the current 
response to cope with that. In turn, the negative effects of unfavorable liberalizing 
policies cannot be counteracted just through aid for the poor. Finally, the current 
investments in education will continue rendering as a mere instrument for training 
potential emigrants as long as a reform to allow assets accumulation and consequently to 
reduce social polarization does not take place in this country. 
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Appendix 6.I: How to introduce spatial data into the econometric notation? 
 
The transformation of relative location information of contiguity into a weights 
matrix is the most employed way to relate the observations to each other in a network. 
Measures of contiguity rely on knowledge of the size and shape of the observational units 
such as municipality polygons depicted on a map. With that we can define which units 
are neighbours (have borders that touch) or represent observational units in reasonable 
proximity to each other using longitude and latitude.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, assume that we are dealing with a geographic area 
comprised of five-regions, as shown in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Conceptual representation of regions’ contiguity 
 
 
To construct the weights matrix, we record in each row of that matrix a set of 
contiguity relations associated with all regions, giving a value 1 to the wij element if 
region i borders to region j, 0 otherwise. All regions’ connections may finally be 
represented in the following matrix: 
 
 
 
2 
5 
1 
3 
4 
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W =    
01100
10100
11001
00001
00110
                            (1) 
 
 
For instance, the element in the row 1, column 3 means that region 1 shares border with 
region 3, as seen in Figure 32, and so on for every element in the matrix W. This matrix 
is symmetric and always has zeros on the main diagonal – because one region has no 
border with itself. To start applying this matrix, it must first be transformed to have row-
sums of unity, conventionally called “standardized first-order” contiguity matrix (LeSage 
1998), which can be denoted as C: 
 
 
 
 
C =     
02/12/100
2/102/100
3/13/1003/1
00001
002/12/10
                       (2) 
 
 
We may now multiply C by a vector of observations of any variable -concerning 
the five regions of this simplified example- which we label y (5X5 matrix).97 The product 
(Cy) represents a new variable, equal to the mean of observations from contiguous 
regions, which we denote as y*, expressed as follows:  
 
 
 
*
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*
4
*
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*
2
*
1
y
y
y
y
y
     =      
05.05.000
5.005.000
33.033.00033.0
00001
005.05.00
       
5
4
3
2
1
y
y
y
y
y
    (3) 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 In our case of study model, both W and C matrices’ size is 2,443 by 2,443. 
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              (4) 
 
 
So,  
 
iy = )( jyf ,  j ≠ i 
 
Equation (4) may also be expressed in linear form in order to explain changes in y 
across space.   
 
    
ερ += Cyy        (5) 
 
 
Where ρ depicts a regression parameter and ε  represents the stochastic error of 
the model. The parameter ρ shows the spatial spill over between neighbours in the data, 
reflecting the average influence of neighbouring on observations in the vector y. So, it 
enables us to estimate the share of total variation in y explained by spatial dependence 
(LeSage 1998). The Spatial Lag model as in equation (5) is an appropriate solution when 
spatial correlation appears among observations of the dependent variable.  
 
Now, we can add explanatory variables to shape our model, representing it with 
the traditional matrix notation Xβ. So, the model equation (5) can be modified as follows: 
 
                    εβρ ++= XCyy                      (6) 
 
 The inclusion of a spatial lag is equivalent to include an endogenous variable on 
the right hand side of the equation in systems of simultaneous equations. This would not 
be a problem if  ρ  was known, but most of the time ρ  must be estimates simultaneously 
jointly with the other regression parameters. This means that estimation using OLS is 
inconsistent. The solution is estimation through maximum likelihood or the instrumental 
variables approach.  
 Another kind of spatial dependence occurs when the residuals are spatially 
correlated with the dependent variable. This kind of dependence occurs when values of 
adjacent observations move in the same direction because they have common or 
correlated unobservable variables. That is, lack of independence of the error between 
observations –as in temporal econometrics- would lead to inefficient estimates if ignored. 
The Spatial Error Model (Cliff and Ord 1972) as in equation (6) by means of a partition 
of the stochastic term into two parts, together with a spatially weighted matrix. In the 
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case of spatial dependence present in the residuals we solve this problem by dividing the 
error term into two parts and incorporate the spatial error dependence in a similar way as 
before. The estimation method is maximum likelihood or generalized method of 
moments.  
 
εβ += Xy    
μελε += C    (7) 
 In (7), λ is the spatial autoregressive parameter, C is the weights matrix, and μ  is 
a vector of i.i.d. errors with variance 2σ . 
 
A first step to test for presence of spatial dependence is to make exploratory data 
analysis to find indications of spatial autocorrelation, present in the data. We must thus 
test whether objects of similar values are more clustered than by mere coincidence. This 
is done using the Moran’s I test with a null hypothesis of no spatial clustering (Moran 
1948, Cliff and Ord 1981, Upton and Fingleton 1985). The second step is to examine and 
solve for spatial dependence in the regression analysis. The classical estimation routine 
towards a proper model specification under the potential influence of spatial dependence 
is, for instance, Lagrange Multiplier tests, given in Florax et al. (2003). The initial model 
is estimated by means of OLS. The residuals are then used to test the hypothesis of no 
spatial dependence caused by an omitted spatial lag or by spatially autoregressive errors 
by use of two Lagrange Multiplier tests (the LM-lag test and the LM-error test), e.g., 
Anselin (1988) and Burridge (1980). When the hypothesis cannot be rejected (no spatial 
dependence is at hand) meaning that the results from the OLS may be used. However, in 
the event that the hypothesis is, by both tests rejected, a new model should be estimated. 
The proper model is indicated by the most significant LM test. In case that only the LM-
lag test is significant, the next step would be to estimate a Spatial Lag Model, or, 
consequently, a Spatial Error Model if the opposite is indicated. 
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Appendix 6.II: The official minimum salary in Mexico, a biased welfare indicator 
 
This paper model makes use of an income-based measurement of vulnerability, 
whose link with poverty addresses this appendix. Further, it analyzes the evolution of real 
incomes (1 minimum salary) over the 1990s and describes its spatial distribution across 
Mexico in 2000. We show that appearing reductions in number of people earning below 
one minimum salary is indeed not reflecting welfare improvements once considered the 
devaluation of one minimum salary over time. 
 
Poverty 
There exists no consensus about what issues embraces poverty. However, a point 
of agreement among the vast existing literature on this regard seems to be that poverty is 
a lack of opportunities to reach a basic minimum level of well being. In turn, well-being 
can include several determinants, i.e., assets, infrastructure, social networks, institutions, 
human development, etc. This leads us to another point of agreement: poverty is a 
relative concept of “minimums of well being” (as in SEDESOL 2002), “society’s hopes 
and aspirations to be fulfilled” (World Bank 2001), or “basic needs” (Todaro 2000), what 
varies widely among and within societies. Other concepts of poverty go beyond tangible 
factors and include rights issues, relationships, powerlessness, socioeconomic exclusion, 
and even loss of dignity (i.e. Elankumaran et al 2000).  
 
Income and consumption criteria 
Among measurements of poverty, there are two basic criteria: income and 
consumption. Income-based measurements of poverty embrace the total current monetary 
and non-monetary income a household obtains from different functional sources, 
including wages, salaries, dividends, rents, etc. Consumption-based criterions consist of 
the total amount of monetary and non-monetary expenditure a household makes in all 
possible items. The advantage of using consumption-based measurements of poverty 
relies on the fact that it can reflect smoothing strategies a household implement in 
response to sudden income fluctuations. The use of income-based measurements is 
advantageous in that of allowing identifying income components whose strengthening 
can help to reducing vulnerability. Though the Ministry of Social Development at the 
Federal Mexican Government (SEDESOL) elaborates both measurements, only data of 
income measurements are available at municipality level. 
For these reasons and in sight of the present work’s aim, we make use of low-
incomes criterion. As this measurement of poverty leaves out household’s assets, we 
include it in the model as explaining variable within the variable ‘marginalization’. The 
low-incomes line approached in this appendix is similar to the $1 per day standard 
criterion at Purchasing Power Parity (or absolute PPP dollar –Chan and Ravillion 2004). 
Given data availability, our low-incomes line is one official minimum salary, equivalent 
to average 2.3 US dollars during the period 1990-2000 (1990 constant prices), similar to 
the 2.1 exchange rate from the World Bank (1993 constant prices). This work’s low-
income line consists of incomes equal or below 1 Minimum Salary (MS) by worker.  
 
1. Minimum Salary across time and space 
Before starting analyzing data, it is important to consider two facts. First, the aim 
of defining this low-income line in real terms is not to provide one more poverty measure 
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of Mexico, but to allow us to identify spatially municipalities with low incomes and 
decreasing incomes in real terms. Whereas low incomes and poverty may keep similar 
geographic distribution, but changes in real incomes over the 1990s may diverge. In 
addition, this analysis is not accounting for the entire population living with less than one 
absolute PPP dollar, but with those workers earning less than that: consider that usually 
one worker still has to share his earned dollar with the rest of the family. Indeed, this 
analysis deals with just income and not with poverty itself. Secondly, a 30% real 
depreciation of Mexican general minimum salary (GMS) took place during the period 
1990-2000 according to the International Labor Organization (ILO 2005). We had to 
modify the original municipal data by transforming minimum salary (MS) from nominal 
to real terms in order to obtain comparable low-incomes shares over a ten-year horizon. 
The latter provides a more realistic picture of the share of workers below the low-income 
line. Since the ILO estimations tend to smooth the MS depreciation in Mexico to 
harmonize within Latin-American countries, we made our own estimations. According to 
this work’s estimations, the real MS depreciation reaches 39% (see Table below). 
 
Table 20: Minimum Salary (MS) 1990-2000 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Nominal 
MS 
(MXP/day) 
Nominal 
Var. MS 
(year 
before) 
Inflation 
rate (%) 
Var. real 
MS (*) 
(%) 
Real MS, 
MXP/ day, 
(constant 
1990) 
1990 9.14 16.66 24.62 -7.96 8.41 
1991 10.79 18.03 25.02 -6.99 7.82 
1992 12.08 12.03 16.73 -4.71 7.46 
1993 13.06 8.08 10.45 -2.37 7.28 
1994 13.97 6.97 7.12 -0.15 7.27 
1995 15.85 13.42 24.02 -10.59 6.50 
1996 19.55 23.35 41.42 -18.06 5.32 
1997 24.30 24.33 23.34 0.98 5.38 
1998 27.99 15.19 15.37 -0.19 5.37 
1999 31.91 14.01 18.00 -4.00 5.15 
2000 35.12 10.06 10.08 -0.02 5.15 
Average 19.43 14.74 19.65 -4.91 6.46 
Var. 
1990/2000 284.29       -38.77 
Sum   162.11 216.17 -54.05 71.10 
Elaborated with data from Comision Nacional de Salarios Minimos, 
BANXICO and INEGI  
 (*) Discounting annual inflation rate. 
 
Whereas in nominal terms accumulated growth of GMS is 162% between 2000 
and 1990, in real terms (discounting 216% accumulated inflation rate) it dropped 54%. 
Real MS at constant prices 1990 decreases nearly 40%. One can observe the dramatic fall 
in real value of minimum salary in 1995 and 1996 -column (4)-, which coincides with the 
Mexican financial-economic crisis started in 1994. Though the federal government 
increases minimum salary, these increments do not always keep proportion with prices 
increments, what explains its depreciation in real terms. 
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In addition, we found different results in shares of labor force earning 1MS when 
taking minimum salary in nominal and real terms. In nominal terms, the share of labor 
force with income below 1MS decreased by 22% over this period (poverty reduction), but 
if one uses real minimum salary, the share of national population with incomes below 
1MS increases 13% (poverty rise) –see Table below. 
 
Table 21: Changes in workers income below 1 Minimum Salary (1990/2000) 
 
Workers income < 1 
GMS 
 
(% of workforce) 
199013 28 
2000 22 
Real 2000 41 
Difference 2000/1990 -6 
Difference Real 2000/ 1990  
 
These estimations diverge with those from the World Bank’s PovcalNet. 
According to this on-line calculation tool, the percentage of national population living 
below the poverty line in Mexico in 1990 was 17%. The estimation for year 2000 from 
PovcalNet drops to 10%, contrasting with our rise to 41%. Two remarks may explain this 
fact: first, here we are dealing with exclusively workforce, whereas PovcalNet’s poverty 
line embraces total population. Secondly, given the increased labor market flexibility in 
Mexico since the end of the 80s (De la Garza 1990, De Buen 1989), employed people 
receives each time lower remunerations from usually eventual jobs –paid either by 
worked hours or even by hour-fraction98. These changes in labor remunerations have 
been responding more to industries’ workforce requirements, pressing for short-term –if 
any- contracts, as well as to smooth unemployment rise. The observed syndicates’ 
weakening during this period was the key in achieving that (Perez 2002, Garabito 1995). 
One has also to account for the labor force growth over the 1990s, which has by far 
exceeded labor demand. As further explained, increases in jobs demand make pressure to 
reducing salaries, other things equal, in order to contain unemployment rise.99 
 
2. Distribution of employed population by salary levels 
Figure 2 shows the aggregate picture of labor force by levels of salary. This 
graphic relates, on the x-axis, levels of salary with, on the y-axis, percentage of labor 
force. The curve presents accumulated values. The blue line represents incomes 
distribution in 1990, and the red line incomes distribution in 2000. Comparing these 
curves, one can observe an improvement, especially for low-salaries workers, as the 
curve displaces to the right. It reflects the fact that, for instance, in year 1990, 80% of 
national employed population was earning 2.9 MS, and for 2000 they achieved to earn up 
to 4.0 MS. In this perspective, this incomes distribution curves seem to have improved 
                                                 
98 This kind of salary flexibility fits with the neoclassical approach of labor markets, where wages adjust as 
the marginal productivity of labor in a perfectly competitive economy. This fact rise arguments to associate 
reductions in the capital/labor ratio with low salaries, as further applied in the next section. See Krugman 
and Obstfeld 2006 and Sala-i-Martin 2000. 
99 Note that real salary depreciation is a plausible measure to employ exceeding labor force only in sectors 
with high elasticity of substitution labor-capital, further explained. 
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incomes for all cumulated percentiles of workers between 1990 and 2000 –in general 
measured by its displacement to the right. However, if one adjust salaries to inflation (as 
in the previous section), this distribution changes substantially. The red dotted line 
represents real incomes distribution in year 2000. Taking into account the ca. 40% 
depreciation of the minimum salary once adjusted for inflation, the leftwards 
displacement of the curve shows that if the minimum salary were adjusted for inflation, 
80% of the national population has reduced incomes from 2.9 to 2.5 minimum salaries, 
and so on for other employed population shares. In addition, comparing earnings 
distribution curves of real 2000 and 1990 in Mexico, the real 2000 curve has a 
comparatively (to 1990) higher slope between 0 and 2 MS, representing a higher 
concentration of people below this threshold than before. Put in terms of a population 
pyramid of incomes, it is equal to an enlargement of the base.  
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Figure 33: Distribution of workforce remunerations by minimum salaries (cumulative) 
 
3. Spatial distribution of low income 
At national level, 41% of labor force earned less than 1 minimum salary in 2000, 
bringing down 13% of labor force from upper levels from 1990 to 2000. At state level, 
the 32 states of Mexico increased this share during the 1990s. Southern states register the 
highest shares of labor force earning less than 1 minimum salary (2 USD a day), 
remarkably high in Chiapas (71%), Oaxaca (65%), Veracruz (58%) and Guerrero (57%). 
The lowest percents correspond to states in the north of the country, namely those 
bordering the USA: Baja California (16%), Nuevo Leon (21%) and Coahuila (25%). 
From that fact, we deduce that this difference is influencing the northwards pattern of 
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domestic emigration during the 90s in Mexico.100 The states with highest increases in 
share of labor force earning below 1 minimum salary between 1990 and 2000 are 
Morelos (24%), Colima (22%), Nayarit (22%), and Veracruz (21%), located in the West 
and South of the country. Although these states have shares of low-income labor around 
the national mean, but this worsening along this period shows signs of vulnerability as 
putting additional population below the 2USD a day poverty line. Except for Veracruz, 
the change in the poorest Mexico’s states -Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero- show 
moderate increases, most likely because further incomes reductions seem to turn smaller 
as approaching the bottom. From its part, Veracruz presents both high share of low-
incomes labor force (3rd. place) along with dramatic increase in low income labor force 
shares over this period (4th. place) –see chart below. As observed, low incomes 
characterize historically marginalized regions, but the highest decreases in incomes are 
taking place along non-extreme poor regions.  
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Figure 34: Share of low income workforce in 2000 and change 2000/1990 
 
4. Final comments 
Roughly, the southern states register the highest shares of workforce with incomes 
below one minimum salary, whereas the north has the lowest. Besides, the highest per 
capita disasters losses regions, relative to insurance access, are located in the south, 
which may be explaining the northwards pattern of migration in Mexico. The real 
depreciation of the minimum salary of the 1990s was more noticeable in non-
marginalized regions as they are more dependent of monetary incomes, but also because 
                                                 
100 For an analysis on labor remunerations increase in the North of Mexico possibly linked with 
Maquiladoras in the framework of the North America Free Trade Agreement, see Lederman et al. (2003). 
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additional reductions in real incomes in marginalized regions imply small monetary 
variations. The highest increases in shares of workforce earning below 2 minimum 
salaries are in non poor states, surely explained by their higher value of their assets. 
These results warn about the relevance of strengthening the implementation of adaptive 
instruments of the poor but also of the non-poor but highly exposed, unless one does not 
wish to enlarge poverty. 
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Appendix 6.III Variables Maps 
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Figure 35: Percentage of agricultural units with insurance coverage 
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Figure 36: Percentage of agricultural units with credit access 
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Figure 37: Irrigation 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Marginalization 
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Figure 39: Workforce below two minimum salaries in 2000 (%) 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Per capita economic losses from natural disasters (1990-2000, constant 2000) 
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Figure 41: Map of residuals from the incomes model using OLS 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Map of residuals from the incomes model using Durbin 
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Appendix 6.IV: Notes concerning data basis and series construction 
 
 
 
The natural disasters data used for this case of study are reports of disasters from LaRed 
and CENAPRED, complemented with extrapolations based on registers from other 
agencies. The integration and harmonization of these two data sources was made as 
follows: 
 
1. It added reports of disasters from CENAPRED to LaRed data, trying to downscale 
state-level data to municipal level, when needed, by weighting with reference to 
particular criteria, depending on the case. It increased the data sampling in 20%, 
providing valuable data on mainly economic losses from disasters and damaged 
hectares of crops. 
 
2. To make comparable monetary data, we transformed every observation regarding 
economic losses from disasters from current to year 2002 constant prices. 
 
 
3. One filtered and left out observations regarding anthropogenic disasters, forest 
fires.   
 
4. Observations at only state-level were distributed into municipalities by dividing 
state amounts by municipal population. 
 
5. In order to enlarge the sample size of economic losses, those observations without 
registers of loss but with number of hectares were included by estimating their 
monetary loss. Area was transformed into monetary losses by multiplying it by 
mean weighted price per ton ($/ton) and further by average yield (ton/ha). The 
latter increased 40% the number of observation for the variable economic losses 
from disasters (L). Mean weighted agricultural prices were based on registers of 
mean rural prices and production from SIACON (Subsistema de Informacion 
Agricola, -SAGARPA 2004). 
 
6. Hereafter, I filtered observations by decade, taking the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 
the period 2000-2002 separately. 
 
7. It estimated subtotals of each disasters-variable by municipality, so to get uniform 
series by municipality along decades in cumulated values. 
 
8. It standardized data code based on the INEGI municipal code, to be used as key to 
join data basis under the GeoDa and Arc-View softwares. So can the software 
identify and add variables columns to the final data basis. Also, I saved separately 
every decade as ‘dbf’ file, which enables it to be read by GIS software. 
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9. Shape file and variables tables are joint, ready to start model specification. 
Variables in the joint shp file include: share of labor by income classes, domestic, 
international and general emigration, population, irrigation, insurance, credit, 
marginalization index, etc.  
 
 
Table 22: Variables characteristics 
 
 
VARIABLE DATA CODE PERIOD UNIT 
GEOGRAPHIC 
AGGREGATION 
OBSERVA- 
TIONS 
LnLIP - 
Low Incomes 
Population  
2MS_00 2000 % of workforce, 
logarithm 
Municipality 2,443 
LnFA - 
Fixed Asstes 
lnFA89p1 1989 Pesos per capita, 
logarithm 
Municipality 2,443 
LnD- Losses 
from Natural 
Disasters  
lnLCS_P 1990-2000 Pesos per capita 
(constant 2000), 
logarithm 
Municipality 2,443 
ΔPA - 
Agricultural 
Prices 
Variation 
Pa_Var 1990 / 
2000 
Pesos/ton (over 440 
crops mean weight) 
State (set to 
municipalities) 
32 (2,443) 
LnDIST -
Distance to 
trading center 
lnMind 1990 Meters, logarithm Municipality 2,443 
LnINS - 
Insurance  
lnINS1 1990 Agricultural units with 
insurance (%),logarithm 
Municipality 2,443 
LnIRR - 
Irrigation 
lnIRR1 1990 Agricultural units with 
irrigation (%),logarithm 
Municipality 2,443 
LnEDU - 
Education 
Lned_s1 1990 % of 12 and older 
population with 
secondary, logarithm 
Municipality  
AGR – 
Agricultural 
D_Agri 1990 0 if non-agricultural 
mun., 1 otherwise 
Municipality 2,443 
EM – 
Emigration 
MIG_TOT 2000 % of 12 and older pop. 
outside birth 
municipality 
Municipality 2,443 
ΔLIP – 
Change in 
Low Incomes 
Population 
Dif_2rms 1990/2000 Difference in % of pop. 
below 2 minimum 
salaries 
Municipality 2,443 
LnCRE – 
Credit 
Ln_cred 1990 Agricultural units with 
credit access (%), 
logarithm 
Municipality 2,443 
LnNDR – 
Disaster 
reports 
Ln_reps1 1990-2000 Number of disasters 
reports, logarithm 
Municipality 2,443 
GRAVE – 
Grains/Vegeta
bles 
Grave00 2000 Volume ratio (tn) State (set to 
municipalities) 
32 (2,443) 
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Table 23: List of municipalities selected as main trading centers cities 
 
 
Acapulco de Juárez                Monterrey                                
Aguascalientes                       Morelia                                    
Ahome                                   Nogales                                    
Benito Juárez                         Nuevo Laredo                          
Cajeme                                   Oaxaca de Juárez                     
Campeche                              Paz, La                                     
Celaya                                    Piedras Negras                         
Centro                                    Puebla                                      
Chihuahua                              Querétaro                                 
Coatzacoalcos                        Reynosa                                   
Cuernavaca                            Salina Cruz                             
Culiacán                                 Saltillo                                     
Durango                                 San Luis Potosí                        
Guadalajara                            Tampico                                  
Guaymas                                Tapachula                                
Hermosillo                             Tepic                                        
Hidalgo del Parral                  Tijuana                                    
Irapuato                                  Toluca                                      
Iztapalapa                               Torreón                                    
Juárez                                     Tuxtla Gutiérrez                      
León                                       Veracruz                                  
Manzanillo                             Victoria                                    
Matamoros                             Xalapa                                     
Mazatlán                                Zacatecas                                 
Mérida     Zapotlán del Rey                     
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusions 
 
 
Vulnerability to natural disasters and market uncertainty in Mexico is 
significantly contributing to the enlargement of poverty and inequity. The current hazards 
management implementation is insufficient to cope with their negative outcomes, and the 
unfavorable productive and entitlement structures contribute to their amplification in 
particular geographic regions and economic sectors. Despite its novel design, the lack of 
penetration of disaster prevention instruments is endemic among the poor, and persists in 
rural areas. Although natural disasters and current trade conditions affect mainly the 
agricultural sector in this country, their negative impacts spill over to other regions and 
sectors. It justifies a more active public intervention that in turn reduces inequity. 
 
7.1 Hazards effects and public response 
 
The present dissertation proves that the number of people living in poor 
conditions is aggravated by disasters losses and dropping prices of the regional 
commodity. This dissertation, consequently, warns of the risk of an even larger 
percentage of the population falling below the poverty line in the future, given the current 
trend of increasing frequency and economic losses from natural disasters, as well as the 
decreasing agricultural prices in the country. 
 
The underestimation of the negative impact of climatic conditions is evidenced in 
the current social and productive expenditure distribution, which tends to ignore the 
protection of ex-ante assets of the most exposed population. Triggered by a vulnerable 
agriculture, the rural economy started a decomposition process during the past two 
decades, which has consequently stimulated out- migration to large cities and abroad. In 
order to counteract that process, this dissertation suggests not only expanding the 
coverage of disaster prevention measures, but simultaneously expanding productive 
infrastructure to boost productivity along with more favorable production projections 
(considering the relative price structure), and expanding credit access and risk-sharing 
mechanisms. 
 
The liberalizing economic policy of the last two decades has largely contributed 
to increasing that vulnerability, as described in Chapters 2 and 3. Lack of investments to 
expand irrigation and further physical infrastructure, rural credit reduction, and the 
reduced share of insured farmers seem to counteract by far the current aid to the poor. In 
addition, the governmental withdrawal of support for the countryside with infrastructure 
and commercialization facilities, may not only have increased poverty in the country (as 
there have not been realistic options to replace its intervention), but also indicated a 
certain naïveté on the government’s part., In comparison, Mexico’s trade counterparts 
continue to support their own countryside, both in the form of facilities and subsidies, 
increasing the trade deficit in that sector, and thus joining together to drop agricultural 
prices and rural incomes in turn. 
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7.2 Stakeholders views 
One of the main obstacles in carrying out public works to mitigate natural 
disasters losses is the current failed budgetary decentralization operation, as derived from 
the consultation with policymakers and authorities presented in Chapter 4. As it is 
mandatory for municipalities to identify their own disasters’ risk in order to apply for the 
corresponding federal fund, the incapacity of most of them in fulfilling that requirement 
leaves most of these resources unused. It follows that the obtained loans and funds aimed 
at disasters’ prevention are used mostly to finance current expenditure. 
 
The empirical evidence from the stakeholders’ interviews presented in Chapter 5 
shows that the complex economic-climatic process behind poverty is sharpened by 
pernicious political practices at the three administrative levels. The insufficient 
promotion of strategies from the federation and state governments fits with the 
asymmetric capacity among municipal authorities and results in a lack of action on the 
part of the authorities. The disaster reduction and productive re-orientation strategies are 
often unknown to local leaders and authorities in regions that are poor and frequently 
affected by natural disasters. In light of these facts, the preferred coping strategies of the 
affected community are often assistance from relatives and neighbors, complemented 
with governmental aid. After the initial shock of the disaster, no preventive action is 
mostly taken for future events.  The lack of planning for future events creates a vicious 
circle of economic vulnerability which pushes this population into an increasing state of 
poverty. 
 
The withdrawal of the government from supporting agricultural 
commercialization has not led to the expected emergence of efficient private market 
instruments, but to the proliferation of speculators and a number of trade intermediaries. 
Such conditions dissolve any possible benefit for farmers when agricultural prices soar. 
Something similar occurs with rural credit, currently commanded by informal loaners at 
dramatically high interest rates and disadvantageous granting conditions, evidenced in the 
surveyed communities of this dissertation. Communities more frequently affected by 
natural disasters and decreasing incomes during the past decade proved to be the most 
likely to view and implement out- migration as a coping strategy. Indeed, the 
communities more prone to emigrate are not the poorest ones of the sample. It suggests 
that the will to emigrate responds to negative expectations of future agricultural incomes 
rather than to poverty itself. However, the economic dynamism of the urban economy in 
the area is too modest to absorb them forcing them to emigrate farther, even encouraging 
emigration abroad, as can be seen in the migration model in Chapter 6. The dramatic 
proliferation in the last five years of bus companies in the surveyed region, exclusively 
offering trips to the Mexico-USA border support this trend. Ironically, Mexican migrants 
work predominantly in the agricultural sector in the USA, contributing to an increase in 
productivity by lowering labor costs and in turn boosting agricultural exports to Mexico. 
 
According to stakeholders’ views, assets accumulation of individual households 
(both physical and human) along with building more favorable entitlements is crucial for 
reducing poverty in the region, and current social polarization in turn. More credit access 
and favorable market re-orientation based on crops diversification and rotation have been 
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shown to be the most effective instruments to increase expectations among surveyed 
farmers and thus to lessen migration. Nevertheless, the benefit of insurance could not be 
conclusively tested given its widespread absence. In addition, the overall prevailing 
mutual distrust among stakeholders and the institutions –most likely derived from a 
recent past of weak democracy- seems to be impeding the implementation of the right 
programs. 
 
7.3 The model 
The models presented in Chapter 6 confirm this dissertation’s hypotheses. 
Additionally, this modeling supports the decision-making process in issues concerning 
poverty, migration and disasters’ vulnerability by levels of geographic desegregation for 
the whole country. It analyzes the effect of relevant determinants of income: productive 
infrastructure, price structure, financing instruments, asset distribution and external 
shocks. Estimating the differential influence of hazards on the different municipalities of 
Mexico allows for a more accurate and impact-based public intervention. Forecasting the 
return of investments in a given municipality together with those in surrounding 
municipalities enables the setting of priorities based on the goal variables of the national 
development plan. The desegregation of the model allows analyzing the differential 
impact of a variable depending on the marginalization degree and location. It enables 
accounting for disparities between crucial dichotomies of the country: north-south, rich-
poor, and rural-urban. As observed, the negative impact of the analyzed hazards is higher 
among particular regions and sectors. It can be counteracted by strengthening 
households’ coping and adaptive capacity based on moving to a more favorable 
productive structure and improving the access to financial, physical and human assets. 
Most likely due to the current entitlements system, better-off economic agents do not 
filter benefits to the others. It calls for additional and more selective public investments to 
close the increasing inequity gaps according to the corresponding poverty determinants. 
 
In general, a marginalized population tends to be more vulnerable to weather-
related disasters, whereas a non-marginalized population is somewhat more affected by 
economic stressors. The higher reliance on self-consumption among marginalized 
populations explains that relation. Their lesser involvement in the monetary economy 
makes their subsistence more vulnerable to climatic conditions, whereas adverse 
productive and trade conditions are an obstacle from enrolling into the commercial 
agriculture, as they are unable to obtain production exceeding their basic needs on a 
regular basis. It impedes them from accumulating assets significantly to overcome 
poverty. Investments in instruments for reducing disaster loss possess comparatively 
higher benefits in reducing poverty across most marginalized regions, whereas enhancing 
intra-branch terms of trade and lowering transport costs brings greater benefits to those 
less marginalized. A public intervention biased to boost the commercial agriculture and 
reduce disaster loss in Mexico may limit poverty enlargement and sustain the domestic 
food supply. But given the spillover effect of poverty in Mexico, it will not be translated 
into permanent sustainable poverty reduction unless combined with substantial 
achievements in protecting and accumulating assets of subsistence farmers and the poor 
community in general. 
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The most significantly migration prone population segments in Mexico are those 
with considerable income decreases and a large frequency of disasters in the last ten 
years. In addition, they have comparatively higher education levels and arise from 
marginalized isolated regions. In absence of a promising welfare horizon, the benefits of 
education in remote areas are frequently wasted given the lack of opportunities to make 
use of such a human capital, subsequently drained through emigration. Public 
investments in productive infrastructure, financial support, and projecting to build a more 
favorable trade environment in these regions may counteract that trend –and in turn, 
reduce social pressure in urban areas and impasses at the Mexico-USA border. Networks 
of migrant traders prove to be crucial for labor mobility, evidenced by the usual remote 
origin of migrants. As long as transport infrastructure does not become an effective input 
to boost trade and productivity in rural areas, it will continue serving just as infrastructure 
for wetbacks trading. 
 
7.4 Further directions 
During this research, the remarkable governmental concern about poverty and 
inequity in Mexico was obvious. However, at the same time, the prevailing excessive 
belief in market instruments and confidence in budgetary decentralization seem to reduce 
the scope of the public intervention. It has opened the floor to a diversity of views 
concerning solutions to cope with hazards, often leading to implementing mutually 
annulling actions among public agencies at the three administrative levels or, perhaps 
worse, not implementing any. This is understandable if one considers the current lack of 
an integral vision concerning natural hazards and economic stressors from both the 
scientific, as well as the policy-making community. The findings from the present 
dissertation regarding poverty and development confirm the need for further analysis 
addressing the coupled economy-nature relations based on a cross-section analysis. 
Mexico needs to actively implement multiple interconnected municipal projects (both 
rural and urban) for reducing vulnerability to natural and economic hazards coordinated 
by the social development authority. These should be carried out based on a transparent 
and stakeholders-inclusive mechanism so as to optimize economic resources and at the 
same time make sure that progress becomes compatible with equity. 
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